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1 Introduction 
It is not a question of trusting China or not trusting it, but it is question, 
nevertheless, of realizing that China and India, two great countries, are going 
through enormous changes which are strengthening them, making them powerful 
modern states, and that they are next to each other and have to remain, for 
millennia to come, next to each other.
1
 
            - Jawaharlal Nehru 
Under the present favourable and peaceful international circumstances, China and 
India have a common responsibility to mankind – to develop. …Unless those two 
countries are developed, there will be no Asian century. No genuine Asia-Pacific 
century or Asian century can come until China, India and other neighbouring 
countries are developed.
2
 
            - Deng Xiaoping 
 
Both China and India are rapidly industrializing states and ascending powers in 
international politics. At the same time, they are neighbors that have emerged as   
modern states while tracing an ancient civilizational heritage. As they gain greater 
projection and salience in the world stage, one has reason to wonder and examine 
the interaction between these two Asian Giants and their resulting repercussions 
and implications. 
As nation states based on ancient civilizations, both China and India have 
much historical burdens and a strong national pride which coupled with 
geopolitical tensions that include territorial disputes, result in an uneasy 
relationship marked by general distrust. In the early days of the two republics, 
                                                 
1
 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches 1946-61, p.376, (New Delhi: The 
Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961). 
2
 “A new international order should be established with the five principles of peaceful coexistence 
as norms,” December 21, 1988, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3, Beijing: Foreign 
Languages Press, 1994. 
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however, their relationship contained signs of friendship and good will. It soon 
deteriorated in the face of a border dispute that led to the war of 1962, leaving 
behind an un-demarcated frontier between them. Relations between the two Asian 
giants since then remained detached and hostile. Constrained by the Cold War, the 
anticipated defreezing process of their relations was slow. While a normalization 
process started on the right track from the late 1980s following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, it suffered a temporary setback in 1998 following India’s nuclear 
weapons tests.  
As India and China entered the 21
st
 century, their relations continue to develop. 
After Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s landmark visit to China in June 
2003, the bilateral relations have entered a stage of overall development through a 
rapid development of economic ties. In this period, the relations tend to be 
multi-layered and multi-facetted. There exists a mixture of competition and 
cooperation, depending on the areas concerned. Often contradictory drivers 
overlapped in an area. For example, both countries are seeking energy for their 
development, thus leading to a competitive situation in energy security on the one 
hand; on the other hand, a number of India-China energy dialogues took place and 
at times both jointly bid for energy projects worldwide. While the competitive 
relations may very well continue to set the dominant tone in security area, there has 
been a substantial increase of cooperation in other areas such as economic relations, 
cultural and educational exchanges and regional and international affairs. 
The recent chapter in the development in India-China relations informs the 
core research questions of this work as well as its central puzzle: how to 
understand and explain current relations (the period from 2003 to 2012) 
mixed with both competition and cooperation? In order to answer this question, 
I will first look at the existing theoretical paradigms of international relations. 
Theories are based on a series of theoretical premises that set constraints on 
deploying arguments. In International Relations (IR) there are three main 
theoretical camps: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Realists see laws of 
nature compelling a recurrent struggle for power and survival. Based on this 
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premise, realists are generally pessimists who emphasize the element of 
competitiveness and rivalry between states. Liberalists are more optimistic. They 
highlight the importance of economic interdependence, international institutions 
and democratization in addition to power and interest that will change relationship 
between states to be a more cooperative one. According to Constructivists, it is 
because of pessimistic expectations that international politics tends to be 
competitive and violent, if people can think optimistically in terms of prospects, 
international cooperation is possible (Friedberg 2005). Hence, Constructivists tend 
to be optimists as they emphasize ideational factors. 
However, as Friedberg (2005) pointed out by using the case of US-China 
relations, analysts whose basic analytical premises place them in one of these three 
schools do not necessarily have similar views on one issue. It is possible to identify 
realists who believe the relationship will be peaceful, liberals who expect 
confrontation and conflict, and constructivists who think that things could go either 
way (Friedberg 2005: 10). According to Friedberg, causal mechanisms are at work 
simultaneously and important is the combined effects of those mechanisms. At any 
given moment, an interstate relationship can be pictured as residing somewhere 
along a spectrum that extends from pure cooperation at one extreme to pure 
competition on the other (see Figure 1-1). The relationship moves between a state 
in which the cooperative aspects dominate (Xa) and the one in which there is a 
larger element of competition (Xb). There are causal forces that are pushing an 
interstate relationship toward conflict (those emphasized by the pessimists) and 
other countervailing forces (emphasized by the optimists) that would tend towards 
cooperation (Friedberg 2005: 40). In a given period of time, one set of forces could 
be so powerful in its effects as to overwhelm the rest, making contending forces 
appear “wrong,” but it is also conceivable that the future will be shaped by a 
confluence of forces, some mutually reinforcing and others opposed (Friedberg 
2005: 10). Where the relationship stands depends either on the relative strength of 
those two causal vectors over time or on the shifting size and direction of the 
resultant vector that is produced by their collision (Friedberg 2005: 40). Hence, 
10 
 
Friedberg suggested that all of six positions (liberal pessimists and optimists, realist 
pessimists and optimists, and constructivist pessimists and optimists) are in some 
sense correct, at least to the extent that they identify causal mechanisms that are 
actually at work. 
 
Pure cooperation ------- Xa ------------------------Xb------Pure competition 
Forces tending toward conflict   Forces tending toward cooperation 
―Liberal pessimists      ―Liberal optimists 
―Realist pessimists      ―Realist optimists 
―Constructivist pessimists    ―Constructivist optimists   
Figure 1-1 Contending causal forces (Source: Friedberg 2005)
3
 
 
Such theoretical proposition tells us that research findings should not be 
self-evidently driven by the premise of the theoretical paradigm applied. The 
decisive factor is how the actual causal mechanisms work. For example, 
researchers who choose realist paradigm should carefully check how causal forces, 
both towards conflict and cooperation, work interactively at a given time instead of 
taking a pessimistic conclusion for granted. The same holds true for constructivists 
and liberals. Moreover, in developing a research, the subjectivity of a researcher 
also plays a constant role. It is worth remembering that any individual model is by 
definition a limited ‘construct’, only part of a bigger picture (Scott 2011: xxiii). 
Therefore, the recognition of the complementarity of different theories is very 
important in social-scientific inquiries. In other words, a deeper understanding of 
the dynamics of the Sino-Indian relations could only be achieved by taking 
considerations of other theoretical perspectives besides the preferred paradigm. 
                                                 
3
 Slightly changed by author. 
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1.1 Literature Review 
Major IR studies on Sino-Indian relations fall broadly into one of two main 
theoretical camps:  realism and liberalism.  Constructivism, which has gained 
popularity since the 1990s, has been seldom applied in the analysis of Sino-Indian 
relations.
4
 For a long time, realist views dominated the topic, not least because of 
the 1962 border conflict, emphasizing how conflict and competition between two 
Asian giants are inevitable.
5
 With the recent strengthening of India-China 
economic ties, a great number of works on economic relations from a liberal tone 
with emphasis on cooperation can be found.
6
 At the same time, some recent works 
attempt to bridge different theoretical approaches and analyse India–China 
relations through more eclectic frameworks.
7
 A case in point is the work of 
Holslag (2010), where he notices the analytical cleavage between realist scepticism 
and liberal optimism. However, his conclusion still falls into the realist camp as he 
writes: “even in an era of globalization the trading states of China and India are 
still stuck in a persistent security dilemma, and that in the end commerce tends to 
exacerbate rather than mitigate conflict” (Holslag 2010: 8). Besides works that 
position themselves in these three theoretical camps, there are a number of works 
around the India-China border dispute and works mainly from a historical 
perspective to document the development of India-China relations.
8
 
                                                 
4
 Lei (2004)’s work “From National Identity to National Security” and Li (2009)’s work “Security 
Perception and China-India Relations” belong to the few works in this category.  
5
 See for example, Malik (1999), Garver (2001), Dabhade & Pant (2004), Jain (2004), Lee (2002), 
Mohan (2003), Sachdeva (2006). The most influential work in realist school is John Garver’s 
Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. 
6
 See for example, Ramesh (2005), Rusko and Sasikumar (2007), Bhattacharyay and De (2005). 
7
 See for example, Athwal (2008), Holslag (2010). 
8
 Works on India-China border dispute see for example, Woodman (1969), Maxwell (1970), 
Vertzberger (1984), Hoffman (1990). Maxwell’s work is considered to be one of the most 
authoritative books on this topic, holding the view that India was not that innocent and China was 
not an aggressor. Hoffman’s work and Vertzberg’s work focus on the perception in Indian 
decision-making process over the 1962 border conflict. For works to document the development of 
the relations see Deepak (2005), India and China: 1904-2004; Jetly (1979), India-China Relations: 
1947-1977; Chaturvedi (1991), India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day. 
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1.2 Research Design 
My analysis of the current development of Sino-Indian relations is situated in a 
constructivist framework. Constructivism emphasizes the role of ideas and socially 
constructed reality. Adopting the position of theoretical complementarity, my 
approach is to treat different theoretical perspectives as ideas so as to integrate 
them into a constructivist framework. My work will be a contribution to the scarce 
constructivist literature on Sino-Indian relations. 
Broadly understood, a constructivist approach would base its explanation of a 
state’s foreign policy on the state political elites’ self-understandings about the 
national interests and identities rather than on a straightforward realpolitik 
calculation underwritten by a balance-of-power logic.
9
 These self-understandings 
should be understood within the cultural and historical context of the state and 
within the norms and values of a society under analysis. In terms of this 
understanding, my research inquiry begins with the two concepts of national 
identity and national interest. I will explore how national identity and interest 
play a role in the formulation of India’s and China’s foreign policy strategies, 
and discuss the implications of their mutual strategies on their relations, since 
India-China relations are very much determined by their mutual strategies. 
Focusing on the bilateral relations in the period from 2003 to 2012, I will ask the 
following sub-questions: What are India’s and China’s national identity and 
interest in the current international system? What are their perceptions of the other? 
What are their general foreign policy strategies that guide their diplomacy? And 
what are their foreign policy strategies towards the other? By answering these 
questions the explanation of my core research puzzle will be unfolded in a 
constructivist way. 
This thesis works on two states’ interactions. State’s national identity and 
interest is the independent variable, the state’s foreign policy strategy towards the 
                                                 
9
 Here, political elites refer to those who have the power to work within the political system, (i.e., 
politicians, bureaucrats) and to translate their preferences into policies. 
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other is the dependent variable. However, the reader should note that the link 
between national identities and interests and actual foreign policies is far from 
being straight-forward. There are some causal links as the policy outcome should 
be understood in the context of which national identities and interests are a part. 
But there are still many other factors that can affect policy outcome. In addition to 
national identity and national interest, I integrate two other factors for analytical 
purpose: one is a state’s perception of others, which reflects other states’ identities 
and interests; the other is a state’s foreign policy strategy that gives the framework 
of its policy towards a specific country.
10
 My intention here is not to emphasize 
causal relationships between national interest and identity and policy making, but 
to show how national interest and identity act as dominant forces in the formulation 
of foreign policy strategies that underpin India-China relations. 
Within the constructivist framework, the methodological approach to be 
adopted will be interpretative in nature and will be concerned with inference and 
empirical induction. The main research method of the thesis is qualitative content 
analysis. The sources of the content analysis include: government documents, 
speeches and works of political leaders, news reports, monographs and journal 
articles and opinion surveys. I also conducted interviews with scholars and 
government officials in several occasions to get better mastery of the topic and to 
test my arguments. 
1.3 Structure and Organization 
The thesis has 9 chapters. Chapter 2 is designed to give a brief introduction of 
constructivism, conceptualize national identity and national interest and present the 
explanatory model. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the historical development 
of India-China relations from the late 1940s until the beginning of 2000s. Chapter 4 
focuses on the current period of their relations. The time frame is set from 2003 to 
2012. Chapter 5 and 6 examine China and India’s national identity and interest 
                                                 
10
 See Figure 2-1 for details on the explanatory model of the thesis. 
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respectively. Chapter 7 explores China’s India policy by looking at China’s foreign 
policy making, its general foreign policy strategy guiding its diplomacy, and its 
perception of India. Chapter 8 focuses on India’s China policy by examining 
India’s foreign policy making, India’s general foreign policy strategy, and India’s 
perception of China. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by considering future prospects 
of their relations as well as policy suggestions to the existing challenges. 
The scope of this thesis is limited on purpose. There is an abundance of 
literature on Sino-Indian economic relations, the causes and effects of the 1962 
border war, and many other specific topics such as security relations, the 
China-India-Pakistan triangle, etc. Instead of working on these aspects in detail, I 
will only provide a general picture of Sino-Indian relations since 1949 and will pay 
more attention to the period since 2003, from which an overall development of 
bilateral relations started. 
The thesis argues that the dynamics of national identity and national 
interest defined by the current international and domestic structures 
determine the formulation of their foreign policy strategies and thus their 
bilateral relations. The end of the Cold War has changed the international 
structure. Their national identities and interests have also changed. In the current 
international structure and under the condition of globalization, their national 
identities as rising power and emerging power and their national interest of  
economic development have become dominant themes defining their international 
positions and guiding the foreign policy-making in China and in India, which lay 
the ground for their cooperative approach towards each other. This explains their 
increasing cooperative behaviours in many issue areas. However, their identities as 
modern states and regional powers prescribe the importance of national security 
interest. In current international system, the realist understandings of self-help and 
balance of power are still dominant in the security related issues in their bilateral 
relations, and have spill-over effects on other issues. This explains competition as 
part of their relations. Regarding the future of India-China relations, it follows that 
the cooperation prospects of India-China relations should be wide and positive. 
15 
 
However, still hampered by historical mistrust which was brought about by the 
border dispute, India-China relations are moving at varied speeds, with some 
sectors faster than the others. The thesis suggests that both sides should continue to 
improve mutual understanding between the two nations, look beyond the “hard” 
issues such as border and security, and start gradual cooperation in “soft” issues in 
terms of pragmatism. Both sides should consolidate the existing institutional 
mechanisms and explore the possibilities of new mechanisms, at the bilateral as 
well as multilateral level. Moreover, their political leaderships should take the 
initiative to foster a shared culture between them that is based on reciprocity and 
ideas of win-win, creating common interests. This is the fundamental path through 
which India and China can get out of their current strategic stasis and bring their 
relations to a new level. 
2 Theoretical Framework and Explanatory Model 
In this chapter, I will first provide a brief introduction of constructivism. Then, I 
will examine the important concepts of national interest and national identity, and 
develop an explanatory model for the thesis. 
2.1 Constructivism 
Constructivism is a social theory of international politics. Its antecedents are 
located in the 1980s in a series of critical reactions to mainstream international 
relations theory and gained its credibility and popularity in the 1990s. The origin of 
constructivism can be summarized in two aspects: Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism, 
on the one hand, and sociological and critical theory, on the other. The birth and 
development of constructivism cannot be separated from the American disciplinary 
context. In the 1980s, Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism dominated American IR 
theory. Though differing in many respects, these two main theories share the same 
commitment to individualism and materialism (Wendt 1999: 2-3). The assumption 
connected to individualism is that actors’ interests are innate and fixed, and the 
structure derives from aggregating the properties of the actors. The assumption 
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connected to materialism is that the structure is defined by material forces such as 
the distribution of power, technology, and geography. However, both approaches 
ignore the dynamic relationship between ideational forces, namely, ideas, norms, 
and material forces, and the interaction between the structures. In this context, 
various scholars who were not satisfied with the explanations of Neo-realism and 
Neo-liberalism found their inspirations from alternative social theories,
11
 and the 
struggle of constructivism to become part of the mainstream shaped its theoretical 
concepts and research agenda (Barnett 2005).  
Constructivists take state identity and interest seriously, and emphasize 
inter-subjectivity and cultural understanding in explaining states’ behaviour. 
According to constructivists, the world is defined by both material and ideational 
forces, the material reality is only a part of the whole reality. The meaning and 
construction of material reality is dependent on ideas and interpretation. However, 
conventional realism ignores the power of ideas to explain international politics. 
For constructivists, ideas, such as knowledge, symbols, norms, rules, concepts, and 
meanings play an important role in states’ behaviour. It is not that ideas are more 
important, but rather that ideas have constitutive effects on states.  
Constructivists use a variety of methods to conduct research, including 
ethnographic and interpretive techniques to better study the meanings that actors 
bring to their practices and how these practices relate to social worlds. On the 
question of constitution and causality, constructivists reject the claim that the only 
legitimate form of causality is when scholars have uncovered an enduring 
sequenced connection between an independent and a dependent variable (Barnett 
2005: 261). On constitution and causation, there are “how” and “why” questions. 
Causal theories ask “why” questions, and to some extent “how” questions. 
Constitutive theories such as constructivism ask “how possible” and “what” 
                                                 
11
 John Ruggie (1983), Richard Ashley (1984), Friedrich Kratochwil (1989), Nicholas Onuf (1989), 
Alexander Wendt (1999) are among the most influential scholars in establishing the theoretical 
orientation of constructivism. 
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questions (Wendt 1999: 78). However, Klotz and Lynch (2007) criticized that this 
separation mirrors the problematic distinction between explanation and 
understanding. They argued that causal studies do tend to speak in terms of 
explaining behaviour, while studies of meaning talk about understanding the 
conditions for action. In practice, there is considerable overlap and therefore no 
clear divide between “what” or “why” or “how” questions. Hence, constructivists 
should not preclude the possibility of causal answers to constitutive questions, or 
vice versa (Klotz and Lynch 2007:15). Yet constructivists do not reject science or 
causal explanation; they occupy a middle ground between rational choices theorists 
and post-modern scholars. They share a largely common epistemology with the 
former and share many substantive concerns such as the role of identity and 
discourse with the latter. Thus constructivism has the potential to bridge the still 
vast divide separating the majority of IR theorists from post-modernists (Checkel 
1998: 325). 
Broadly understood, a constructivist approach would base its explanation of a 
state’s foreign policy on the state political elites’ self-understanding about the 
national interests and identities embedded in the cultural and historical context of 
the state and the norms and values of the society. Hence, it is necessary to first 
examine these two concepts (i.e. national interest and national identity) within a 
constructivist framework. 
2.2 National Interest as a Social Construction 
The “national interest” is a relatively modern idea. Its development can be traced 
back to the earliest stages of the evolution of the modern state. According to E. H. 
Carr, until the French Revolution the term “nation” was identified with the person 
of the sovereign so that international relations were essentially relations between 
royal families (Carr 1945: 2-4). It is through the French Revolution in the 18
th
 
century that displaced the absolutist with popular sovereignty that “people’s 
sovereignty” came to be embedded in the concept of nation. From that time on, the 
nation came to be seen as the natural basis of the state. With the development of 
18 
 
the nation-state and nationalism, the older terms – “the will of prince,” “raison 
d’etat,” or “dynastic interests” were gradually replaced by the national interest. 
This concept expressed no longer the interests of dynasties or royal families, “but 
the interests of the society as a whole and as such was lined with the idea of 
popular sovereignty and the legitimacy of the state” (Evans and Newnham 1998: 
345). 
“National interest” usually refers to foreign policy but is applied also to 
domestic politics, e.g. when it is said that it is in the national interest for children to 
receive compulsory education. When referring to the domestic sphere, it is equal to 
terms like “public interest,” “common interest,” or “common good” (Frankel 1970: 
38; Clinton 1994: 50-55, 60-67). Despite its centrality to foreign policy discourse, 
national interest is a fuzzy rather than precise concept in the study of international 
politics. Generally implicit in the notion is an idea of preferences for the policy that 
is best for a nation or state as a whole (Danilovic 2008: 557). There are three 
different usages of the notion: first, as an analytic construct to describe and explain 
the sources of state preferences in foreign policy; second, as a criterion for 
evaluating particular strategies or courses of action; and third, as a justification for 
foreign policy decisions taken by policymakers to mobilize domestic support 
(Danilovic 2008: 557).
12
 In the realm of political science, the concept is mainly 
used in the first two ways. There are two fundamentally different approaches to the 
analyses of the concept, represented by the “objectivists” and the “subjectivists” 
(Frankel 1970: 16). The former assumes that national interests can be objectively 
defined with the help of some objectively definable yardsticks and criteria, whereas 
the latter interprets it as a changing set of subjective preferences, the study of 
decision-making is the work in this direction (Frankel 1970: 17). The objectivist 
approach is best exemplified by the realist school of Hans Morgenthau (1951) and 
                                                 
12
 For a distinction between the usages of the concept see also Evans and Newnham (1998: 344), 
Rosenau (1968: 34). Frankel also points out that there is no clear-cut distinction between the usage 
as an analytical tool and its usage as a political discourse to justify policy preferences. See Frankel 
(1970: 16). 
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other followers. The subjectivist approach can be exemplified by the 
decision-making approach to foreign policy analysis
13
 and the constructivist 
approach. 
There has been a dispute over the analytical usefulness of national interest. On 
one side of this dispute stand critics who argue that the notion of the national 
interest as a research tool has grave flaws (Rosenau 1968: 39; Hoffmann 1978: 133; 
Smith 1986: 23-26).
14
 On the other side, are those who insist on the importance of 
the national interest in explaining foreign policies and theorizing international 
politics (Morgenthau 1978; Weldes 1996). I side with the second view that the 
national interest is an important explanatory tool in international politics 
because it does highlight important factors in foreign policy analysis and continues 
to be used in political discourse. 
The main problem of the realist conceptualization of national interest is that 
the concept is viewed as an objective reality defined in terms of military and 
economic power, while ignoring its subjective aspects. In fact, the national interest 
does not exist independent of perceptions. Charles Beard, the first scholar to 
produce a sustained analysis about the national interest traces the historical 
development of the term “interest.”15 According to Beard, ideas and material 
interests cannot be separated. In his view, shared in this study, an interest is also an 
idea which involves human perception and interpretation:  
                                                 
13
 According to the decision-making approach, the national interest is subjectively defined by the 
participants in the policy process in terms of their social interests at any particular time, rather than 
the interest of an entire nation. For example see Trubowitz (1998)’s work on American Foreign 
Policy, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy. 
14
 The problem lies in the difficulty to generalize national interest. Particularly from the decision 
making perspective, the interests that guide foreign policy are more likely to be a diverse, pluralistic 
set of subjective preferences that change in response to the domestic and international environment. 
For a survey of criticisms of the concept, see Clinton (1994). 
15
 Academic scholarship on national interest blossomed in the 1930s with Charles A. Beard’s 
publications, The Idea of National Interest (1934) and The Open Door at Home (1935), New York, 
Macmillan. 
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Interest, subjectively considered, may take the form of an idea, and every idea 
pertaining to earthly affairs is attached to some interest considered as material 
thing and is affiliated with social relationships.
16
  
This objective/subjective dichotomy is important and meaningful for the 
conceptualization of the national interest. 
Constructivism gives a supportive explanation to the subjective aspects of 
national interest ignored by the realists. For constructivists, national interest is a 
social construction and the concept is also seen as an important explanatory tool in 
international politics. Constructivism emphasizes the subjective aspect of state 
preferences and the impact of international structures (understood in terms of 
shared values, transnational collective identities or norms of behavior) on state 
preferences. According to constructivism, national interests are not just “out there” 
waiting to be discovered; they are constructed and constituted through social 
interaction and defined in the context of internationally and domestically held 
norms and values. The normative context changes over time, and thus creates 
coordinated shifts in national interests and states’ behavior across the system 
(Finnemore 1996). 
This constructed nature of the national interest is well presented by an 
empirical research conducted by Jutta Weldes (1996) on how the United States 
constructed its national interest during the Cuba missile crisis. According to 
Weldes, in the policy making process, governments are the agents that interpret and 
articulate the national interests. The normative context influences the behavior of 
decision-makers and of mass publics who may choose and constrain those 
decision-makers. Therefore, national interests emerge out of situation descriptions 
and problems definitions of decision-makers, in other words, out of representation, 
through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them 
(Weldes 1996). In the process of representation, the cultural and linguistic 
resources play a crucial role in constructing national interests. 
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 See Beard (1935: 157-158). 
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Another constructivist who has written extensively about how states define 
their interests is Martha Finnemore. She treated states as unitary actors and 
developed a systemic approach
17
 to the understanding of state interests. According 
to Finnemore, states are socialized to accept certain preferences and expectations 
by the international society in which they and the people who compose them live 
(Finnemore 1996: 128). She focused on the normative processes which define the 
national interest by examining the roles of international organizations in 
institutionalizing and propagating cultural norms in the international system, for 
example, the role of the World Bank in redefining the ways that states approached 
development problems by institutionalizing new anti-poverty norms. Her case 
studies show that international norms – in her cases, socially constructed through 
international institutions – are able to reshape state interests by the ways in which 
states endogenize these norms as their foreign policy preferences.  
Alexander Wendt, a leading thinker in the school of constructivism, also 
attempted to conceptualize national interest (Wendt 1999: 233-238). Wendt agreed 
with the distinction of objective interests and subjective interests. He used an 
objectivist approach to answer the normative question of what states should do. 
Objective interests are needs or functional imperatives that must be fulfilled if an 
identity is to be reproduced.
18
 Subjective interests refer to those beliefs that actors 
actually have about how to meet their identity needs (Wendt 1999: 231-232). In 
Wendt’s view, many state interests are social constructions of the international 
system. However, national interest in his definition refers to objective interests. 
According to Wendt, states have certain objective national interests that are used in 
turn to define their subjective interests. These objective interests are the 
reproduction requirements or security of states (Wendt 1999: 233-238). He defined 
                                                 
17
 Systemic approach emphasizes the causal powers of the structure of the international system in 
explaining state behavior. For more details on the systemic approach see Kenneth Waltz (1999: 
7-10). 
18
 His needs-based view of objective interests was drawn on Wiggins (1985) and McCullagh (1991), 
see also Benton (1981) and Connolly (1983). 
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them as physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective 
self-esteem.
19
 Physical survival is the survival of a state-society complex, of 
which the preservation of territory is at the center; autonomy refers to the ability of 
a state-society complex to exercise control over its allocation of resources and 
choice of government following the notion of sovereignty; economic well-being 
refers to the maintenance of the mode of production in a society and the state’s 
resource base; collective self-esteem refers to a group’s need to feel good about 
itself, for respect or status (Wendt 1999: 235-236). These four national interests are 
common to all states if states are to reproduce themselves. They may on occasion 
have contradictory implications that require prioritization (this process is 
subjective), but in the long run they must be satisfied, so that state can keep its 
identity as state, otherwise, state will tend to die out. In this respect, national 
interests are a selection mechanism and their real significance lies in the fact that 
they dispose states to try to understand them, to interpret their implications for how 
subjective interests should be defined (Wendt 1999: 237).  
Wendt’s definition of objective interests indicates the reality of the current 
state system, which is established on the understandings of the key principles of the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648. What he generalized is in fact the standard 
understandings about conditions for a Westphalian state to reproduce its state 
identity, which is generally accepted as essential for states in current system, to 
some extent, is also subjective. Despite this conceptual fault line of his definition of 
objective national interests, Wendt’s definition is useful for analysis, at least as it 
provides some categories for generalization. Moreover, his definition implies that 
subjective and contingent interpretation needs to be established on some relative 
stable categories that will not change very easily or quickly. Stable, here, implies 
an extent to which people in a certain period will even regard it as “objective.”  
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 George and Keohane (1980) identify the first three national interests – physical survival, 
autonomy, and economic well-being. Wendt add the fourth, “collective self-esteem” (Wendt 1999: 
235). 
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In this thesis, I adopt Wendt’s objectivist approach to national interest. 
The national interest discussed here is in the domain of foreign policy. I will 
look at India’s and China’s objective national interests that define their 
subjective interests, and the time frame under analysis is from 2003 to 2012. 
Rather than simply super-imposing his categories, I prefer to define objective 
national interests as economic development, security, and status. Here economic 
development refers to the economic and social well-being of the people. Security 
stands for the physical survival of the state, including the preservation of territory 
and sovereignty, the protection of the people’s lives. Analysis of security will 
mainly focus on the traditional military and strategic dimension. Status is state’s 
reputation and ranking in the larger states’ community. The content and meaning of 
the objective national interests are defined and interpreted by the political elites in 
India and China. They decide contingently the limit, scope, and priority of these 
interests, since foreign policy decision-making is essentially an exercise in the 
choice of ends and means of a state’s political elites in an international setting. 
2.3 Centrality of National Identity in the Construction of National 
Interest  
The concept of identity was first imported from philosophy into the social sciences 
(Dittmer and Kim 1993: 3). Cognitively, identities are ideas that help individuals 
cope with complex, demanding situations, by organizing incoming stimuli into 
categories based on prior experience. Thus, an important aspect of identity is its 
directive function on actor’s behaviour. It is defined as a mental construct that both 
describes and prescribes how actor should think, feel, evaluate, and ultimately, 
behave in group-relevant situations (Turner 1985: 80). 
The concept implies a relationship between self and others. It connotes both a 
persistent sameness within oneself and a persistent sharing of some kind of 
essential character with others (Erikson 1959: 27-28). According to Wendt, it is a 
subjective or unit-level quality which roots in actor’s self-understandings and the 
meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors 
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represent an actor in the same way (Wendt 1999: 224). In Kowert’s words, “To say 
that a group of people has a particular identity is to suggest both that they share 
certain qualities and also that these qualities somehow set them apart from others” 
(Kowert 1999: 5). 
Constructivists are concerned with the relationship between identities and 
interests. For example, Ruggie argued that “identities are logically prior to 
preferences” (Ruggie 1993: 172); Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein argued that 
“identities both generate and shape interests” (Jepperson et al. 1996: 60); Wendt 
held the view that interests presuppose identities (Wendt 1999: 231), and treated 
identity as “a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and 
behavioural dispositions” (Wendt 1999: 224). Wendt argued that identities belong 
to the belief side of the intentional equation (desire + belief = action), while 
interests belong to the desire side, without interests identities have no motivational 
force and without identities interests have no direction (Wendt 1999: 231). Thus, a 
state’s behaviour is motivated by a variety of interests rooted in the state’s identity. 
Just like a person has many identities, this is also true for states. Each identity is a 
script or schema, constructed and reconstructed in broader domestic and 
international context. 
National identity relates to the psychological foundation for behaviour patterns 
of a nation-state and entails the purposes, roles and images that a nation-state 
pursues and projects in the international arena. Once established, “a national 
identity may be expected to provide a reasonable basis for expectations concerning 
that nation’s future comportment” (Dittmer & Kim 1993: 30-31). Moreover, it 
should be understood as “an ongoing process or journey rather than a fixed set of 
boundaries, a relationship rather than a free-standing entity or attribute” (Dittmer 
& Kim 1993: 13). 
Although national identities as ideational forces are susceptible to social 
change, they are also relatively stable. First, identities are a kind of schema, and 
schemas, once formed, must resist easy change; second, national identities contain 
physical elements, such as size, race, and language. These physical elements can 
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shape the perceptions of both the actor toward others and others toward the actor 
and they also strongly resist change.
20
 The stability of national identity varies with 
state’s status and material capabilities in the international system. A powerful and 
satisfied state is more likely to enjoy stable identity, at the same time, its power and 
security reinforces the success and validity of that identity; a weak and dissatisfied 
state may be willing to make a move to a favorable international position (Deng, in 
Hu, Chan & Zha 2000: 44). Each individual, group, and nation always tries to 
redefine his/her/its identities when they are challenged, or broken. This will cause 
an identity crisis and the search for new identity elements. The identity crisis will 
be solved if a new equilibrium is achieved.  
An effort to refine the concept of national identity was made by Paul Kowert. 
He suggested a distinction between internal identity and external identity. Internal 
identity “describes the cohesion or uniformity of the nation-state’s parts and, in 
particular, the way such cohesion manifests itself in loyalty to the nation-state”; 
external identity “refers to a nation-state’s distinctiveness, as compared with other 
nation-states” (Kowert 1999: 4). Theories of internal coherence tell us whether or 
not (or to what extent) a state is able to act coherently as a unitary actor. Theories 
of external distinctiveness, on the other hand, tell us something about whether a 
given state might want to act differently from other states (Kowert 1999: 7). In this 
thesis, the identity I discuss refers to external identity, that is, their national identity 
in international relations, or in other words, international identity, which relates to 
their roles and status projected by themselves as well as by others in world politics. 
For the purpose of policy making, policy elites’ perceptions and worldviews 
are important to our understanding of states’ identities and thus their international 
behaviours as the meanings that objects, events and actions have for states are 
necessarily the meanings they have for those individuals who act in the name of the 
state (Weldes 1996: 280). These elites “approach international politics with an 
                                                 
20
 See (Chafetz et al. 1999: xi), without social interaction, such attributes of actors have no 
meaning.  
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already quite comprehensive and elaborate appreciation of the world, of the 
international system and of the place of their state within it” (Weldes 1996: 280). 
Hence, national identity here is more specifically related to political elites’ 
understandings of their country in the world.
21
 To sum up, national identity here is 
defined as political elite’s relatively stable understanding of their country’s role and 
status in the international system in a given period, which implies national interests 
and guides state’s behaviours. 
Moreover, there is also the objective and subjective distinction among various 
national identities. Identity implies a relationship between self and others. For some 
identities, other actors may not understand an actor in the sense the actor 
understands itself. Some identities are about objective attributes which leave little 
room for interpretation thus less contentious. For example, since the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) the Chinese government has had many 
national identities in its diplomacy. These include the identity of a peace-loving 
country, victim of foreign aggression, socialist country, third world state, bastion of 
revolution, anti-hegemonic force, developing country, major power, rising power, 
responsible power, international cooperator, and autonomous actor, etc.
22
 Identities 
such as developing country, rising power are generally shared in the perception of 
other state actors, because they are the identities given by objective indicators; 
identities such as peace-loving country, responsible power, international cooperator 
require subjective judgement. These identities could be at odds with the perception 
of China held by other states hence need careful examination. For operational 
                                                 
21
 Such understandings can be strategic or internalized, see Wang (2005: 90) who distinguished the 
difference. 
22
 There is a quantitative content analysis conducted by Wang Hongying. See Wang (2005), 
“National Image Building and Chinese Foreign policy”. She analysed two official series – the 
Peking Review (later renamed Beijing Review) between 1958 and 2002 and the government work 
reports (zhenfu gongzuo baogao) between 1954 and 2000. The results of her content analysis shows 
that the PRC government has tried to build the following images of China in international affairs: 
peace-loving country, victim of foreign aggression, socialist country, bastion of revolution, 
anti-hegemonic force, developing country, major power, international cooperator, and autonomous 
actor. These images are assertions of China’s national identity (Wang 2005: 96). 
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convenience, I will examine India and China’s national identity in terms of 
“civilization state,” “nation state,” “developing country,” “rising power,” and 
“regional power.” These are objective identities generally agreed by other 
state actors in the international system without dispute. 
2.4 Explanatory Model 
The trends of India-China bilateral relations are very much determined by mutual 
foreign policy strategies. In the international system, before actors can choose a 
course of action, they need to define the situation. “These definitions will be based 
on at least two considerations: their own identities and interests, which reflect 
beliefs about who they are in such situations; and what they think others will do, 
which reflect beliefs about others’ identities and interests” (Wendt 1999: 186-187). 
On the basis of this understanding, I develop a model (See Figure 2) to explain how 
national identity and interest of one state affect its foreign policy towards the other 
in a relationship between two states. In the model, there are two countries, A and B. 
A’s national identity and interest are the independent variable and its foreign policy 
towards B is the dependent variable. I use two other controlled variables for a 
better explanation of the process, A’s perception of B, which reflects B’s identity 
and interest, and A’s foreign policy strategy, which gives the general framework of 
making A’s foreign policy towards B. Moreover, it should be noted that I will not 
discuss how the national identity and interest of India and China are formed 
because of the complexity of this formation process and the limited scope of the 
thesis. 
In terms of this model, my research strategies are as follows: first, I will 
examine national identity and national interest of India and of China; second, I will 
examine their current foreign policy frameworks; third, I will explore their mutual 
perceptions and analyse their foreign policy strategies towards each other; and 
finally, I will explain the current dynamic of India-China relations in terms of their 
mutual strategies. 
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Figure 2-1 Linkage between national identity, national interest, and foreign policy in a state’s 
decision-making process 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
To summarize, in constructivism, the social rather than the material has greater 
weight in world politics. The world is understood as a continuing process of 
interaction between agents (individuals, states, non-state actors) and structures 
(broader environment and social relationships). Agents and structures are mutually 
constituted. Constructivists emphasize the socially constructed nature of actors and 
their identities and interests in understanding states’ behaviour. In this framework, 
my research inquiry starts with the concept of national interest and national 
identity. 
As discussed above, national identity and national interest are complex, 
multi-layered and multifactorial. Hence, national identity and national interest 
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should be conceptualized as umbrella terms, encompassing in reality many 
identities and interests. In a period of time, some components are more 
powerful thus forming dominant identities and interests which are more 
relevant to decision making. Moreover, national identity and national interest 
have subjective as well as objective attributes. For operational convenience and 
conceptual clarity, I will focus on the objective attributes. I use Wendt’s 
objectivists approach to national interest, and define national interest in terms of 
economic development, security, and status. National identity here is understood as 
political elite’s relatively stable understanding of their country’s role and status in 
the international system in a given period, which implies national interests and 
guide state’s behaviors. I will examine India’s and China’s national identity as 
“civilization state,” as “nation state,” as “developing country,” as “rising power,” 
and “as regional power.” These are objective identities generally agreed by other 
state actors in the international system without dispute. 
The explanatory model of the thesis is based on the understanding that in a 
decision making process, the situation is defined by an actor’s own identity and 
interest and its perception of the others, which reflects the understanding of others’ 
identity and interest. The model treats a state’s national identity and interest as the 
independent variables and its strategy towards the other in a bilateral relationship 
as the dependent variable. My approach in order to explain the current dynamics of 
India-China relations will first start with the examination of India’s and China’s 
national identity and interest, their respective foreign policy frameworks, and their 
mutual perceptions, and then evaluate their foreign policy strategies towards each 
other, since the dynamics of their relations is determined mainly by their mutual 
strategies. 
This research emphasizes the inter-subjective quality of national identity and 
national interest, though the operationalization of the two concepts focuses on the 
objective attributes. The definition of national identity and national interest in 
reality cannot be separated from a state’s cognitive process which is mainly 
practiced by its political elites. They decide contingently the limit, scope, and make 
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prioritization and interpretation of these identities and interests. The objective 
identities and interests could be the same, but the meanings attached to them by the 
political elites, which is context dependent, would not be the same. This is exactly 
where the explanatory power of social constructivism lies. 
3 Review of the Sino-Indian Relations (1950s-2002) 
In this chapter, the post-independence history of the India-China relations from the 
early 1950s to 2002 (the year before the overall development of their relations 
started) will be reviewed in terms of three periods. The first period is from the 
1950s until 1962, the year in which India and China fought a border war. The 
second period is the period of diplomatic freeze after the war, from 1963 onwards 
until 1976, in which the ambassadorial-level relations were restored. The third 
period is the period of gradual improvement in their relations, from 1976 until 2002. 
This chapter is particularly important for those unfamiliar with the evolution of 
their relations and provides the broader context for the subsequent chapters.  
3.1 The 1954 Agreement and the 1962 Border Conflict 
The Republic of India gained its independence from the British rule on August 15, 
1947. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) declared its establishment on October 
1, 1949. From 1949 to 1957, relations between the two republics were friendly, due 
partly to the sense of commonality as new Asian states liberated from the colonial 
rules, but also due to their respective strategic interests. After World War II, the 
United States and the Soviet Union emerged as “superpowers.” World politics was 
greatly influenced by the conflict between the two countries. By the early 1950s, 
the Cold War had spread into Asia. China entered the socialist camp and sided with 
the Soviet Union. China and the United States remained hostile to each other. The 
breakout of the Korean War resulted in the direct involvement of China, while 
India was facing a hostile Pakistan after a war in Kashmir in 1948. The US was in 
negotiation with Pakistan to establish a military alliance. Under these 
circumstances, neither China nor India wanted to open a second front. For India, 
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the friendship with China could redress the strategic balance of power in South 
Asia, and this friendship was in accordance with Nehru’s basic structure of foreign 
policy, his value of non-alignment and broader vision that India and China should 
play a special role in the post-colonial world. As a result, India supported China in 
the Korean War, lobbied for China’s representation at the United Nations. For 
China, India’s friendship was important to break out of its isolation in the 
international community and dependence on the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders 
believed that India might be a partner of China, because in the struggle between 
imperialism and socialism, it was necessary to win over as many countries as 
possible to form a united front against the West. 
In April, 1954, India and China signed the Agreement on Trade and 
Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India. Under this agreement, India 
gave up its privileges in Tibet which it had inherited from the British and 
recognized Chinese sovereignty there. The famous Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence,
23
 also called Panchsheela, was one of the highlights of this friendly 
period, and formally written in the preamble of the Agreement. Another highlight 
was their cooperation at the Bandung Conference in 1955, which led to the 
establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement. However, this friendship did not last 
very long. By the late 1950s, serious differences between the two states had begun 
to surface, particularly over the unresolved border issue, leading to a brief war in 
October 1962. 
The Sino-Indian border is generally divided into the eastern, middle and 
western sector (See Map 3-1). The dispute is mainly on the western and eastern 
sector. On the western sector lies the Aksai Chin plateau, which, on its three sides, 
faces Ladakh (in Indian-administered Kashmir), Tibet, and Xinjiang. India claims 
Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh and China claims it as part of Xinjiang. On the 
                                                 
23 These five principles are: 1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
2. Non-aggression; 3. Non-interference in each other’s national affairs; 4. Equality and mutual 
benefit; 5. Peaceful coexistence. As norms of relations between nations, they have become widely 
recognized and accepted throughout the world. 
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eastern sector, the dispute is over the area between the pre-1914 British Outer Line 
and the McMahon Line, formerly the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) of the 
Indian state of Assam, now the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. The middle 
sector involves a dispute over various points on the border between 
Indian-administered Kashmir and Nepal. 
The Sino-Indian border dispute is a legacy of the British Raj.
24
 As Neville 
Maxwell summarized: “…, through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British 
power in India expanded, filling out its control of the peninsular sub-continent until 
it reached the great retaining arc of the Himalaya. There it came into contact with 
another empire, that of China. … the British sought secure and settled boundaries 
with China: these they failed to achieve, and the failure was to lead in the middle of 
the twentieth century to the border war between India and China” (Maxwell 1970: 
19). 
 
 
Map 3-1 The Sino-Indian Disputed Border Area (Source: The Economist, Feb 8
th
, 2012 ) 
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 For a more detailed exploration of Sino-Indian border see also Lamb (1964), Maxwell (1970), 
Woodman (1969), Hoffmann (1990), Liu (1994).  
33 
 
With regard to Sino-Indian border, Tibet has a critical position in the whole 
issue. After the fall of the Qing dynasty in China in 1912, Tibet government at 
Lhasa expelled all Chinese forces and declared itself independent in 
1913. However, this was not accepted by the newly founded Republic of China. 
From 1913 to 1914, British India, Tibet and China held a tripartite conference in 
Simla to discuss the issue of Tibet’s status. During the convention, the British tried 
to divide Tibet into an Inner and Outer Tibet. As a secret by-product of the Simla 
Conference, Indian Foreign Secretary Henry McMahon, proposed a Tibet-Assam 
border to advance the British line of control without inviting and informing the 
Chinese representative (Maxwell 1970: 48-49). This line later came to be known as 
the McMahon Line, a source of great controversy in the Sino-Indian border dispute. 
Tibetan representatives signed the agreement under British pressure. However, the 
representative of the Chinese government did not, repudiating in fact all the results 
of the Simla Conference. After the Simla Conference, the McMahon Line was in 
fact forgotten. It was not until the 1940s that the British government began to 
reconsider making the McMahon Line as India’s northeast border, and began to 
translate the McMahon Line from the maps to the ground as the effective northeast 
boundary of India, given that the control of the southern slope of the Himalayas 
was linked to the defensibility of India’s entire northeast. By 1947, when the 
British left India, they had already established some posts in the area south of the 
McMahon Line. Following independence, the Indian government pursued a more 
active forward policy in the northeast.
25
 At the end of 1949 the situation in NEFA 
was much as the British had left it (Maxwell 1970: 73). However, the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949 and its takeover of Tibet in 
1950 added a new dimension to India’s perceived threat horizons. The Government 
of India reacted by a more active forward policy in NEFA and decided to make the 
McMahon Line India’s boundary in the northeast. As Nehru answered the question 
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 For more details about the Simla Conference and the controversial McMahon Line see Maxwell 
(1970: 39-64), Liu (1994: 48-62). 
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about a new Chinese map which was showing a boundary far south of the 
McMahon Line in the parliament on 20
th
 November, 1950: 
There is no new map of China so far as we know. But all the maps of China for 
the last thirty years have shown a certain portion of that north-east frontier 
which is now part of India as not part of India.
26
 
 
Our maps show that the McMahon Line is our boundary – map or no map. That 
fact remains and we stand by that boundary, and we will not allow anybody to 
come across that boundary.
27
 
In 1950, twenty additional posts were set up in NEFA (Maxwell 1970: 73). In 
February 1951, Indian officials entered Tawang, a Tibetan Monastery south of the 
McMahon Line, and evicted the Tibetan administration there.
28
 The Tawang 
district has now become a crucial point in the ongoing Sino-Indian border 
negotiations. By 1954, when India and China held negotiations with respect to 
Tibet, India had already secured its control in the eastern sector of Sino-Indian 
border. 
The western sector of Aksai Chin is an uninhabitable area. For most of time in 
history, it was an almost forgotten area except for some ancient trade routes that 
crossed it. The British recognized the strategic value of the Aksai Chin as a buffer 
zone in the late 19
th
 century. There were three alternative British boundary lines 
formulated for Ladakh. These are the Ardagh-Johnson Line (proposed in 1897), the 
Macartney-MacDonald Line (proposed in 1899), and the Threlawney Saunders 
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 Lok Sabha Debates, 20
th
 November, 1950, vol.5, no. 4, cols. 155-156. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 It is a historically Tibetan area. The sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, was born in Tawang. 
When the Indian Government took over Tawang, the Chinese Government did not react. The silence 
of China was regarded by India as China’s acquiescence of Tawang. The reason why China did not 
react according to Liu Xuecheng is that the new Chinese Government did not know of India’s 
takeover of Tawang because the PLA had not yet entered Tibet. Later the Tibetans reported the 
event to the Government and asked China to take Tawang back. However, it was decided to 
postpone the settlement of Tawang issue because the Korean War was going on and that attention 
could not be diverted away from the eastern front. See Liu (1994: 62). 
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Line of 1873 (Hoffmann 1990: 9-16). Yet all these lines were not confirmed by any 
treaties, they were simply British ideas about possible border alignment. In the 
days of the British departure, the western sector was left undefined.
29
 In 1953, 
India decided to regard the Aksai Chin as India’s territory.30 After the 1954 
Agreement, India published a new official map reflecting India’s considerations of 
its border alignment with China. The new map showed the McMahon Line as a 
delimited boundary with China and the most of the Aksai Chin plateau in India’s 
territory (See Map 3-2 and Map 3-3). From 1951 to 1957, China constructed a 
motor road in Aksai Chin, which is strategically important for Chinese 
transportation to Tibet at that time. In September 1957, the Chinese newspaper 
People’s Daily published news of the completion of the road. This was noticed by 
the Indian embassy in Beijing and passed along to New Delhi (Hoffmann 1990: 35). 
India protested that the road was constructed through the Indian territory. The 
protest notes exchanged between the two governments raised the curtain of the 
Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Indian relations began to deteriorate. In 
1959, the Tibetan revolt and the Sino-Indian border confrontation in Longju and 
Konka passes broadened the level and amount of hostility in an already 
deteriorating relationship. 
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 For a detailed description about India’s border decision and the psychology of Indian border 
formulation see Hoffmann (1990). 
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Map 3-2 India Showing Political Divisions in the New Republic, published by the Survey of India (1950). On this map the Sino-Indian boundary in the eastern 
sector is drawn generally in accordance with the McMahon Line, but is marked as “boundary undemarcated” (see the arrows). In the western and middle sector, 
no boundary is drawn. It is marked as “boundary undefined” (see the arrows). This way of delineation was consistently followed by official Indian maps prior to 
1954 (Source: The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962). 
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Map 3-3 Political Map of India, published by the Survey of India (1954). On this map the marking for the entire Sino-Indian boundary is changed into the 
delimited boundary (see arrows). This was the first time that India showed its claims on an official Indian map (Source: The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, 
Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1962).
38 
 
According to Liu Xuecheng, the revolts in Tibet were the catalyst of the war 
(Liu 1994: 25). The question of Tibet’s legal status, which seemed to have been 
solved by the 1954 Agreement, had been interwoven with the evolution of the 
Sino-Indian border dispute. China had been suspicious of India’s motives of 
separating Tibet from China. With regards to Tibet, India and China had different 
perceptions. In India’s perception, Buddhism provided a special cultural link 
between India and Tibet, and India also inherited some extra-territorial rights in 
Tibet from the British. Hence, it had a right to speak about Tibet. In Chinese 
perception, Tibet was seen as an integral part of China and its control over Tibet 
had only been loosened by the British imperialist intervention because of the 
weakness of the Chinese government. Thus, the Indian concern for Tibet was seen 
by Chinese as interference in China’s internal affairs.  
In March 1959, revolts broke out in Tibet and the 14
th
 Dalai Lama and his 
followers fled to India to seek political asylum. China suspected that India 
supported the subversive activities of Tibetan, using the Indian border town of 
Kalimpong as a base. In fact, it was the Americans who supported Tibet’s 
separatist activities for its strategic calculations of containing China in Asia.
31
 
China also possessed evidence of CIA’s involvement. The Indian Government 
denied Chinese charges, yet this only heightened the Chinese suspicion of India’s 
involvement and its collaboration with the US in Tibetan affairs. The tensions over 
Tibet made India reconsider the unresolved status of borders in Ladakh and in the 
North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Correspondingly, India launched “Operation 
Onkar,” a strategy designed to establish military posts along the McMahon Line 
(Saigal 1979: 19).  
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In August 1959, armed clashes occurred at Longju, located on the Chinese side 
of the McMahon Line.
32
 In October 1959, another armed clashes occurred at 
Kongka pass in the western sector. This time, it was a more serious border clash, 
with nine Indians killed and several personnel captured (Liu 1994: 28). In April 
1960, India and China held a summit meeting to discuss the border question. 
However, there was no movement from the fixed positions of both sides. India also 
refused Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s “package” approach, by which China would 
accept Indian claims in the eastern sector in exchange for Indian recognition of 
China’s claims in the western sector (Liu 1994: 30). Shortly thereafter, the Indian 
army began to implement its “forward policy,” setting up as many posts as possible 
in the disputed area in the eastern and western sector. India’s action unavoidably 
led to military confrontation with China.
33
 After reviewing the rapidly 
deteriorating situation on the border and the latest military developments on the 
other side of the border, Chinese leaders decided to fight a limited war against 
India, which was termed in Chinese “zi wei fan ji zhan” (war of self-defence 
counterattack). On October 12, 1962, massive attacks from Chinese troops began 
along the entire border. The better prepared Chinese troops overwhelmed Indian 
troops in both the eastern and western sectors. However, China’s purpose was not 
to occupy the territory that China had claimed, but to punish India with a decisive 
strike (Liu 1994: 40). The domestic and international situations at that time did not 
permit China to prolong the war. On-going troubles in Tibet, growing tensions in 
the Taiwan Strait, and the failure of the Great Leap Forward drew Chinese leaders’ 
attention to urgent domestic problems. Internationally, China faced animosity from 
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the US and the Sino-Soviet relations were deteriorating due to ideological 
controversy between them (Liu 1994: 37). After a remarkable advance, Chinese 
troops declared a unilateral cease-fire on November 21, 1962, and withdrew to 
where the Chinese government thought the boundaries with India should be. 
Although India was unwilling to accept China’s point of withdrawal, India had no 
intention of impeding the withdrawal of Chinese troops from a realistic view. After 
the war, the Indian troops quickly moved back to where they had been deployed 
earlier. In fact, the war did not change the status quo of the border, that is, India’s 
control over the south of McMahon Line, and China over Aksai Chin. The lines of 
cease-fire have actually been regarded as the de facto boundaries between them. In 
an attempt to bring India and China back to negotiation, Sri Lanka’s Prime 
Minister Bandaranaike convened a conference in Colombo in December 1962, 
attended by six countries (Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Cambodia, Myanmar, Egypt and 
Ghana). The Colombo Conference produced some proposals but there was dispute 
over their implementation. Ultimately, the Conference proved unsuccessful in 
bringing the two countries back to negotiation (Liu 1994: 41-42; Deepak 2005: 
259-262). 
3.2 The Sino-Indian Cold War 
The bilateral relationship of India and China entered froze after 1962. The war 
raised strong nationalist sentiments in India. There, the war was a Chinese invasion 
of Indian territory. The defeat was a national humiliation on a grand scale and the 
psychological impact that it had on India cannot be underestimated. The war also 
had a long-term effect on India’s security environment and security policies. In the 
belief that the inadequate defence preparation of India led to the losses of 1962, 
India made the shift towards developing an indigenous conventional military 
capability. From the Chinese vantage point, they were forced to fight in 
self-defence. The 1962 border conflict enhanced China’s sense of insecurity and 
fear of encirclement from the superpowers. The Soviet Union sympathized with 
India with regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute and offered India military 
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assistance in 1960 (Maxwell 1970: 285). In 1962, the Soviet Union signed an 
agreement with India that provided military equipment (Kaul 1979: 113). During 
the war, the US naturally sided with India and also offered India military support. 
Hence, China saw India as an adversary associated with both the US and the Soviet 
Union in encircling China (Liu 1994: 105). In response, China turned to Pakistan. 
In 1963, China and Pakistan signed trade and air agreements, as well as the border 
agreement over Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.
34
 During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani 
War, China openly supported Pakistan and termed India as aggressor (Deepak: 
277). The Sino-Pakistani alliance emerged. Another consequent power dynamic 
was India’s move to the Soviet Union. The ideological disputes between Mao and 
Khrushchev led to the Sino-Soviet split by the mid-1960s, and India replaced China 
as Moscow’s major partner in Asia.  
The two states not only allied with each other’s adversaries, thereby, 
undermining each other strategically, but also supported those internal forces 
hostile to one another. After 1962, there was an obvious rapprochement with 
Taiwan, though India never accepted Taiwan’s independence (Deepak 2005: 
289).
35
 The Dalai Lama was allowed to establish his exiled government in North 
India, and some Indian politicians actively supported the movement for Tibet’s 
independence. On their part, the Chinese government offered support to insurgent 
groups like the Nagas and Mizos in India’s Northeast, as well as the Naxalbari 
movement in the north of West Bengal (Deepak 2005; Liu 1994; Ranganathan & 
Khanna 2000).  
                                                 
34
 The border agreement resulted in China ceding over part of western Sinkiang to Pakistan and 
Pakistan ceding part of the Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to China. India does not recognize the 
border agreement because of the Indo-Pakistani dispute over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. 
According to the agreement, the boundary is provisional. It will be opened to renegotiation if, after 
the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, the sovereign authority concerned is India. See Agreement 
between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Pakistan on the 
boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas, the defense of which is under actual 
control of Pakistan, March 2
nd
, 1963, Article 6.  
35
 For more details about the contacts between India and Taiwan from 1961 to 1970 see Zhao (2000: 
196-198). 
42 
 
In July 1961, India withdrew its ambassador first, and one year later, the 
Chinese ambassador left his position as well. The bilateral relationship was 
dropped to a charge d’affaires level. In June 1967, a diplomatic crisis broke out 
and further damaged Sino-Indian relations (Liu 1994: 115; Zhang 2004: 26). On 
June 13, 1967, China announced the expulsion of two Indian diplomats from 
Beijing on espionage charges, withdrew their diplomatic status, and opened a 
public trial. In retaliation, the Indian Government deprived two Chinese diplomats 
of their diplomatic status and deported them. On June 16, 1967, some Indian 
demonstrators in front of the Chinese embassy in New Delhi assaulted Chinese 
embassy personnel. This event led to the siege of the Indian embassy in Beijing by 
Chinese Red Guards. Consequently, Chinese embassy in New Delhi was also 
encircled. The diplomatic crisis ended when two governments released the embassy 
of the other side from encirclement.  
In the late 1960s, there were some signs that India and China would move out 
of the diplomatic deep freeze. In 1969, China and the Soviet Union had a border 
conflict. Hostility and confrontation between them intensified further. Feeling the 
Soviet Union the biggest threat to China’s national security, China began to look 
for a better relationship with the US to get out of the stalemate in its diplomacy. 
Normalization of the Sino-Indian relations as a countermeasure to the 
Soviet-Indian joint pressure on China’s border was considered by the Chinese 
Government (Liu 1994: 121). In the Indian side, a new thinking to restore relations 
with China emerged. In Indira Gandhi’s opinion India should have an open mind in 
foreign policy and take cognizance of the changing interests in the world. With 
regard to Pakistan and China, the intention was to open dialogue that lead to better 
understanding and a solution of problems (Jetly 1979: 253-258).
36
 On January 1, 
1969, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated in a press conference that the 
Indian Government was prepared to try to find a way of solving the dispute with 
China without insisting on its acceptance of the Colombo Proposals as a 
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pre-condition.
37
 On May 1, 1970, when Mao met diplomatic representatives at the 
podium of Tiananmen Square, Mao shook hands with the Indian charge d’ affaires 
Brajesh Mishra, and told him, “India is a great country. The Indian people are a 
great people. Chinese and Indian people ought to live as friends, they cannot 
always quarrel” (Wang 1998: 302). Mao’s comment was seen in India as a vague 
response to the Indian Prime Minister’s offer to normalize relations with China, 
and raised fresh hopes for a rapprochement (Jetly 1979: 265). However, some 
succeeding events interrupted this process. India moved closer to the Soviet Union, 
as Indira Gandhi saw the threat of emerging China-Pakistan-US triangle. In 1971 
India and the Soviet Union signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and 
Cooperation in the context of the East Pakistan crisis. The treaty was the signal that 
India had deviated from its previous position of Non-alignment in the Cold War. 
China regarded the Indo-Soviet Treaty as being directed against it and Pakistan. In 
1972 India enhanced its administrative control in the Northeast. The NEFA became 
the centrally administered Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Moreover, 
Sikkim was made a State of India in 1974 through a constitutional amendment. 
China strongly protested India’s actions in the NEFA and Sikkim. 
3.3 Gradual Progress in the Sino-Indian Relations since 1976 
In 1976, India and China finally reached a consensus to restore ambassadorial-level 
relations. The exchange of ambassadors suggested that relations had emerged out 
of the deep freeze and entered a period of Détente. In the middle of the 1970s, both 
China and India experienced a number of internal changes, which provided an 
opportunity for the new leaders of both countries to reassess their policies towards 
each other (Liu 1994: 123). In China, the death of Mao and the arrest of the 
ultra-leftist clique, the “Gang of Four,” declared the end of the Cultural Revolution. 
Deng Xiaoping became the new paramount leader of China. In 1978, the Third 
Plenum of the 11
th
 Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided on 
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a policy direction of “reform and opening-up.” This began first with rural reform, 
spreading later to other fields. In foreign policy, it was set that the diplomatic work 
should serve the domestic economic construction. It was extremely important for 
China to have a peaceful international environment. Deng readopted an 
independent foreign policy and emphasized the importance to develop good 
relations with all countries in the world based on the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, including the US and the Soviet Union. He also emphasized the 
importance of the Third World countries as a force of world peace. A friendly 
Sino-Indian relationship would promote the South-South cooperation.
38
 
In India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, facing a political challenge to her 
power, imposed the Emergency of 1975 to bring the situation under control. 
However, her measures led to a crisis of political confidence, and the opposition 
parties unified against her regime. In the general election of 1977, the Janata Party 
won and organized, for the first time in modern Indian history, a non-Congress 
central government. Morarji Desai became the Indian Prime Minister. Desai 
promised a return to “genuine non-alignment,” which meant that India would move 
away from its overtly pro-Soviet stance and adopt a more even-handed approach in 
its dealings with the superpowers. The new regime also coined the term “beneficial 
bilateralism” with regard to India’s neighbors (Ganguly 1994: 153). The Janata 
Government continued Mrs. Gandhi’s policy of improving relations with China. In 
February 1979, Indian Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. 
Vajpayee’s Beijing visit concluded with the signing of a new trade agreement 
between the two countries. Discussing India’s national security with his Chinese 
counterpart, Huang Hua, he received satisfactory assurances for the cessation of 
support to Naga and Mizo insurgents in India’s northeast (Deshingkar 1979: 69-75). 
Vajpayee also had a long session discussion with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. 
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Deng Xiaoping also raised the “package deal” again with regard to the border 
dispute. He elaborated that India had areas under its control which were rich in 
natural resources, whereas China had an area that was not economically useful. It 
would be advisable to have a comprehensive solution on the basis of give-and-take 
(Ranganathan & Khanna 2000: 166). Deng said that if the border question could 
not be resolved at an early date, it “should not prevent us from improving our 
relations in other fields.”39  Furthermore, the Chinese Government agreed to 
reopen the two Hindu holy places in Tibet, Kailash and Manasarovar, to Indian 
pilgrims. Unfortunately, Vajpayee’s visit was overshadowed by the Chinese 
military attack on Vietnam. It was an awkward situation for India because of Deng 
Xiaoping’s remark that China was intervening “to teach Vietnam a lesson,” which 
naturally reminded India of the humiliation of 1962. Indian public opinion reacted 
strongly. Vajpayee cut short his visit and hurried back home. However, his decision 
to visit China was courageous, under circumstances in which the Soviet Union had 
expressed its unhappiness with India’s step to improve relations with China, as well 
as adverse voices from within the Janata Party (Gandhi 1983). 
Although Indo-China relations suffered a small setback in terms of the 
China-Vietnam conflict, Mrs. Gandhi, who returned to power in January 1980, 
made it quite clear that it was in India’s interests to improve relations with China. 
In 1981 Chinese Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, was invited to India, his visit 
leading to the establishment of an annual dialogue on the boundary question at the 
level of Vice-Ministers to be held alternatively in Beijing and New Delhi, thus 
opening the formal border negotiations between India and China. From 1981 to 
1987, India and China held eight rounds of border talks in Beijing and New Delhi 
alternately. Although eight rounds of official-level talks failed to achieve any 
breakthrough on the border issue, these talks still have their significance. Firstly, 
after a prolonged interruption in India-China relations, these talks allowed a 
friendly and candid exchange of views and enhanced mutual understanding 
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between the two governments. The dialogue itself eased tensions and helped to 
shape a negotiated solution acceptable to both sides. In addition, through official 
channels, both sides explored the exchange and cooperation in the areas of 
economy, trade, culture, science and technology, and the possibility of a 
corresponding mechanism. Official, semi-official and unofficial exchange 
increased markedly during this period (Zhang 2004: 107-108). However, there 
were also tensions in this period. In December 1986, India granted statehood to 
Arunachal Pradesh, formerly NEFA. Also in this year, the Sumdorong Chu valley 
dispute in the eastern sector heated up border tensions once again. Both sides 
deployed their armies on the border region, making the prospect of war ever more 
real. However, with tensions growing, both governments realized that a new 
Sino-Indian border war would be harmful and some measures were taken to 
alleviate the tensions (Liu 1994: 142-143).  
A definitive moment in Sino-Indian relations was Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in December 1988. This was the first visit of an Indian 
Prime Minister to China since the 1950s. During the visit, India accepted China’s 
position that bilateral relations could be expanded and improved before the 
resolutions of the border issue. The two governments agreed to broaden bilateral 
ties in various areas and signed bilateral agreements on science and technology 
cooperation, on civil aviation to establish direct air links, and on cultural exchanges. 
The two sides also agreed to hold annual diplomatic consultations between foreign 
ministers, and to set up a joint ministerial committee on economic and scientific 
cooperation and a joint working group specifically on the boundary issue 
(Chaturvedi 1991: 178; Ranganathan & Khanna 2000: 61). Following Rajiv 
Gandhi’s visit, a channel of regular high-level exchange between India and China 
was established. Between 1988 and 1998, India and China agreed to reduce troops 
along the LAC of the Sino-Indian border areas and signed two confidence-building 
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agreements in 1993 and 1996 respectively;
40
 bilateral exchanges in the fields of 
defense, trade, culture, education, environment, information and broadcasting grew 
steadily; increasing institutional links were established not only at the military level 
but also within the scientific, journalistic and political communities (Deepak 2005). 
However, due to a deep mistrust and isolation over a very long time period, both 
countries lacked the domestic circumstances, especially the public opinion, to 
enable greater progress in bilateral relations and on the border question. Mansingh 
(2005) described the tendency of this period in the following way, “possible 
intangible gains of better understanding in the top leadership as well as the 
general public, and sensitivity to each other’s concerns, were not evident in the 
years that followed when differences in security perceptions surfaced again and the 
level of interest and knowledge about each other, even among educated Chinese 
and Indians, remained appallingly low.” 41  Thus, although there was steady 
progress made on the Sino-Indian relations through bilateral exchanges, the events 
that unfolded in 1998 proved that a decade’s period was too little to dispel the deep 
rooted mistrust and misunderstanding between India and China (Deepak 2005: 
355). 
The year 1998 marked a turning point in India’s political system. The Hindu 
nationalist party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was voted to power in March 
1998 and formed a coalition government with the support of 14 political parties. 
Atal Behari Vajpayee assumed the Office of Prime Minister. The BJP, had 
consistently held the position that India required nuclear weapons to safeguard its 
national security. On May 11 and May 13, 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests 
and brought international attention and concern to the subcontinent. Beijing’s 
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initial response to the tests, reported in the Xinhua News Agency was restrained and 
simply expressed concern. However, beaten by India’s Defence Minister, George 
Fernandes’s polemic public comments about China being India’s “potential threat 
number one”, and by Vajpayee’s letter to the US President Clinton published by 
the New York Times on May 13, 1998, linking Chinese threat in defence of India’s 
nuclearization, China reacted angrily and strongly to the second series of nuclear 
explosions of May 13
th
 and launched a rhetoric against India’s nuclear tests.42 The 
bilateral relations were immediately damaged. “China threat” in this context is a 
tactical attempt to justify India’s nuclear tests (Li 2009: 126). Though, China did 
play an important role in shaping the course of India’s nuclear history through the 
1998 tests, had India adopted a little cautious approach, the new negative factor in 
Sino-Indian relations could have been avoided. In essence, Chinese reaction was 
directed more against being labelled as the primary motivation for India developing 
a nuclear capacity rather than against the tests themselves (Ye 1998: 7-10). 
Nevertheless, maintaining good relations with China was also in India’s national 
interests. Following the Chinese reaction, voices of criticism were raised in India 
against the Government’s unwarranted and provocative depiction of China as the 
country’s prime threat, especially from the left-leaning Indian political parties. 
India began to moderate its “China-threat” rhetoric and adopted a proactive 
diplomatic approach towards China. This time, bilateral relations recovered rather 
quickly.  
However, with the eruption of conflict at Kargil in 1999 between India and 
Pakistan presented a new test for the relationship. In June, the conflict escalated 
into a full-scale war. At this critical point, Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh 
visited China and received the assurance from Chinese leaders that China would 
not back Pakistan’s offensive.43 He also confirmed Chinese leaders that India 
perceived no threat from China. This visit was proved to be a key turning point in 
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Sino-Indian relations. The dialogue process was resumed. The year 2000 was the 
50
th
 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and 
China. Indian President K. R. Narayanan’s visit to China in 2000 marked a gradual 
re-engagement of Indian and Chinese diplomacy. High-level exchanges between 
the two countries returned. Li Peng, Chairman of the National People’s Congress, 
visited India in January 2001. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji visited India in January 
2002 with a focus on economic issues. Zhu emphasized that India and China are 
“neighbors and friends,” and that as the largest and most populous countries in 
Asia they have a greater responsibility for maintaining peace, security and stability 
in Asia-Pacific region. Vajpayee also stated in response that “China does not pose 
a threat to India, nor does India believe that China regards India as a threat” to 
ensure China India’s willingness to cooperate.44 Both sides agreed that China and 
India had much more consensus than disagreement, and many more common 
interests than differences. Based on the fact that since the attacks of September 11, 
terrorism had emerged as a challenging issue in world politics, both sides agreed to 
set up a consultation mechanism to fight terrorism. Zhu reiterated China’s stance 
on the Kashmir issue, and expressed hope that India and Pakistan could peacefully 
resolve their disputes through dialogue and consultation. Moreover, Zhu made a 
five-point proposal on the full development of bilateral relations: maintaining 
high-level exchanges between the two nations and exchanges in all fields, 
strengthening mutually beneficial cooperation in economy and trade, promoting 
exchange and cooperation in science and technology, pushing forward regional 
economic cooperation, and properly handling those problems existing between the 
two countries.
45
 A new momentum emerged following the high-level exchanges 
between the two countries. 
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3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the Sino-Indian relations after 1949 when both countries, as 
new nation states, emerged out of colonial rule onto the stage of world politics. 
There was a brief period of cooperative relationship between them at the beginning, 
but soon they were caught up in the politics of the Cold War. The un-demarcated 
common border left by the British to India and China led to the Sino-Indian border 
dispute and the border tensions finally escalated in the fall of 1962 into a limited 
war. Relations between both countries reached the lowest point in the 1960s. The 
brief but bitter war caused a tremendous psychological influence on India, which 
led it to strengthen its military capacities. The 1962 Sino-Indian border war also a 
catalyst for the aggravation of Sino-Soviet relations. While the Sino-Soviet alliance 
collapsed, the Soviet-Indian ties were strengthened. The stalemate of the 
Sino-Indian relations was not only hurting on both sides, but also strengthened the 
Cold War dynamics in the South Asia region. By the early 1970s, the power 
dynamics was as follows: China sided with Pakistan and the United States, and 
India sided with the Soviet Union. Hence, Sino-Indian relations were constrained 
by the Sino-Soviet antagonism and the Indo-Pakistani confrontation. 
The deep freeze of the Sino-Indian relations did not thaw until they restored 
ambassadorial-level relations in 1976. The relationship between India and China 
improved at a very slow pace between the mid-1970s and the mid-1980s. The new 
drive for the Sino-Indian rapprochement was given by the adjustment in the Soviet 
Union’s foreign policy. From 1985 to 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev’s new Asia policy 
of maintaining friendly relations with India and normalizing relations with China 
created a positive atmosphere for both Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations (Liu 
1994: 122-123). It was in this context, that Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, 
visited China in 1988, leading to the full normalization of Sino-Indian relations. 
Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s, the economic development became a 
main theme of the two countries’ strategic planning. The Chinese economic reform 
(started in late 1970s) as well as Indian liberalizing efforts started from the early 
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1990s created a new atmosphere for their interaction which is very different from 
the one set by the Cold War. Since then, bilateral trade between India and China 
has increased markedly. The old themes of rivalry and threats were gradually 
replaced by themes of economic development in the post-Cold War structure. Yet, 
the border issue remained unresolved and belongs to the most protracted problems 
between the two countries. On the security issue, India’s Prokharan II nuclear test 
in 1998 led to a new setback of their relations. However, this time, the restoration 
process soon began and a broad consensus was reached on the bilateral relationship 
and the strengthening of cooperation and coordination in international and regional 
affairs. India-China relations gradually entered a new stage of overall development, 
which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
4 Current Dynamics (2003-2012) 
In this chapter the period of the overall development (2003-2012) of the 
Sino-Indian relations will be reviewed. This period is the main focus of my 
analysis. I will begin with the general settings of the period and then go through 
seven major issue-areas, including economic relations, cultural and educational 
issues, multilateral cooperation, energy relations, Tibet problem, military and 
security issues, and China-Pakistan-India triangle. These issue-areas will provide a 
general picture of the relations in this period. 
4.1 General Settings 
After the temporary setback of 1998 due to India’s nuclear tests, Sino-Indian 
relations in the 21st century continue to develop and diversify in a steady manner. 
The economic liberalization of India launched in the 1990s strengthened India’s 
economic ties with China and paved the way for the idea of deepening synergies 
between them. At the beginning of the new century, the economic impetus became 
self-sustaining and bilateral ties now began to branch into other levels. Started with 
Vajpayee’s China visit in 2003, the relationship has witnessed regular summit-level 
meetings and intensified high-level exchanges. For a better understanding of  
52 
 
India-China relations in this period, it is important to first look at the global 
settings. 
One of the main features of the international system in this period is the 
unipolar reality of which the Unites States is the sole superpower. In terms of 
military-political power, the United States is the only country in the early 21
st
 
century that possesses the ability to project military power on a global scale. The 
question that remains for analysts is how long this “unipolar moment” will last, 
since the power balance does not rest in a state of static equilibrium.
46
 
Another main feature is globalization, emerged in the late 1980s. The 
revolution in communication and information technology has led to a faster 
movement of goods, products, technologies, capital, idea and expertise, as well as 
human beings such as travelers and tourists, causing an increasing interdependence 
between peoples and states. In this context, it is becoming more often the case that 
the use of force might jeopardize a state’s economic objectives (Nye 2003: 5-7). 
This realization indicates that the global accent has gradually shifted to economic 
development in the post-Cold War era, especially for developing countries. The 
importance of economics became a major determinant in its own right, instead of 
the military-centric point of view. 
From June 22-27, 2003, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee paid a six-day official 
visit to China. Vajpayee and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed the Declaration 
on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation on 23 June. Although 
it is only a framework document, the Declaration still indicates how far the two had 
progressed from the mutual suspicion of 1998. At the beginning of the Declaration 
both sides explicitly stated that “the common interests of the two sides outweigh 
their differences,” and that they would “fully utilize the substantial potential and 
opportunities for deepening mutually beneficial cooperation.” These two points 
make the Declaration distinct from previous bilateral document, implying that the 
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bilateral relationship would emphasize a firm foundation based on “common 
interest.” Both sides agreed to promote a “long-term constructive and cooperative 
partnership.” It was decided that the foreign affairs ministers would hold annual 
consultations, and that personnel exchanges between ministries, parliaments, 
political parties, and the militaries of the two countries should be further enhanced. 
On the boundary issue, the Declaration marks the first public acknowledgement of 
seeking eventual solutions of border dispute based on political considerations. It 
was decided to establish Special Representatives’ Meeting to explore the 
framework for a boundary settlement.
47
 
After the Indian general elections of 2004, BJP lost office. Manmohan Singh 
of the Congress Party assumed control and the Congress Party continued the policy 
line of the former government to seek a stable and mutually cooperative 
relationship with China. One year later, in April 2005, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao 
visited India. The two governments signed a Joint Statement and a series of new 
bilateral documents on economic, cultural and border issues. The most significant 
move in the 2005 Joint Statement, compared to the Declaration of 2003, was the 
agreement “to establish an India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for 
Peace and Prosperity.”48 It reflects the consensus that bilateral relations had 
acquired a global and strategic perspective. Another move was on the energy 
question. India and China agreed to cooperate in the field of energy security and 
conservation due to the challenges from the enormous energy requirement of their 
rapid growing economies. In addition, the two sides also declared 2006 as the 
“Year of India-China Friendship” to promote mutual awareness and to deepen the 
friendship between the two peoples. 
The 2003 and 2005 bilateral documents provide a road map for the 
development of relations and comprehensive cooperation between India and China. 
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They indicate the “course correction” from the earlier approaches adopted by the 
two governments to a conscious attempt at charting a new way out of a tangled 
historical legacy.
49
 The achievement acquired by these two visits was further 
elaborated as the “ten-pronged strategy,” expressed in the bilateral document 
signed in November 2006 during China’s President Hu Jintao’s visit to India. The 
“ten-pronged strategy” includes the following aspects: 1. ensuring comprehensive 
development of bilateral relations; 2. strengthening institutional linkages and 
dialogue mechanisms; 3. consolidating commercial and economic exchanges; 4. 
expanding all-round mutually beneficial cooperation; 5. instilling mutual trust and 
confidence through defence cooperation; 6. seeking early settlement of outstanding 
issues; 7. promoting trans-border connectivity and cooperation; 8. boosting 
cooperation in science and technology; 9. revitalising cultural ties and nurturing 
people-to-people exchanges; 10. expanding cooperation on regional and 
international stage.
50
 The “ten-pronged strategy” does not provide any concrete 
measure about how to achieve the cooperation, nevertheless, it prescribes a 
cooperative keynote for the significant bilateral issues at the political level. 
4.2 Economic Relations 
Trade and economic relations are an important part of India-China bilateral 
relations and have witnessed continuous expansion and deepening over the past 
two decades. The opportunities of the bilateral trade and economic relationship are 
enormous and manifold.  
In matters of trade, it has achieved rapid growth. In 1984, the two sides signed 
the Most Favored Nation Agreement. In 2000, India-China bilateral trade volume 
was US$2.92 billion and this reached US$73.9 billion in 2011. In 2008, China 
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became India’s largest goods trading partner, replacing the United States. 51 
However, the trade deficit for India has remained a big problem in their trade 
relations. By 2011, India’s trade deficit had risen to over US$27 billion.52 India is 
very concerned with the fast-widening trade deficit and with Indian exports, largely 
made up of iron ore, other raw materials and cotton. China, in contrast, exports 
finished goods to India, mainly machinery. The high volumes of Chinese trade in 
India is also focussed on infrastructure development, especially telecom and energy 
generation equipment. Although trade has emerged as a strong binding force for the 
bilateral ties, the imbalances in trade and trade frictions have also become a source 
of discords and other uneasiness in the relations. Just as Amit Mitra, Secretary 
General of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FICCI) 
addressed:  
Not only is India’s exports to China less than one-third of China’s exports to 
India, hidden in the statistic is the quantum of raw material exports from India 
like iron ore which at one time, smacked of neo-colonial trade relations. 
Obviously, such large imbalances in trade and the skewed components in the 
trade basket are not sustainable. They are not conducive to a deepening 
economic friendship and needs urgent correction.
53
  
The challenge for India is to diversify its export basket to China. The Indian 
government has urged Indian business to actively pursue opportunities for 
expanding non-traditional items of export and called for greater market access for 
Indian goods in China as a means of dealing with the rising trade deficit. India’s 
concerns over trade deficit have been acknowledging by the Chinese government 
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and efforts are being made to improve market access for Indian products in China. 
These measures include supporting Indian participation in China’s national and 
regional trade fairs, advancing of trade facilitation, enhancing exchange and 
cooperation of pharmaceutical supervision, stronger relationships between Chinese 
enterprises and Indian IT industry and speedier completion of phyto-sanitary 
negotiations on agro products.
54
 However, the trade deficit has its structural roots 
and will not be overcome in the short term. Moreover, India is worried that a large 
number of Chinese cheap goods could hurt domestic industry. According to the 
Indian Minister of State for Commerce and Industry Jyotiraditya Scindia in 
December 2012, India initiated 149 anti-dumping cases against China, accounting 
for more than 50 per cent of all cases India had filed against foreign countries.
55
 
On the mutual investment front, despite strong potential for development, their 
mutual investment is still limited. By October 2011, India’s FDI in China reached 
US$432,98 million comparing with China’s FDI in India of US$298,75 million.56 
Chinese investments in India are still being confronted with lots of restrictions, 
either due to protection of its own market or considerations of security reasons. 
Nevertheless, there has been an upswing in Chinese investments since the two 
countries signed a bilateral investment protection and promotion pact in November 
2006. According to India’s 12th Five Year Plan, India’s infrastructure sector will 
require investment of about US$1 trillion. This will provide enormous opportunity 
for Chinese companies investing in India. 
There are several institutional mechanisms for India-China economic ties. The 
first mechanism is the India-China Joint Economic Group (JEG). India-China Joint 
Economic Group is a ministerial-level dialogue mechanism established in 1988 
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during the visit of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China. JEG had met 
eight times by 2011. Since 2003, there has been a remarkable increase in 
establishing new mechanisms. In 2003, a Joint Study Group (JSG) was set up to 
examine the potential complementarities between the two countries in expanded 
trade and economic cooperation. It suggested setting up a Joint Task Force (JTF) 
for studying the feasibility of a China-India Regional Trade Arrangement. The JTF 
Report was completed in 2007. It recommended Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as a 
mechanism to boost trade dynamics between the countries. However, due to the 
current state of Sino-Indian trade, a free trade agreement is likely to benefit China 
more than India. Therefore, India is reluctant for a FTA with China. In order to 
reach such an agreement, there has to be a trade-off, so that both sides can balance 
the gains and losses and the agreement has to be a comprehensive one that includes 
trade in both goods and services (Virmani 2006: 280). 
In 2010, both sides agreed to set up the India-China Strategic Economic 
Dialogue (SED) for further India-China economic engagement. They also agreed to 
establish an India-China CEO’s Forum to deliberate on business issues and to make 
recommendations on expansion of trade and investment cooperation.
57
 The first 
SED was held from September 26-27, 2011, in Beijing. The official meetings 
included detailed deliberations in three working groups on investment and 
infrastructure, water management and energy efficiency. The two sides also agreed 
to stay committed to deepening bilateral investment cooperation, further opening 
markets and improving the investment environment in both countries to lay a solid 
foundation for pragmatic cooperation between the businesses of the two 
countries.
58
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Economic ties have also been tightened in the financial sector. As their 
influence on the international monetary market increased, this was seen as a matter 
of necessity. Since the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the launch of the 
financial dialogue between India and China was signed in 2005, the two sides had 
held five financial dialogues by 2011. In 2010, a MoU between the Reserve Bank 
of India and China Banking Regulatory Commission to increase banking and 
financial cooperation was concluded. India and China also agreed to grant 
permission to the banks of the other country to open branches and representative 
offices.
59
 In 2011, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China opened its first 
branch office in Mumbai, marking a new milestone in bilateral financial 
cooperation.
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The growing travel connections between India and China mark further 
evidence of the growing economic ties between both countries. In March 2002, 
India and China opened the first direct flight between them from Beijing to New 
Delhi.
61
 In 2005, a MoU was signed, providing for major liberalization of air links 
between India and China.
62
 Since then, flights between the two countries have 
increased exponentially as trade further grows. By 2011, eight direct air links had 
been launched, including Beijing-New Delhi, Shanghai-New Delhi, 
Guangzhou-New Delhi, Chengdu-Bangalore, Kunming-Kolkata, 
Shanghai-Mumbai, Beijing-Mumbai, Shenzhen-Kolkata. 
In addition to governmental efforts, the local governments have been also 
playing an active role in strengthening India-China economic ties. Sichuan 
province in China’s southwest agreed with West Bengal to promote commercial 
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exchanges.
63
 Its capital Chengdu, is ambitious to attract Indian IT companies to 
replicate the success of India’s Bangalore, a hub for India’s IT sector.64 Gujarat, 
which is considered to be India’s growth engine, is also actively seeking Chinese 
investment. In November 2011, during its chief Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in 
China, there were about 80 Chinese companies present in a key business meeting 
“Business and Investment Opportunities in State of Gujarat,” jointly held by the 
embassy of India along with the China Chamber of Commerce for Import and 
Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME).
65
 Shortly before his visit, 
a MoU was signed in New Delhi to confirm the investment by the Chinese energy 
company TBEA in Gujarat to develop a green energy park at an investment of Rs 
2,500 crore.
66
 
4.3 Exchanges and Cooperation in Culture and Education 
In the Joint Declaration between India and China of 2006, one aspect of the 
“ten-pronged strategy” is the revitalization of cultural ties and nurturing 
people-to-people exchanges. Since then, many programs in cultural and educational 
exchanges and cooperation have been launched, making this a focus in the relations. 
The development indicated that leadership in both countries have realized the 
importance and urgency of enhancing mutual understanding between two peoples, 
and fostering people-to-people contacts as one of the best ways to achieve this 
goal. 
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The year 2006 was declared as the India-China Friendship Year. The year 
2007 was the India-China Year of Friendship through Tourism.
67
 In order to 
reinforce traditional cultural links, an agreement was concluded for the 
construction of an Indian-style Buddhist temple at Luoyang in Henan Province of 
China in 2005. In May 2010, President Pratibha Devisingh Patil inaugurated the 
temple during her visit to China.
68
 In February 2007, the Xuanzhang memorial hall 
was inaugurated at Nalanda in Bihar. China also contributed US$1 million for 
India’s effort to build a modern international Nalanda University.69 
In 2005 the two sides announced the launching of regular youth exchange 
activities.
70
 In 2010, the two sides further decided to encourage greater exchanges 
between the civil society organizations, youth, media, scholars, think-tanks, artists 
and cultural personalities. Memorandum of Understanding on Media Exchanges as 
well as the Programme of Cultural Exchanges between the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of India for the 
year 2010-2012 were signed. Both sides agreed to discuss compiling an 
encyclopaedia on India-China cultural contacts.
71
 The Indian Embassy in Beijing 
also launched a public diplomacy campaign aimed at directly reaching out to young, 
middle-class Chinese by opening an account on the popular Sina Weibo microblog, 
which has more than a hundred million users.
72
  According to Mr. Jaishankar, 
Indian Ambassador to China, getting on Weibo was part of a larger campaign to 
make the Indian Embassy’s public diplomacy initiatives more interactive. It was an 
attempt to connect Chinese young people to present a more updated image of India 
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in China where perceptions are still rooted in images of Indian cinema from the 
1950s and 1960s.
73
 
India-China relations in the field of education were further strengthened. The 
Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) of India introduced Chinese as a 
foreign language in the curriculum of schools in India in 2011. China decided to 
offer support for training Chinese language teachers and provided Chinese 
language training materials. The two sides also declared the establishment of the 
India-China Outstanding College Students Exchange Programme, and agreed to 
work on an agreement on mutual recognition of degrees and diplomas.
74
 
4.4 Multilateral Cooperation 
In the current international system, it is increasingly felt that cooperation rather 
than confrontation should govern approaches to regional and global affairs. 
Multilateral cooperation has become a norm that has been gradually accepted by 
states. The following paragraphs from the Declaration of 2003 indicate the 
consensus of the two governments about multilateral cooperation at the regional 
level: 
The two sides supported multilateral cooperation in Asia, believing that such 
cooperation promotes mutual beneficial exchanges, economies growth as well 
as greater cohesion among Asian countries. The two sides viewed positively 
each other’s participation in regional and sub-regional multilateral 
cooperation process in Asia.
75
 
Currently, the major regional frameworks in which both India and China are 
engaged include the East Asia Summit (EAS), the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
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(SAARC).
76
 Yet cooperation between India and China in these regional regimes is 
far from rosy, mainly due to interfering factors such as geopolitical considerations, 
security concerns, entanglement and disputes among members. 
In the case of SAARC, since its inception in 1985, the process of SAARC has 
been hijacked by India-Pakistan relations and India’s dominance in South Asia. 
India would not like to see any regional institution being used as a vehicle to 
countervail it.
77
 Moreover, India has been reluctant to see a growing Chinese 
influence in its backyard. Given its interests in South Asian countries, China also 
shows great interest in SAARC. In the Dhaka Summit of 2005, India agreed on 
China’s observer status in the SAARC but as a condition, Japan also joined as an 
observer. As the subcontinent’s geopolitical weight grows, international interest in 
SAARC is increasing. Today, SAARC has nine observers, but it still refrains from 
admitting new members.
78
 The “China factor” is largely responsible for this. 
India’s smaller neighbors, especially Pakistan and Bangladesh want to see China 
playing a larger role in the economic development of the region and taking a more 
active part in the SAARC process. Though China has invested considerable 
diplomatic and economic resources in pushing its links with the SAARC, “the one 
missing link in China’s SAARC policy is a comprehensive dialogue with India on 
South Asia,” commented the Indian analyst C. Raja Mohan. He suggested that “a 
structured bilateral conversation between Beijing and Delhi could help dispel the 
notion of a Sino-Indian rivalry in the subcontinent and explore ways to leverage 
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the weight of the world’s two fastest-growing economies for regional stability and 
prosperity.”79  
As two regional powers, they are very concerned about the other’s influence in 
the region in which they dominate. This has created problems to their cooperation 
at regional level. However, in international regimes, such as the WTO, the BRICS 
grouping, the G20 major economies, the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), it seems that India and China find greater room for 
cooperation, not only because they have common interests as the two largest 
emerging economies and developing countries in these regimes, which lay a solid 
foundation for their cooperation, but also because there is less entanglement of 
security concerns and other disputes when it is beyond the region. This creates a 
better condition for them to set their differences aside and find common positions. 
For example, in the WTO negotiations of 2003, India and China, together with 
Brazil and South Africa, formed a negotiating bloc with some other developing 
countries and submitted an alternate plan to the WTO demanding immediate 
removal of export and production subsidies on agriculture in developed countries. 
This proposal marked the creation of the G-20 developing country grouping at the 
WTO (Chakraborty and Sengupta 2006: 52). During the UN’s Climate Change 
Conference of 2009, the cooperation of India and China was one of the remarkable 
features, irrespective of the outcome at Copenhagen that the conference did not 
achieve a binding agreement for long-term action. Together with Brazil and South 
Africa, they urged developed countries to fulfil their obligations and commitments, 
forced the western nations to accept the principal of equity while drafting the final 
agreement that protected the rights and interests of the emerging economies and 
large developing countries.
80
 The Chinese appreciated the fact that India stood 
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with China and ensured that China could not be isolated.
81
 Trust was built on 
climate change through the two countries’ coordinated approach to the Copenhagen 
negotiations. In 2010, India and China agreed to continue their consultations on 
climate change negotiations and strengthen bilateral cooperation in green 
technologies.
82
 The BRICS group is another successful example of India and 
China’s cooperation in multilateral regimes. Chinese President Hu Jintao claimed 
BRICS countries are the defender and promoter of the interests of developing 
countries.
83
 Although the grouping has been criticized for having less in common 
than other large emerging economies, its development has gained momentum based 
on practical cooperation, especially in the context of global financial crises since 
2008. The BRICS Summit in New Delhi in March 2012 indicated that the members 
focused more on matters related to economic issues than political.
84
 Their decision 
to create a joint development bank, as a possible alternative to international banks, 
and trade in local currencies, stand as important achievements that highlight BRIC 
countries increasing influence in global decision-making and a shift of economic 
power towards the emerging countries. 
4.5 Energy Relations 
India and China have also emerged as two super energy consumers as their 
economies continue to grow. Limited energy resources in China and India have led 
to an intense competition for oil and gas fields. Since current international energy 
security framework is dominated by the United States, both India and China opted 
for acquiring overseas energy assets for their energy security based on the view that 
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global energy markets and open access can be manipulated and restricted by 
American-led effort. Though Chinese companies have performed better than India 
in the quest for energy assets overseas, the rivalry between Indian and Chinese 
companies is to the disadvantage of both, regardless of who eventually win the bid. 
As it happened in Angola in October 2004, India bid US$600 million for a 50% 
stake in Shell’s Angola oil field Block 18 with a promise to include US$200 
million to support Angola’s ongoing project on railway construction. India’s bid 
was outbid by China with a US$2 billion offer (Singh 2010). After several such 
expensive biddings against each other, they realized any intense competition would 
be detrimental as it would not only contribute to price escalations but also bilateral 
tensions. Hence they started energy cooperation so that the competition for energy 
would not become a zero-sum game.  
In 2005, the two countries agreed to cooperate in energy security and energy 
savings, including through an active collaboration in the survey and exploration of 
oil and natural gas resources in third countries.
85
 Since then there have been 
encouraging signals that their energy cooperation has been working. In December 
2005, oil companies from the two countries teamed up for the first time to purchase 
37% of Petro-Canada’s stake in Syria at a cost of US$573 million. In August 2006, 
China and India jointly acquired 50% of the shares of an oil field in Colombia 
(Kumaraswamy 2008: 351). In January 2006, Indian Petroleum Minister Mani 
Shankar Aiyar led an Indian natural gas delegation to visit China and signed five 
MoUs, most of them dealing with information sharing and cooperation between 
companies.
86
 In the first India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue held in 
September 2011 in Beijing, there was a separate working group on energy 
efficiency, besides two other working groups on water management and on 
investment and infrastructure. 
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Moreover, India and China can coordinate their positions to gain more in 
global energy market. The multilateral energy dialogue has become a stage for 
Sino-Indian energy cooperation. In early 2005, India hosted a round table meeting 
of “Asian Ministers on Oil Cooperation.” At the meeting, major oil-consuming 
countries in Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea and India, agreed to adopt a 
unified position to deal with the “Asian oil premium” and oil security issues 
together. On Dec 16, 2006, energy ministers of China, the US, Japan, South Korea, 
and India met in Beijing to discuss energy security issues.
87
 China, India also 
agreed to explore energy cooperation within the framework of the BRICS.
88
 
To sum up, though the initial driver in this issue area was competition, it 
fostered a sense of interdependence and led to cooperation. Not only the two 
countries discovered repeatedly that they were being played off each other by oil 
producers, but also they frequently fell short in competing against Western oil 
companies due to their inferior position in expertise and experience. This led to the 
formation of an alliance toward influential energy suppliers and cartels. Their 
potential cooperation in the energy sector includes joint bidding, energy efficiency, 
clean and renewable energy, civil nuclear energy, downstream and upstream 
cooperation, transmission and city distribution of gas, multilateral energy 
frameworks, pipeline networking etc (Singh 2010). Although the progress of 
energy cooperation has been slow with some slippery slopes, their energy 
cooperation has been widely supported by the two governments and other actors 
such as company leaders and think thanks (Kumaraswamy 2007; Noronha and Sun 
2008).
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4.6 Military and Security Issues 
4.6.1 Border Dispute 
The border dispute between India and China is no longer the largest hurdle in the 
development of their relations. It has moved into a qualitatively different state, 
which may be termed post-conflictual, that is, if current trends continue, force is 
unlikely to be used to settle the ongoing dispute (Acharya 2011: 159). Nevertheless, 
it has been constantly casting a shadow on their relations and has remained as one 
of the major sources of trust deficit between them. 
The most important development in border issues from 2003 onwards, is the 
establishment of the Special Representatives’ Meeting. Since 1981, when India and 
China began to negotiate their border, three institutions for border negotiations 
have been set up. The first institution is the eight rounds of border talks at the 
vice-ministerial level from 1981-1987. The second institution is the Joint Working 
Group (JWG) on the border which was established in 1988, replaced the 
vice-ministerial border talks. The third institution is the Special Representatives’ 
Meeting established during Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to China in 
2003. Its assignment is “to explore from the political perspective of the overall 
bilateral relationship the framework of a boundary settlement.”90 The Special 
Representatives-level talks and the JWG’s work do not preclude each other. The 
JWG deals with the technical aspects of the border question such as the 
clarification of the LAC and the implementation of CBMs, while the Special 
Representatives’ Meeting discuss the question at a political level. As a major 
achievement of the Special Representatives’ Meeting, the Agreement on Political 
Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Border Question was 
signed during Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005. 
According to this Agreement, both sides agreed to arrive at “package settlements.” 
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This represented a major change in the Indian approach to the resolution of the 
problem as compared to the previous sector-by-sector approach. 
Another meaningful progress in the border issue is the re-opening of border 
trade through Nathula Pass, which belongs to a series of CBMs in border areas in 
recent years. The decision was made during Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003. 
After three years of preparation, the Nathula Pass was reopened in 2006. Although 
the border trade running in Nathu La did not live up to expectations, the decision 
has symbolic significance.
91
 First, the trade through Nathu La was suspended since 
the 1962 war, hence, the resumption is a historic event in bilateral relations; second, 
it established firmly China’s recognition of Sikkim as a part of India, a 
precondition to reach such an agreement. 
The Special Representatives’ work is essentially divided into three phases and 
the first phase was successfully completed with both sides agreeing on the Political 
Parameters and Guiding principles for the settlement of the Indo-China boundary 
question in April 2005. In the second phase of the boundary negotiations, the 
special representatives are expected to draw a framework for the resolution of the 
boundary based on the agreed political parameters and guiding principles. The third 
phase is the delineation and demarcation phase based on an agreed framework. 
Current Special Representatives’ work is at the second phase. 
The present situation in India-China dispute areas is that there is no commonly 
delineated Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China, and both sides 
patrol up to their own perceptions of the LAC in some area. As the Indian Defence 
Minister A.K. Antony described:  
There are few areas along the border where India and China have different 
perceptions of LAC including territory in Arunachal Pradesh. Both sides patrol 
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up to their respective perceptions of LAC due to perceived differences in its 
alignment.
92
  
Hence, border transgressions from both sides take place occasionally. In the 1990s, 
India and China signed two Agreements about CBMs in the border area.
93
 Since 
then, peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border 
areas is being largely maintained.
94
 In Indian Foreign minister S M Krishna’s 
words:  
Let me go on record to say that this (border with China) has been one of the 
most peaceful boundaries that we have had as compared to other boundary 
lines with other countries.
95
  
However, Indian media reports have occasionally highlighted Chinese “incursions” 
or “intrusions” that agitated bilateral relations. The media hype on Chinese 
“incursions” reached a peak in August and in September 2009. For nearly a 
month-long period, there were breaking news about Chinese incursions, especially 
on the 24-hour TV news channels. This led to a war-like hysteria in India and 
seriously affected bilateral relations.
96
 The incursions were, however, downplayed 
by the Indian government. According to Indian Army Chief Deepak Kapoor, there 
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was no increase in the number of such incidents as compared to last year.
97
 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu also denied the incursions.
98
  
In response to a reported Chinese aggression in PoK, Indian Foreign secretary 
Nirupama Rao gave her opinion concerning similar accidents. She said, “The 
correct term is transgression and not incursion. There are transgressions from time 
to time when Chinese troops come over to our side of the line of actual control and 
occasionally we are told that we cross into their side,” She said such issues had to 
be discussed rationally, “There is no point in trying to raise the temperature and to 
accentuate tension.”99 Nevertheless, these Chinese “incursions” do raise much 
concern in India and reflect that part of the Indian society, especially the strategic 
community and the military have been very worried about China’s growing 
influence. The considerable tensions arising out of reported Chinese incursions 
across the border in the Indian media indicated the urgent need to establish some 
institutional mechanism for better and effective border management. It was against 
this background that during the 15th round of Special Representatives’ Meeting, 
held in January 2012, the Agreement on the Establishment of a Working 
Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs was 
signed. This border mechanism is expected to check cases of border transgression 
and address such cases effectively and expeditiously, which is a small but 
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significant step towards the settlement of border dispute between the two 
countries.
100
 
4.6.2 Military Exchanges 
In 2003, Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes visited Beijing and helped 
ease the tensions after the Indian nuclear tests in 1998. Fernandes’s China visit was 
followed by a return visit by Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan in March 
2004. In 2006, China and India signed a MoU on defense cooperation during 
Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s ongoing visit to China that 
formalized the regular and institutional contacts between the armed forces and 
defense officials and experts.
101
 The first Annual Defence Dialogue between India 
and China was held in Beijing in November 2007; in the same year, Indian and 
Chinese armies conducted their first joint training exercise “Hand-in-Hand” on 
land in China’s Kunming province. In 2008, the joint exercises took place in 
Belgaum, India. However, 2009 witnessed a worsening of bilateral relations and in 
2010 India suspended military exchanges with China after it was refused to grant 
permission to a senior Indian Army Commander to proceed on an official trip to 
Beijing.
102
 When the relations went back on the right track, the military exchanges 
soon resumed. In December 2011, both sides agreed to enhance defense exchanges 
and communications for better understanding and mutual trust in the Annual 
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Defence Dialogue. The third “Hand-in-Hand” military exercise was scheduled in 
2013 as a major confidence-building measure between the two armies.
103
  
Generally speaking, bilateral military exchanges as a way of confidence 
building between the two armed forces have been steadily growing except for a 
setback in 2009 and 2010. Nevertheless, the demilitarization of the border area and 
their increasing military exchanges cannot change the fact that they have a disputed 
boundary. The defence of border is still prominent and the logic of balance of 
power continues in their military strategic planning. 
4.6.3 Security Dilemma 
Since the 1990s, China has made significant progress in modernizing its military. 
According to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), China’s military expenditure in 2011 totaled US$129,272 billion (923 
billion yuan), is the second-largest in the world. As a share of GDP, China’s 
military spending has remained extremely stable at approximately 2 per cent from 
2001 to 2010.
104
 Although China constantly emphasizes the peaceful intent of its 
military build-up, the high military expenditure has unavoidable caused concern 
among China’s neighbors, as well as the US. 
India has also increased its military spending. The China factor does contribute 
to India’s military build-up, not only due to the prolonged border dispute but also 
due to the fact that in many ways India sees China as a rival for regional power. In 
2011, India’s military expenditure was ranked seventh in the world and India 
became the world’s largest weapons importer. India’s share of military expenditure 
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in GDP is higher than China, which is in the range from 2.3 to 3 in the period 
2001-2010.
105
 
In China, military regions of Chengdu and of Lanzhou, which border India, are 
responsible for defence against India. The Chengdu Military Region has its primary 
task of maintaining the stability of Tibet, of defence against attacks from India and 
of monitoring the boundary with Myanmar. The Lanzhou Military Region 
prioritizes security in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the Ali 
Prefecture of Tibet Autonomous Region, which includes part of the Aksai Chin 
area. China’s military build-up is not specifically aimed at India since China’s 
perceived security threat mainly comes from the Asia-Pacific region, including 
Taiwan, Japan, the US, and recently in the South China Sea. However, the 
modernizations in the two military regions do take India into account as a potential 
challenger. 
In general, China’s infrastructure along the LAC is much better than India’s. 
By developing road, rail and air connectivity in Tibet and Xinjiang, China has 
connected all the passes and military posts on the LAC with highways, logistic 
depots and military installations. In India, the development of the northeast had 
been long ignored by the Government. Only in recent years, India began to rethink 
border issues with a particular focus on increasing military capability by 
strengthening infrastructure in its border areas with China, including the states of 
Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal 
Pradesh.
106
 By 2011, several steps had been taken in the territory along the LAC 
including raising two mountain divisions of the Army and the deployment of four 
squadrons of its frontline Su-30 MKI fighters. Several new and old airfields had 
been activated and new roads constructed to enable the quicker movement of 
troops and equipment in the region.
107
 Sources in Indian Home Ministry and 
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Border Roads Organization also confirmed its massive road network projects along 
the Indo-China border region, which had been given maximum priority towards 
completion.
108
 
On issues of India’s nuclear program, India has the opinion that it is important 
to reach a minimal deterrence capability against China though not for equivalence. 
In the late 1990s India reached sufficient nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis Pakistan. 
Since then, its nuclear and missile development programmes have shifted to be 
China-centric. “We are not looking at how many missiles China or Pakistan has. ... 
we only want a sufficient number of missiles to defend the country in the event of a 
crisis,” said the DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation of India) 
chief V. K. Saraswat.
109
 In line with this thinking, the Agni missile is at the heart 
of deterrence in the larger context of Sino-Indian equation. In April 2012, India 
successfully tested its Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile, which indicated 
that India had entered the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) club. The 
Agni-V has a range of over 5000 km, designed to hit high-value targets deep inside 
China.
110
 It technologically narrowed the missile gap between India and China and 
gave India more confidence in dealing with China. “Agni-V is to meet our 
present-day threat perceptions, which are determined by our defence forces and 
other agencies,” said DRDO spokesman Ravi Gupta.111 Kanwal Sibal, former 
foreign secretary of India also wrote, “China, in any case, possesses missiles with 
even longer range. Earlier it was India that was vulnerable to Chinese missiles and 
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now the reverse will be true, creating a better balance in deterrence.”112 Having 
the confidence that the weight would be hold on its side, Chinese media openly 
dismissed the importance of the Agni-V.
113
 Nevertheless, the reaction of the 
Chinese government was quite restrained. In answering the question about India’s 
missile test, the spokesman of foreign affairs ministry Liu Weimin said, “China 
and India are cooperative partners rather than competitive rivals,” and the two 
countries “should cherish the hard-won sound relations.”114  
Although India and China both insist on the defensive purpose of military 
build-up, there have been concerns about the escalation of the regional arms race. 
Paul K. Kerr, a non-proliferation expert said, when China, India and Pakistan fire 
missiles, it “has potential ripple effects, and there’s no arms control among the 
three.”115 Pakistan also wants to keep a minimum deterrence capability vis-à-vis 
India. Only six days after India tested Agni-V, the Pakistan military said it 
successfully tested an improved intermediate-range ballistic missile.
116
 Professor 
Zhang Zhaozhong of the National Defense University of China said in a media 
interview that China would not become involved in an arms race with India and 
would further follow the policy of being good neighbors and friends, “but for the 
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sake of regional stability, China should continue to develop defence systems 
against ballistic missile threats.”117 In light of the Agni missiles, we see that the 
three countries are still trapped in a security dilemma with no end in sight. 
4.6.4 Indian Ocean Naval Presence 
Recently, the Indian Ocean has gained great importance in the context of military 
issues between India and China. Maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean belongs 
to India’s core interests in the region. Given the evolving geo-strategic significance 
of the Indian Ocean, India has developed an ambitious maritime strategy.
118
 
India has undergone extensive modernization and expansion with an intention 
to increase its capabilities as a recognized blue-water navy, on the one hand; on the 
other hand, soft power is another element of India’s strategy. India assumes the role 
of a formidable guardian in the Indian Ocean region under the banner of 
cooperative security. It has concluded cooperation agreements with all island states 
in the Indian Ocean, and reached out to the coastal states of eastern Africa and 
initiated defence cooperation with the navies of South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, 
and Mozambique. India is also very concerned about naval intrusion in the Indian 
Ocean, rejecting the view that an outside power is needed as “a sea-balancer” for 
the area. After the British withdrawal, New Delhi opposed the entry of the United 
States and Russia into the Indian Ocean. Currently, India is concerned about 
Chinese activities in the Indian Ocean.  
With the expansion of its overseas interests, China’s dependence on the Indian 
Ocean for safe maritime routes has been increasing. Hence, it is also in China’s 
interests to strengthen cooperation with the Indian Ocean littoral states. Due to 
historical distrust and practical reasons, China’s economic activities in Myanmar, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka tend to be misinterpreted by India as activities with 
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military purpose. Fears over China setting up military bases in the Indian Ocean 
have become heightened after China’s naval presence in the region increased 
following the involvement of its naval vessels in anti-piracy escort missions in 
2008.
119
 There is a so-called China’s “string of Pearls” strategy, a term first used in 
an internal United States Department of Defense report titled “Energy Futures in 
Asia,” which later gained popularity in the international geopolitical discourse.120 
China denies, however, that there is a “string of pearls” strategy. The so-called 
string of pearls represents more of a chain of Chinese commercial ventures than 
military stepping-stones in the Indian Ocean. However, based on the proposition 
that China is building a ‘string of pearls’ along vital Sea Lines of Communication 
(SLOC) in the Indian Ocean, some Indian analysts began to talk of a potential 
“necklace of diamonds” strategy as India’s reaction, suggesting that India’s 
strategic cooperation needs to be strengthened with countries in the eastern section 
of the Indian Ocean such as Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam.
121
 In the 
perception of these analysts, China is not only containing Indian on land, but also 
on the sea. However, the fears over China setting up military bases in the Indian 
Ocean are exaggerated, considering that China have not yet had the capabilities to 
maintain a military base overseas, and the fact that China’s policy of not seeking to 
build any oversea military bases has remained unchanged. 
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China’s navy has gained maturity through two decades of reform and military 
modernisation but it still lacks capabilities for long-distance operations. In addition, 
Chinese naval efforts have been directed first to concerns in the East and South 
China Sea because of the Taiwan issue, dispute of Senkaku Islands with Japan, and 
territorial disputes with several Southeast Asian states. In China, there are voices 
calling on the government to rethink its policy of not setting up military presence 
abroad, because the needs to establish a resupplying system for long-distance 
operations of the Chinese navy have become urgent. One of the contributors of the 
China’s National Defense White Paper, Chen Zhou, a researcher of the Chinese 
Academy of Military Science acknowledged that the long-standing policy of not 
establishing military bases overseas would be challenged.
122
 Yet China has always 
advocated non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Refraining 
from establishing military bases overseas is important for the Chinese government 
to show that it adheres to this position. Hence, a possible solution in the future is to 
establish oversea staging posts rather than military bases.
123
  
In China, the Indian Ocean has not been established as an overall strategic 
research area.  Nevertheless, the discussion has begun. In August 2011, China’s 
first Indian Ocean Strategy Symposium was held at Xiamen University. 
Participants recognized the growing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean to 
China and expressed their will to promote systematic, comprehensive and scientific 
study of the Indian Ocean strategy for the needs of the national strategic 
development. Expert discussions on China’s marine time strategy in the Indian 
Ocean will, without a doubt, lead to policy choices. Since maritime security of 
China does not terminate at the Strait of Malacca, China’s economic lifelines could 
be cut off at any point at vast waters from the Strait of Hormuz to the Straits of 
Malacca in the Indian Ocean, it is foreseeable that the Chinese navy in the Indian 
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Ocean will be more active in the future to ensure the safe voyage of its ships. 
However, it is not China’s intention to challenge India’s domination on the Indian 
Ocean. 
4.7 Tibet Problem 
The Tibet issue has been one of the major open wounds in India-China relations. 
India recognizes that Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the Chinese territory. 
The major problem nowadays revolves around the fact that India hosts the 14
th
 
Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile. Beijing has been consistently 
accusing the Dalai Lama of carrying on separatist activities from Indian soil and 
telling New Delhi to take some concrete measures to stop the “anti-China political 
activities.” The position of the Indian government is that “it is firmly opposed to 
any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about ‘independence 
of Tibet’.”124 However, there has been a public sympathy towards Tibetans in 
India and the Indian government could not prevent pro-Tibetan groups in India 
from supporting the Tibetan exile government in view of India’s democratic 
structure. Furthermore, through decades of effort by the Dalai Lama and the exile 
Tibetans, the Tibetan issue has been successfully internationalized, adding more 
complexities to the matter. 
The India government took all precautions to ensure that the sensitive Tibet 
issue does not affect bilateral ties. For example, in March 2008 a series of riots, 
protests, and demonstrations broke out in Tibet, followed by a series of anti-China 
protests in India. Activists stormed Chinese embassy and also attempted to disrupt 
Olympic torch relay in India. China in turn, sought understanding and support from 
India for a smooth passage of the Olympic torch. In this context, India took great 
effort in security and Indian Foreign Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, also sent 
warnings to Dalai Lama asking him to refrain from political activities that could 
hurt the relationship with China: 
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Dalai Lama is a religious leader. India will render all the hospitality to him as 
he is a respectable guest, he will have full freedom to preach religion in India 
but he cannot conduct any political activities in this country that lead to 
negative impact on Indo-Sino relations.
125
  
India’s effort on this issue was very appreciated by China. Nevertheless, the unrest 
in Tibet of 2008 did cause some detrimental effects on the Sino-Indian relations, 
which was later reflected by the media hype about Chinese border incursions in 
India in August and September 2009. According to B. Raman, former director of 
the Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai, some Indian strategic analysts saw the 
Tibet unrest as an opportunity to play the Tibet card against China. Since the 
border dispute had been inextricably intertwined with the Tibet issue, some 
analysts believed that by playing the Tibet card India might be able to change the 
status quo in the western sector and preserve the status quo in the eastern sector 
(Raman 2009).
126
  
New Delhi has been facing two sources of pressure, one from Beijing’s request 
to restrict the activities of the Tibetan government-in-exile in India and one from 
the domestic criticism over the placement of restrictions on the freedoms of the 
Tibetan refugees. Generally speaking, India does not want to offend Dalai Lama, 
yet India does not want to damage India-China relations because of Dalai Lama 
either. Indian political leaders have so far managed to balance the pressure from 
Beijing and from within. Recently, the self-immolation protests carried out by 
Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns in China have emerged as a new problem zone, 
creating frictions and tensions.
127
 The reincarnation of the 14
th
 Dalai Lama could 
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turn as a further source of conflicts between India and China adds more 
unpredictability of the issue. Although the annoyance related to the Tibet issue will 
not change the general positive tendency in Sino-Indian relations currently, 
predicting the nature of future developments on this sensitive issue remains a 
difficult exercise. 
4.8 China-Pakistan-India Triangle 
China-Pakistan-India triangle has been one of the protracted problem issues in the 
Sino-Indian relations. The intimate relationship between China and Pakistan 
developed in a special historical context, in which China’s adversarial relationship 
with India was one of the most important factors. Today, in the context of China 
and India’s improved relations, the trend of cooperation also has an impact on this 
issue area. China remains Pakistan’s closest friend and strategic ally, but this 
relationship is no longer mainly aimed at India. However, the distrust in the 
triangle cannot be easily dismissed in the short run and competition remains as the 
dominant force in this area. India and Pakistan relations witnessed twists and turns 
in this period. Yet, some CBMs were established and economics might become the 
new impetus between them.  
Pakistan and China have their own stakes in each other to continue their 
strategic closeness. Besides their close military relations, economic cooperation has 
become another main theme in their relationship over the past decades. A 
comprehensive free trade agreement was signed in 2006, giving each country 
unprecedented market access to the other.
128
 According to the Chinese Commerce 
Ministry, by the end of 2010, Chinese enterprises had signed contracts with 
Pakistan worth a total of 19.87 billion dollars; China’s direct investment in 
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Pakistan hit 1.36 billion dollars, while Pakistan’s investment in China, 57.38 
million dollars.
129
  
For China, Pakistan has a unique economic, security and strategic value in 
today’s international environment. First of all, it is the first Islamic country to 
establish diplomatic relations with China and the bridge for China to the Islamic 
world. Second, Pakistan’s location which connects West Asia and Middle East is 
significant for China in securing energy routes for its economic development. Third, 
Chinese efforts against Islamic terrorism need cooperation with Pakistan. After the 
September 11 attacks in 2001, Pakistan became a key ally against terrorism with 
the United States. This directly led to a deterioration of Pakistan’s domestic 
security environment and the spill-over of Islamist extremism from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan into the autonomous regions of western China, forcing Beijing to pay 
greater attention to the sources of international terrorism in Pakistan. Fourth, 
Pakistan is an important card to play to keep its strategic influence in South Asia. 
For Pakistan, both China and the United States are crucial strategic allies. 
However, Islamabad places greater value on its relationship with Beijing. On the 
one hand, Pakistan’s special relationship with China has strengthened its strategic 
importance in the eyes of the US and other western countries; on the other hand, 
although Pakistan is the “non-NATO ally” of the US in its War on Terror, Pakistan 
considers China a more reliable ally than the United States because China is an 
“all-weather” friend whereas the US is a friend only in “good-weather.” China’s 
“no-strings attached” economic aid to Pakistan mainly used in Pakistan’s 
infrastructure construction is more appreciated than the aid it receives from the US, 
which often comes with attached conditions.  
The year 2011 marked a turning point of the US-Pakistan alliance. A series of 
events including the assassination of Osama bin Laden led to the deterioration of 
their relations and Pakistan was under the pressure of facing diplomatic isolation. 
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Many in Islamabad held the opinion of moving even closer to China so that it could 
show the international community that Pakistan has an emerging world power 
standing behind it. Nevertheless, China is no longer simply a regional power that 
has to cater to Pakistan’s interests alone but also sees its ally through the prism of 
its own global interests (Khokhar 2011: 9). Beijing is dealing with the relationship 
in a more cautious manner and is unlikely to supplant the United States in 
Pakistan.
130
 In recent years, growing closeness between India and the US has 
caused concern in China about US’s attempts to encircle China by integrating India 
into its alliance system. If Pakistan gets closer to China strategically, India would 
possibly move faster to the US. This is a situation that China will not be willing to 
see. Hence, China has been trying to court India to keep it from getting closer to 
the United States.  
 Currently, there are limits to China-Pakistan ties. Both sides need 
reconsideration of their cooperation. First, Pakistan has run a substantial trade 
deficit with China. Excessive import of cheap Chinese products is distorting the 
market, hurting local industries, though Pakistan has not made anti-dumping 
complaints against China.
131
 Second, Chinese investment has failed to create the 
expected number of jobs, for example in Balochistan and there are delays in the 
implementation of agreements (Khokhar 2011: 10). Third, Chinese direct 
investment is far from reaching its proper scale because of considerations over 
Pakistan’s domestic instability. Chinese workers have become targets of extremists. 
China also worries Pakistan’s inability to curb terrorism. Fourth, cultural relations 
and people-to-people contacts are still weak fields in Pakistan-China relations. 
Pakistan’s relations with China have been so far dictated by the military, and it is 
the military which benefits the most from this relationship. 
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Although current Pakistan-China relations are not without question marks, the 
basic framework of this strategic partnership will continue. The Chinese steadfast 
support for Pakistan has been an ongoing source of tensions in the Sino-Indian 
relationship. However, as the international environment has changed, this 
understanding has reached its limit to explain new development between them. 
Given the size and potential of Indian economy, India is the more important actor 
in South Asia for China to interact with. Over the years, Sino-Indian relationship 
has acquired an independent dynamism and cannot be easily hamstrung by the 
all-weather friendship between China and Pakistan. At the same time, China is 
increasingly reluctant to get trapped in the quagmire of South Asian politics, and 
Kashmir in particular. 
The Pakistan-India relationship has undergone twists and turns over the past 
years. Some confidence-building measures, such as the 2003 ceasefire agreement 
and the Delhi-Lahore Bus service, were successful in deescalating tensions 
between Pakistan and India. However, these efforts have been consistently 
impeded by terrorist attacks. In 2008, the Mumbai attacks carried out by Pakistani 
militants gave the bilateral ties a severe blow. The deterioration of US-Pakistan 
relations in 2011 brought a new opportunity to the normalization between India and 
Pakistan. Pakistan, with its own confrontation with the US, did not want to fight 
wars on two fronts. The country’s economy was also structurally in deep trouble. 
All these pressures pushed Pakistan to get closer to India. Pakistan agreed to grant 
India the most-favored nation (MFN) status in 2011 and to relax visa restrictions as 
well as discuss trade and the Kashmir issue simultaneously.
132
 Expanded economic 
engagement between India and Pakistan could alter the dynamic of mutual 
suspicion and rivalry in South Asia, which would be a positive step towards 
regional cooperation. China is happy to see continuous improvement of 
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Pakistan-India ties, because any confrontation between India and Pakistan would 
put Beijing in the position of having to choose between the two countries, which is 
not in China’s interest. Moreover, the rapidly deteriorating situation in Pakistan has 
already jeopardized India and China’s own security. Both India and China share the 
stake to stabilize the situation in Pakistan. In fact, China played a role in facilitating 
the recent warming up between Pakistan and India. “Our best friend China... has 
advised us to promote trade relations with India,” said Pakistan Prime Minister 
Yousuf Raza Gilani.
133
 Since Pakistan reposes its full trust in China, China could 
play a bridge-building role between Pakistan and India. Yet, India traditionally 
views the India-Pakistan and India-China relationships as separate issues, 
connected by China’s support for India’s enemy. It still remains to be seen whether 
India can accept China to play such a role, and to what extent India-Pakistan 
relations can be improved. A better India-Pakistan relationship is expected to 
neutralize the China factor in the triangle.  
4.9 Conclusion 
The development of India-China relations in this period should be first understood 
in the global context that economic development has become the main theme 
instead of the security-centric point of view. The economic liberalization of India 
launched in the 1990s has strengthened India’s economic ties with China and paved 
the way for the idea of deepening synergies between them; the economic impetus 
has become self-sustaining. This mitigates conflict potentials and lays the ground 
for cooperation in this period. The 2003 and 2005 bilateral documents signed by 
the two governments provided a road map for the development of relations and 
bilateral ties began to branch into other levels.  
If we frame the relationship within a spectrum that goes from pure cooperation 
to pure competition, we can observe that in this period, the relationship reaches to a 
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state that is hard to recognize which kind of forces is stronger, cooperation or 
competition. At the government level, from both sides cooperation has become the 
dominant theme in government rhetoric towards each other. Yet, if we look at 
concrete issue-areas, different issue-areas have shown different pictures.  
In economic relations, in cultural and educational issues, cooperation has been 
the major trend; in multilateral settings, though both countries have adopted the 
norm of multilateral cooperation; however, cooperation has been easier to be 
achieved in the international regimes rather than regional regimes because of the 
competition mindset of keeping their traditional sphere of influence in the region. 
On energy-related issues, the initial driver was competition, but it then fostered a 
sense of interdependence that led to cooperation. There have been some hard-core 
issues that constrain India-China relations and have been the sources of conflicts 
and competition. This ground reality has not changed, though cooperation and 
mitigation of conflicts are observable. The Tibet issue has remained a source of 
political conflicts between India and China, mainly because the exile Tibetan 
government and the Dalai Lama are welcomed in India. The China-Pakistan-India 
triangle is another one point of friction, unless India and Pakistan manage to alter 
the dynamic of mutual suspicion and rivalry in South Asia. With regards to the 
military and security issues, military conflicts are not an interest for both sides, 
therefore military and security cooperation are necessary in terms of conflict 
prevention. In this period, India and China continue to work together to enhance 
mutual trust in the security field and to maintain peace and tranquillity in 
India-China border areas through various CBMs. Military ties between India and 
China have increased alongside with intensified exchanges in other areas of 
bilateral relations, though there was a period of stagnation from 2009 to 2010. 
Meanwhile, security dilemma is persistent.  Both are carefully watching each 
other and seek to maintain a military balance between them. This is the case with 
the military infrastructure in the border area, where development and construction 
goes hand in hand with the establishment of various communication channels to 
react flexibly on security challenges; with nuclear arms, where a minimal 
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deterrence is aimed for defensive purpose. In the Indian Ocean, China has currently 
no intention and capability to challenge India’s domination. However, China is 
strengthening its navy, for its ocean disputes and for its secure SLOCs. Concerning 
the China-India-Pakistan triangle, China and Pakistan will continue their intimate 
relationship. However, China is also willing to see a better Pakistan-India 
relationship, while having good relations with India. And whether the China factor 
can be neutralized in the triangle to a large extent depends on the dynamics 
between India and Pakistan.  
In sum, India-China relations have shown a mixed nature and gained a 
multifaceted character in this period oscillating between competition and 
cooperation. Sometimes one side is stronger, and sometimes they are equal in 
power and influence. The following chapters will try to explain this reality by 
examining how national identity and interest of one state affect its foreign policy 
towards the other. Below, I begin by an analysis of China’s national identity and 
national interest.  
5 China’s National Identity and National Interest 
Broadly understood, a constructivist approach would base its explanation of a 
state’s foreign policy on the state political elites’ understanding about national 
identity and interest rather than on a straightforward realpolitik calculation. 
National identity and national interest are both umbrella terms, including many 
identities and interests. In a period of time, some components are more powerful 
thus forming dominant identities and interests. There is also an objective and 
subjective distinction between various national identities and national interests, as I 
have elaborated in the theoretical part of this thesis. For operational convenience I 
will mainly focus on the objective attributes. In this chapter I will first examine 
China’s objective identities which are apparent and dominant in the period I study, 
including “civilization state,” “nation state,” “developing country,” “rising power” 
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and “regional power.” These are objective identities generally agreed by other state 
actors in the international system without dispute. Following this, I will examine 
China’s objective national interests, including economic development, security, and 
status. 
5.1 China’s National Identity 
5.1.1 China from Civilization State to Nation State 
In order to understand China’s international role and status in the international 
politics, it is important to have an idea about how China is perceived by Chinese 
themselves. In general, China’s self-conception is first based on a positive 
self-identification as a civilization state, as well as a nation state with an 
ambivalent mix of a negative historical experience due to the foreign aggression in 
the 19
th
 and the first half of 20
th
 century. 
In Chinese perception, China’s history is written by dynasties. Although China 
has been divided in the past because of the fall of dynasties or foreign conquest, 
there has always been a driving force to reunify China, which can be largely 
attributed to Chinese culture. One of the crucial factors which contribute to this 
continuity of Chinese culture is that the Chinese have an early and sustained 
interest in history and chronology, which sets Chinese civilization apart from other 
civilizations. Indian civilization, for example, is also highly sophisticated, but it 
was relatively little concerned with chronology (Dreyer 2008: 24). Another crucial 
factor is the Chinese written language. Chinese developed a sophisticated written 
language at an early date and this script has been used continuously without break. 
Through the written language, Chinese inherited one common cultural heritage and 
share a common perception of their history, which in turn gives them the 
identification as Chinese. Chinese characters evolved over time from earlier forms 
of hieroglyphs. In the Chinese language, there is much less need for a uniform 
speech-and-writing continuum. This is an advantage to connect a great variance of 
people within its territory, because there is no problem of understanding each other 
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between various peoples with different spoken varieties of Chinese, so long as they 
can understand the written language. There are lots of spoken varieties of Chinese 
language, and the pronunciations of them could be totally different from each other. 
Internal divisions of Chinese are usually perceived by their native speakers as 
dialects of a single Chinese language, rather than separate languages, although this 
identification is considered inappropriate by some linguists and Sinologists (Mair 
1991).  
Chinese civilization originally developed from tribe civilization of a core 
group which inhabit in the Yellow River (Huang He) basin in north China. This 
group of ancient people formed the nucleus of what later became the Han ethnic 
group in China. Over time, this core group gradually spread out, generally 
southwards along cultivable river banks. This major ethnicity had extensive 
contacts and exchanges with other ethnic groups in its periphery and continuously 
assimilated them into the dominant Han culture, thus forming a multi-ethnic based 
mono-group. Hence, the Han Chinese is in fact not one ethnic group but internally 
very diverse. In the core lands of North, Central and South China, the Han Chinese 
have always been the majority. The periphery regions have been alternately inside 
and outside the borders of Chinese empires, but have been regarded as integral 
parts of the ebb and flow of Chinese history, and their peoples either confirmed the 
Han cultural heritage thus become parts of Han-Chinese or shared parts of this 
cultural heritage. On occasion, China was ruled over all or in parts of the core lands 
by powerful non-Han Chinese groups from its periphery such as Uygurs, Mongols 
and Manchus. Some were later assimilated themselves to Chinese culture, some 
were not.
134
 The Dynasties they established are also regarded as Chinese. Rather 
than origin, in Chinese perception, one’s willingness to accept Chinese cultural 
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norms, such as ethics, behaviour, language, is the main determinant of being a 
Chinese. 
Chinese have a great pride in their ancient and continuous civilization. For 
many centuries, they felt secure in the image of a central kingdom, and the physical 
and cultural strength that China possessed did sustain this image. However, this 
image was broken by the Westerners who desired trade and wanted to spread their 
religious beliefs in China. Beginning with the Opium War of 1839-1842, the 
Chinese were defeated in this confrontation and was cut deeply by the outside 
powers until the mid-20
th
 century. This defeat induced the sense of humility and 
inferiority in the Chinese and haunted their elites for generations. At the same time, 
through contact with the Western countries, the Chinese gradually developed the 
consciousness of a nation state. In October 1949, the CCP won state power and 
established PRC as one of the members of the Westphalian state system, which 
prescribes territory, sovereignty, and international legitimacy as the basic 
constitutive dimensions of a modern nation state. The leadership of the CCP 
regarded this historical event as a break with a humiliating past and felt the need to 
“fashion a sociocultural ethos that is distinctively Chinese, traditionally superior to 
and contemporarily distinct from the values and behaviours of foreign societies” 
(Whiting 1992: 240). This perception of victimhood has great influence on China’s 
policy making and it is an important factor to be taken into account in 
understanding China’s foreign policy behaviour and in dealing with China. 
However, under the leadership of Mao, China did not gain prosperity and was 
isolated in international society. This situation was changed by Deng Xiaoping, 
who assumed the political power after the death of Mao. In 1978, the Third Plenum 
of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided on a 
policy direction of “reform and opening-up.” This began first with rural reform, 
spreading later to other fields. The result of the Chinese opening-up policy is 
significant, since it paved the way for steady high economic growth rates. In turn, 
the growing economic and political influence in the globe has brought new 
confidence in China as a nation state. 
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5.1.2 China as Developing Country 
According to the World Bank Country Classification, China belongs to the group 
of Lower-middle-income economies. China’s per capita GDP in 2009 stood at 
US$3,687 a year, ranking 103 worldwide.
135
 According to the country 
classification of the IMF, China falls into the category of emerging and developing 
economies.
136
 China’s Human Development Index (HDI) was 0.699 in 2012, 
which gave the country a rank of 101 out of 187 countries with comparable data.
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Such indicators consolidate China as a developing country. In terms of its material 
reality, most Chinese also perceive China as a developing country.
138
 China at the 
same time is the most populous country in the world, with a population of 1.34 
billion by 2010. More economic growth will be needed to create jobs and for the 
welfare of the population. 
According to Dittmer and Kim (Dittmer & Kim 1993: 16), an international 
reference group contributes to national self-definition in two ways: first, it provides 
domestic legitimacy to a regime to maintain its governance; second, it provides 
leadership in pursuing joint international objectives. The identification of China as 
a developing country not only reflects its historical experiences and its material 
reality, but also defines its positions in diplomacy and its relations with other 
countries. Identifying itself as a developing country, Chinese foreign policy has 
been dominated by the “tao guang yang hui (韬光养晦), you suo zuo wei (有所作
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为)” strategy, which is a series of foreign policy thoughts formulated by Deng 
Xiaoping in the context of the upheavals in Eastern Europe from 1989 to 1991. 
Literally “tao guang (韬光)” means to “hide brightness,” “yang hui (养晦)” means 
to “nourish obscurity,” “you suo zuo wei (有所作为)” means “do something,” or 
“modest operations.” Many English speakers translate “tao guang yang hui” as 
“hide our brightness and bide our time.” However, the English translation is not 
entirely correct. The phase has nothing to do with “biding time.”139 Considering 
the context of when Deng used the phrase, a more accurate interpretation would be 
that China should keep a low profile and should not seek to play a leadership role 
on the international stage, while doing something and making its own contribution 
to the world. 
Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third 
World. But we absolutely cannot do that – this is one of our basic state policies. 
We can’t afford to do it and besides, we aren’t strong enough. There is nothing 
to be gained by playing that role; we would only lose most of our initiative. 
China will always side with the Third World countries, but we shall never seek 
hegemony over them or serve as their leader. Nevertheless, we cannot simply 
do nothing in international affairs; we have to make our contribution. In what 
respect?I think we should help promote the establishment of a new 
international political and economic order.
140
 
For Deng Xiaoping, the greatest threat of Chinese state was not war, but its own 
lack of economic development. Thus, China, as a poor and weak country, should 
avoid conflict and concentrate on its development.  
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The crucial thing for us is to avoid unrest. … We should be calm, calm and 
again calm, and quietly immerse ourselves in practical work to accomplish 
something – something for China.141 
Although China has achieved a robust economic growth since three decades, the 
basic reality about China – a populous country with a weak economic foundation 
and uneven development – has not changed. In an interview to the Washington 
Post in November 21, 2003, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said:  
China is a big country with 1.3 billion people. … But the problem can only be 
resolved through continued development. … So if we use multiplication, any 
small problem multiplied by 1.3 billion will end up being a very big problem. 
For a very big aggregate divided by 1.3 billion, it will come to a very tiny 
figure.
142
  
This indicates that China’s overwhelming priority is a domestic one and its leaders 
are clearly aware of this. 
5.1.3 China as Rising Power 
In the past 20 years, China has undergone a profound transformation not only in its 
economic power, but also in how it views itself and the world. It no longer views 
itself as a third world country, but as a rising power, with limited but increasingly 
significant capacity in shaping its environment. 
The CCP’s leadership has regarded the restoration of China’s rightful place in 
the world as their mission. Since power is an essential determinant of its 
international status, the power factor plays a critical role in China’s 
self-identification. In matters of power, China has long recognized the importance 
of enhancing its economic and military strength, and a powerful national economy 
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would support its military strength. Although during the first 30 years of PRC, its 
leaders were heavily concerned with ideology and class struggle and failed in 
economic construction, this does not mean that they did not attempt to pursue the 
latter. Although the Great Leap Forward launched by Mao in the late 1950s ended 
as a national disaster, it did reflect the political elite’s urgent desire at that time of 
making China a powerful nation in the world. However, only until the late 1970s 
China seemed to have found its right way to enhance its power by launching 
liberalising economic reforms. 
China’s rising power had remained a delicate topic inside China because of 
Deng’s “tao guang yang hui” strategy. Chinese officials were cautious about 
talking the rising Chinese power slogan because the government would not like the 
world to see its rise as a threat. This was changed when the fourth generation of 
leaders, of whom Hu Jintao was the core figure, took over. When Hu Jintao 
assumed office in 2002, China had become the world’s sixth largest economy. 
Chinese leadership found out that it was becoming more and more difficult to hide 
brightness and nourish obscurity. Like it or not, China’s rise had become a reality. 
Rise was no longer something they wanted to be hidden and national confidence 
reached an unprecedented height. Public reports of the two collective studies of the 
Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China showed the signs of China’s 
new identification as a rising power.
143
 In November 2003 and February 2004, two 
continuous collective studies were both about rising powers. The topic of the 
collective study in November 2003 was about the history of the world major 
powers since the 15
th
 century and the one in February 2004 was about international 
structure and China’s security environment. The former was in a “vertical” 
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direction, discussing the major powers’ ups and downs since the fifteenth century; 
the latter was in a “horizontal” direction, discussing the current interaction between 
China and the world.
144
 These studies revealed that Chinese top leadership began 
to consider the relationship between China and the world from a new angle. Based 
on history and reality, they asked questions such as: a) would China be able to find 
a different development path – which is more peaceful comparing to the rise of 
major powers in the past? b) what kind of impact would China’s rise bring to the 
world? The result of this kind of discussions gave shape to China’s new foreign 
policy doctrine in Hu Jintao’s era based on China as a rising power. 
In contemporary Chinese political thought, the main goal of the Chinese state 
is to maximize China’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP).145 CNP stresses 
economic and military power, namely hard power, as well as soft power. The 
concept of soft power was coined by the American political scientist Joseph Nye in 
1990. Unlike its antithesis “hard power,” which is about using military or economic 
might to force other countries to act in a particular fashion, “soft power” refers to 
the ability to get others to do what you want. It depends on the attractiveness of 
your culture and ideas, your legitimacy in the eyes of others, and your ability to set 
the rules in international organizations (Leonard 2008: 94). Joseph Nye (1990) also 
argued, “if it [a state] can establish international norms consistent with its society, 
it is less likely to have to change. If it can support institutions that make other 
states wish to channel or limit their activities in ways the dominant state prefers, it 
may be spared the costly exercise of coercive or hard power.” This power concept 
is consistent with Chinese traditional understanding of power, that “wang dao (王
道),” that is “kingcraft,” has a higher value than “ba dao (霸道),” which is “rule by 
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force.” Currently, China’s government promotes soft power with great zeal. The 
most well-known example is the establishment of Confucius Institutes overseas to 
teach Chinese and promote Chinese culture. China Central Television (CCTV)’s 
English news channel CCTV-9 was also designed to upgrade to a global news 
channel to rival CNN, and to voice more perspectives from China. 
5.1.4 China as Regional Power 
Because of its size and central location, China physically dominates Asia. It 
borders with countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Central 
Asia, thus can exert influence on all these Asian sub-regions. In the history of Asia, 
particularly the history of East Asia (here including Northeast and Southeast Asia), 
China deeply influenced the culture of the peripheral countries and drew them into 
a Sino-centric international order by the imperial tribute system. However, Chinese 
tribute system ended in the 19
th
 century by Chinese military confrontation with the 
West and the decaying of the Chinese empire itself. China lost its long-standing 
position as the dominant regional power. Instead, Japanese Empire emerged as the 
dominant power in Asia and promoted its interests with the concept “Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” in the 1930s until the end of the World War II. After 
the Japanese rule in East Asia, the US established its de facto hegemony in the 
region during the Cold War period by establishing military alliances. 
After a century of exerting only modest influence in Asia, China has now 
become an active and important regional actor. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
ties with neighboring countries gained increasing importance in China’s diplomacy, 
because a stable and prosperous surrounding will help China focus on its economic 
development. In this context, China implemented a new regional policy to win over 
its East Asian neighbors. China resorted to regionalism, which is proved to be 
successful to enhance China’s economic, political and security interests in the 
region.  
China’s experience with regionalism started first with APEC in the early 1990s, 
which at that time was perceived to serve China’s economic development agenda, 
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and the formation of APEC also helped develop an “Asian-Pacific” regional 
identity in China. A tougher test for China’s approach to regionalism came with the 
establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, which is a 
mechanism aimed at promoting regional security cooperation (Wu 2009: 56). At 
the beginning, China viewed such organization as a potential tool of the United 
States that could be used to contain it. However, Beijing soon found out that the US 
did not control it and ARF was a useful forum to promote security dialogue and 
cooperation among member countries. The ARF experience made Beijing feel 
more comfortable with regional security cooperation. Another critical turning point 
is the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98. The Chinese Government acted 
responsibly by not devaluing its currency and by offering aid packages and 
low-interest loans to several Southeast Asian states. These actions were appreciated 
and helped to turn China’s image from threat to a responsible power in the region. 
The success of its policies in the financial crisis boosted the confidence of China in 
regional affairs. In the years that followed, China began to play an active role in the 
ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and the mechanisms of ASEAN Plus China. China also 
founded the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a means of combating 
terrorism and expanding its influence in Central Asia in 2001. It recognized that 
regional cooperation is the trend in the post-Cold War era, and China needs to be 
an active part of this trend for a more desirable regional order. 
In addition to active participation in regional multilateral organizations, China 
has taken concrete measures to reduce distrust and anxiety in the security sphere, 
including participation in the UN peacekeeping missions and in bilateral and 
multilateral military exercises with neighboring countries, increasing transparency 
of military issues, publishing biannual white papers on national defense, and 
participation in non-traditional security issues such as disaster relief, counter-piracy. 
China has also resolved most of its land border disputes with its neighbors, except 
with India. This has paved way for cross-border cooperation against terrorism and 
cross-border crime and has eased concerns of potential border conflicts. 
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In the economic sphere, China has expanded its economic ties with its 
neighbors. Asian FDI, mainly from East Asia, played a critical role in fueling 
China’s economic take-off. Asia now serves as an important source of energy and 
raw materials for China, a market for finished Chinese products as well as Chinese 
investment. In its rhetoric, China emphasizes “win-win” and “mutual benefit” to 
persuade its neigbors that they will benefit from China’s growth. Meanwhile, China 
has been keen on negotiating regional and bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in 
China’s economic diplomacy. The most significant example is the China-ASEAN 
FTA. Other concluded negotiations are China-Pakistan FTA, China-Singapore 
FTA. Some FTAs are under discussions, such as China-India FTA and 
China-Japan-Korea FTA.
146
 Thus, with their deepening economic ties with China, 
Asian countries have a huge stake in China’s continued economic development and 
stability.  
Despite the significance of China’s regional rise, China is far from being the 
only consequential power in Asia. China shares the regional stage with the US, 
Japan, Russia, ASEAN and increasingly India, and the US remains as the most 
powerful actor in the region. Undoubtedly, China and the US are the two biggest 
powers in Asia. China’s regional rise automatically brought about the questions of 
the US’s role in Asia. The US has its alliance system in the Asia-Pacific (e.g., those 
between the United States and Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of 
Korea, and Thailand), which lays the ground for the East Asian security structure. 
China has been uneasy at the prospect of an enduring American security role in its 
neighborhood. Many of its South Asian neighbors tend to cooperate increasingly 
with China in areas of common concern, while strengthening relations with the US 
or other major powers in Asia such as Russia, Japan, India to preserve freedom of 
action and other interests in the face of China’s rise. Hence, China has become a 
focal point of regional hedging in its neighborhood. China’s logic is to maintain a 
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stable external environment for China to concentrate on economic growth and 
accumulate relative power, without provoking the US or destabilizing the region. 
5.2 China’s National Interest 
5.2.1 Economic Development 
In the late 1970s, China under Deng Xiaoping launched economic reform and open 
up to the outside world. Since then economic development has been the central task 
of Chinese government. Deng Xiaoping made the remark on December 6, 1979 
when he met Japanese guests that China’s Four Modernizations were aimed at 
realizing the xiao-kang level of living for the Chinese people by the end of this 
century.
147
 “Xiao-kang (小康)” is a Confucian term which describes a society in 
which most of the population are of modest means have achieved a comfortable 
standard of living. This concept rapidly gained prominence in China and has been 
heavily promoted by China’s leaders as the goal for China’s socio-economic 
development. Moreover, Deng also realized the importance of peace for China’s 
development. As Deng said: 
Only by constantly developing the productive forces can a country gradually 
become strong and prosperous, with a rising standard of living. Only in a 
peaceful environment can we develop smoothly. 
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Hence, the goal of China’s diplomacy was set to create a favorable international 
environment for domestic economic construction. Deng also made clear that 
China’s development cannot be accomplished if China isolates itself from the 
world: 
Reviewing our history, we have concluded that one of the most important 
reasons for China’s long years of stagnation and backwardness was its policy 
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of closing the country to outside contact. Our experience shows that China 
cannot rebuild itself behind closed doors and that it cannot develop in isolation 
from the rest of the world.
149
 
Economic development is also related to the legitimacy of the CCP’s rule. In 
Chinese classical political tradition, a government’s legitimacy is essentially 
defined by the substance and outcomes of its policies. If the rulers do not care for 
peoples and promote welfare, they will lose the legitimacy to rule the people. When 
the Chinese Communist elites established PRC in 1949, they promised they would 
bring Chinese people prosperity and dignity in the world. However, in Mao’s era 
political considerations were over economic considerations and China did not 
achieve prosperity but was immersed in poverty and underdevelopment. As Deng 
concluded: 
One of our shortcomings after the founding of the People’s Republic was that 
we didn’t pay enough attention to developing the productive forces. Socialism 
means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism.
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Hence, since Deng Xiaoping, Chinese leaders have viewed economic prosperity 
not only as a key to realization of the century-old dream of rejuvenating the 
Chinese nation and Chinese civilization, but also a way to the political preservation 
of the Communist Party. 
The result of the economic opening up is obvious. China has achieved a higher 
economic growth rate over the past thirty years and cultural life of Chinese people 
has also constantly improved. In this way China has justified its political system to 
millions of Chinese, especially the new elite class. However, the fruits of economic 
growth have not been distributed evenly in China. The persistent widening of 
development and income gaps has contributed to increased tensions and unrests in 
the society. At the same time, China faces serious degradation of natural 
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environment. In this context, China’s development strategy has witnessed the shift 
from emphasizing high economic growth rate to quality, balance and sustainability 
of economic growth, from “getting rich first” to “common prosperity.” This shift 
was clearly indicated in China’s 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010) and 12th Five 
Year Plan (2011-2015). In other words, although economic development is still 
“the absolute principle,” in Chinese, “fa zhang shi ying dao li (发展是硬道理),” 
economic development is now understood in broader terms. Economic growth is 
not the equivalent of economic development. 
5.2.2 Security 
China’s National Defense White Paper of 2004 could give us an idea about what 
China perceives as prior national security interests. According to the White Paper, 
the first sentence of China’s basic goals and tasks in maintaining national security 
is, “to stop separation and promote reunification, guard against and resist 
aggression, and defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity and maritime 
rights and interests.”151 
Modern international system rests on the notion of sovereignty, that sovereign 
state is the sole legitimate claimant of its territory. Security is traditionally 
understood as to meet the need of survival of states, in which preservation of 
territory integrity of a sovereign state is the ground and the primary. China is a 
strong adherent of these Westphalia principles, though China has realized that in an 
era of globalization, sovereignty is no longer absolute, and it could be undermined 
by the forces of economic interdependence and global information flow due to the 
rapid development of communication technology. For China, a country that has the 
memory of victimization by foreign powers, protection of its sovereignty and 
territorial integrity has heavily defined Chinese foreign policy since the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was established. Moreover, China also put value on 
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independence and self-reliance, yet due to the practical concern of Cold War 
situation China deviated from its independent foreign policy, playing between the 
Soviet Union and the United States. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
CPC Central Committee in 1978, Deng Xiaoping made some major adjustments to 
the country’s foreign policy to safeguard independence and self-determination and 
reemphasized the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. In the post-Mao era a 
rigid definition of sovereignty continues to be a central concern. As Deng made 
this point very clear: 
We are more keenly aware that first priority should always be given to national 
sovereignty and security. Some Western countries, on the pretext that China 
has an unsatisfactory human rights record and an irrational and illegitimate 
socialist system, attempt to jeopardise our national sovereignty.
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In another talk he continued to elaborate this point:  
Actually, national sovereignty is far more important than human rights, but 
they often infringe upon the sovereignty of poor, weak countries of the Third 
World. Their talk about human rights, freedom and democracy is only designed 
to safeguard the interests of the strong, rich countries, which take advantage of 
their strength to bully weak countries, and which pursue hegemony and 
practise power politics. We never listen to such stuff.
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Owing to this insistence on sovereignty and territory integrity, China in the 1990s 
took back the sovereignty of Hong Kong and Macau. However, China still has 
other unresolved territorial issues and has been challenged by Tibetan and Uyghur 
separatists. With regard to the Taiwan issue, the pro Independence leader Chen 
Shuibian was reelected as Taiwan’s new president in 2004. Chen promoted a new 
Taiwanese identity that caused a great deal of alarm in Beijing. It is under this 
context that the Anti-Secession Law was passed by the third conference of the 10th 
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National People’s Congress of China and went into effect on March 14, 2005. The 
Anti-Secession Law is aimed at preventing eventual Taiwan independence by 
formalizing the use of “non-peaceful” actions under several conditions which can 
lead to separation of Taiwan from China. This is a strong case in the contemporary 
era showing China’s insistence and determination to its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. 
5.2.3 Status 
A state needs to feel good about itself. The self-confidence of the Chinese empire 
was shaken when the western powers came to China and enforced China unequal 
treaties in the 19
th
 century. Since the founding of the PRC, rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation has been a primary strategic goal of which a great power status is 
the crucial indicator. Since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
China’s economy has kept a high growth rate and China growing power and its 
engagement with the world has brought new confidence to itself. 
Chinese political elites have witnessed China’s comprehensive power have 
been growing, including military and economic capabilities. Generally, they hold 
confidence that China will continue to rise. However, they have been not satisfied 
with China’s international status. China’s rise has challenged other established 
great powers in the world, fuel the “China threat” perception of these great powers 
and of Chinese neighbors. The existing world order has been dominated by the 
Western powers led by the United States. China is an out-group member and even 
its material capabilities have caught up. Furthermore, the undemocratic polity of 
China makes the identification with the Western powers difficult, from the Chinese 
side, as well as from the side of the great power club. This out-group status is 
certainly disadvantageous for China in terms of its overall security interests (Deng 
2005). Hence, it is China’s intention to ensure the Others in the international 
system that China is not aggressive and not a revisionist power so that it can create 
a favorable international environment for its development and national rejuvenation. 
As a result, China has turned to multilateralism for international acceptance and 
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reassurance, advocating Chinese identification as a responsible and cooperative 
member in the regional and global communities, because, as Wendt noted, a state’s 
positive self-image will partly depend on relationships to significant Others, and 
positive self-images tend to emerge from mutual respect and cooperation (Wendt 
1999: 237).  
With its growing power, the Chinese government has been in fact under great 
pressure which stems from an international expectation that China must do more 
constructively to deal with regional and global problems. This has brought the idea 
of international responsibility to China’s foreign policy. It has attempted to 
improve its social standing and image in the international community by promoting 
an image of a responsible and non-threatening power. Since the mid-1990s, China 
has attached great importance to cultivating an international image of a responsible 
cooperative power. Phrases such as “responsible big nation”, “big responsible 
country” or “responsible great power” have emerged frequently in official talks. 
However, the existing international laws, rules and norms are very much the 
product of Western experiences. China’s commitment to being responsible in fact 
indicates China’s acceptance of these rules and norms and China’s willingness to 
integrate to the current system. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine the objective attributes of China’s national identities and 
interests in the contemporary era. These are reflected in China’s self-perception in 
decision-making and thus have impact on China’s foreign policy strategy and its 
behaviour.  
China’s identity is based on the following objective attributes: (1) a civilization 
state that maintains its cultural continuity, though divided in the past with the fall 
of dynasties or foreign conquests; (2) a nation state with a negative historical 
experience due to the foreign aggression in the 19
th
 and the first half of 20
th
 century; 
(3) a developing country with the largest population in the world and uneven 
development; (4) a rising power with growing material strength; (5) an active and 
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important regional actor re-established since the late 1990s, yet constrained by the 
US in its own region. Among all these identities, China as a civilization state is a 
fundamental building block for understanding China in its own terms. China today 
is a civilization state in a form of a nation state. It remains essentially a civilization 
state in terms of history, culture, identity and ways of thinking.  
According to constructivism, China’s national interest has its root in its 
national identity. My intention above has not necessarily to establish causal links 
between national identities and national interests in detail, but to paint a general 
picture in terms of some obvious causal links: first, China’s identity as a 
developing country prescribes the importance of socio-economic development; 
second, as a rising power, China’s current status is to maximize China’s 
comprehensive national power and to improve its standing in the international 
community; third, as a nation state and a regional power implies that in its way of 
dealing with security issues, Chinese leaders firmly uphold Westphalia principles 
in foreign policy making, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national 
unification, value China’s independence and autonomy, and care about China’s 
influence in the region in which it dominates. Among all these interests, economic 
development is the anchor of the other interests. This priority is given by the 
domestic structure as well as the international structure in the contemporary era. 
6 India’s National Identity and National Interest 
After examining China’s national identity and national interest, this chapter is 
aimed to look at India’s national identity and national interest. As I have done in 
the last chapter, I will focus on the dominant objective attributes of India’s national 
identity: India as a civilization state and nation state, India as a developing country, 
as an emerging power and as a regional power. On India’s national interest, I will 
look at the three objective aspects, economic development, security and status.  
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6.1 India’s National Identity 
6.1.1 India from Civilization State to Nation State 
India, like China, is a modern state which embodies a major civilization. The 
question of India’s national interest and national identity is embedded in the broad 
context of Indian civilization. By looking back, we can derive some clearer 
perspectives that could link India’s past with its future as a global power. 
Historians often divide Indian history into three distinct periods: Hindu, 
Muslim, and British. Each of these periods has left its imprint in the cultural and 
socio-political structure of the country. Despite the confluence of the various 
cultures that have affected the Indian people, the Hindu worldview constitutes the 
dominant cultural force that deeply influences the Indian society. The Hindu period 
was the formative period of Indian civilization, which laid down the foundations of 
Indian social and philosophical thought. Over centuries Hinduism developed as the 
predominant religion of the Indian subcontinent. At one time, there were challenges 
from Buddhism and Jainism. However, Hinduism was able to reassert its 
domination (Baxter et al. 2002: 24). The Hindus developed a complex social 
structure based on the caste system. In the most of Hindu period, the sub-continent 
was ruled by various Hindu kingdoms. They were mainly regional in nature and 
only a few of them were able to establish their control over the most of 
subcontinent. The most famous one is the Mauryas. The empire was once thought 
to have controlled most of the subcontinent excepting the far south (Stein 1998). 
The vision of an imperial India was defined at this time. The Mauryans replaced 
traditional military-tribal patterns of governance with a bureaucratic system. By 
185 B.C. Mauryan Empire had collapsed into a series of rival Buddhist and Hindu 
kingdoms. Other empires in later centuries never enjoyed quite the same conditions, 
particularly the same degree of central control (Thapar 1996: 91).  
By the end of the tenth century A.D., Hindu civilization had lost its dynamism 
and creativity (Baxter et al. 2002: 24). The Muslim invaders from the northwest 
gradually conquered parts of western and northern India and founded their own 
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kingdoms. In the 16th century, the Mughal rulers conquered most of India and 
established the Mughal Empire. The rise of the Mughals led to a major change in 
the political integration of India. Under the emperor Akbar, it reintroduced 
bureaucracies, which did not stamp out the Hindu societies, but rather balanced and 
pacified local leaders through new administrative practices (Asher & Talbot 2008: 
115). During his reign, India enjoyed much cultural and economic progress as well 
as progress in architecture, arts and literature. Some progress was made during the 
Mughal period to unite Hindus and Muslims in a composite Indian culture. Islam in 
India was powerfully influenced by Hinduism and transformed Hinduism as well. 
Yet, the deep gulf between Hindus and Muslims was unable to be bridged and the 
Hindu-Muslim division has remained a reality of Indian society. There have been 
two contradictory attitudes toward the Muslim period in contemporary India. The 
Hindu nationalists regard the Muslim period of Indian history as a period of alien 
rule and subjugation, while secularist Hindus and nationalist Indian Muslims 
emphasize the positive side of the Muslim rule (Baxter et al. 2002: 26-27) 
From the early 18th century onwards, India was gradually brought under the 
administration of the British East India Company. Over time, disaffection with the 
Company grew and set off the Indian Rebellion of 1857. The rebellion led to the 
end of the Company rule. In 1858, the British government took over the direct 
administration of India and the British rule was firmly established. The 
confrontation with the British brought a new dynamism to Indian civilization. The 
British displayed superior organizational skills. They founded a centralized 
administration and a merit-based system of recruitment to bureaucracy. Local and 
provincial administrator acted as the agents of the central government. The British 
administration system is one of the most important legacies inherited by India from 
this period. The territorial and economic integration of the country was 
strengthened by construction of highways, railroads, and post and telegraph 
systems. This fostered mobility and trade within India. The introduction of the 
Western system of education had also impacted the Indian elites. They received 
their training in English and were exposed by English to the democratic ideals of 
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liberty, equality, and social justice, which gradually transformed their value 
structures and behaviour patterns.  
In the British period of Indian history, a national sense of unity developed 
among the Indian elites. The average British ruler looked down on the native 
culture. Not only common people, but also Indian elites were the victims of racial 
discrimination. The sense of humiliation and status deprivation brought them 
together, despite their different ethnic and religious backgrounds, to think about the 
political issues in all-India terms, leading to the founding of the Indian National 
Congress in 1885, which took the lead of the nationalist movement in the country. 
The end of World War I, marked the beginning of a new period of nationalist 
movement. The British government introduced some reforms to increase 
self-government while continuing the repressive policies that the government 
adopted during the war. Indians gained experience of electoral policies and 
parliamentary government through the new measures, yet the alienation was 
increased because of repressive policies. More and more, Indians called for 
self-rule. Under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, by applying his concept of 
satyagraha and the technique of civil disobedience, the elitist nationalist movement 
became a mass movement and began to press for complete independence. However, 
there were several sub-movements representing the aspirations of the minorities 
that could not be absorbed by the nationalist group led by Gandhi. The Muslim 
League, for example, became a powerful rival of the Indian National Congress and 
emerged as the representative body of the Muslims of India. The Muslim League 
pressed its demand for the division of the country and was successful. On August 
15, 1947, India gained its independence but with the bloody partition of the 
subcontinent into two states: India and Pakistan. The Indian people today still 
suffer the bitter memories of the partition and the consequences it has brought 
about. 
Through the interaction with the British, and based on their own cultural 
traditions, Indian elites already came to their own understandings of India by the 
time of independence. Although there are divergent conceptions of India, there 
109 
 
have been several basic themes which gain consensus and construct the founding 
idea of India. These themes are: India is a great civilization; India is an ancient 
nation defined by its timeless existence and space; India is a state with diversity 
and multiculturalism; Indian nation is conceived as tolerant and non-violent as well 
as non-materialistic and spiritual; India is a victim of invasions from outsiders. 
The reality of Indian history is that India is a melting pot. Sub-continent is an 
area of intense cultural encounters, foreign influences poured in, were absorbed and 
new synthesis were generated. In India as in elsewhere, present politics are shaped 
by conceptions of the past. Broadly speaking, there have been two narratives of 
Indian history. One views India as victims of recurring invasions, and the other 
views India as an arena of cultural encounters which have produced unique and 
splendid cultural forms (Khilnani 1997: xiv). The first sees India’s history as a 
series of rude interruptions. Its adherents want to end such interruptions and to be 
back to an original purity which is Hindu. The second aims for breaking the 
narrations of a pure homogenous identity, sees the moments of mixture as the most 
creative and imaginative ones, insists that distinctiveness was its ability to 
transform invasion into accommodation, rupture into continuity, and division into 
diversity (Khilnani 1997: xiv). In terms of these two narratives, two discourses of 
India’s national identity were constructed – to be more precisely, India’s internal 
identity – one is the religious-cultural discourse and one is the secular discourse 
(Commuri 2010).  
In India, diversity is of caste, of language, of region and religion. “Every 
Indian is also a Gujarati, a Bengali or a Punjabi, a Sikh, a Muslim, a Christian or 
a Hindu, and so on” (Parekh 2010: 147). While Indians see complexity and 
diversity a source of national greatness, they also set value in unity. Unity in 
diversity is practically a national motto in contemporary India. The unity of India 
was understood by Nehru as being already there at the very beginning. In his book 
Discovery of India, Nehru (1956: 63) wrote:  
Some kind of a dream of unity has occupied the mind of India since the dawn of 
civilization. That unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a 
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standardization of externals or even of beliefs. It was something deeper and, 
within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practised and 
every variety acknowledged and even encouraged. 
In countries like China and India, unity in diversity is a social reality. Yet, Indians 
emphasize diversity with greater frequency than in China. The specificity in India’s 
diversity is that different groups categorized by religions and castes tend to 
distinguish themselves from others by emphasizing difference and distinction in 
order to keep their relative independence. The identities claimed by different 
groups are in fact the creation of democracy, not the intrusion of the primordial. In 
the language of democratic politics, there are appeals and claims for recognition 
and fair treatment. In this sense, India is a “salad bowl” rather than a “melting pot” 
that allows distinct ingredients to retain their individuality (Khilnani 2010: 202). 
Here, there is a danger in terms of the logic of the self-fulfilling prophecy. If people 
form a shared representation of themselves and the world, then it becomes that way 
for them (Wendt 1999: 347). India’s emphasis on diversity has brought about more 
diversities in society challenging India in its unity. This situation is described by 
Saighal as unity in diversity in juxtaposition to increasing disunity: “the more the 
diversity, the greater the disunity; national integration opposed by national 
dis-aggregation; cultural plurality yielding place to cultural segregation; 
multi-ethnicities leading to multitudinous divisions” (Saighal 2004: 170).  
Nevertheless, the Indian government has so far managed to keep the unity 
going in the form of democratic politics. The idea of democracy has penetrated in 
India’s conception as a nation state and democracy has become the asset that 
Indians feel proud of. Though India has a mixed record of democracy with both 
success and failures, Indian democracy has become self-sustaining (Mitra 2011). 
India’s democratic framework has been relatively effective in addressing 
challenges from India’s diversity by transforming various groups into legitimate 
political actors and self-correcting in the moment when diversity has been devalued 
(Khilani 2010: 193).  
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6.1.2 India as Developing Country 
The objective indicators show India is still a developing country with many internal 
problems to concentrate on. The label “developing country” is internalized as part 
of India’s belief system and help India to define its position and interests.  
Like China, India situates in the group of lower-middle-income countries in the 
World Bank’s classification system.154 India’s Human Development Index (HDI) 
is 0.554 in 2012, which gives the country a rank of 136 out of 187 countries.
155
 
India is the second most populous country. By 2010, it has a population of 1.21 
billion. India’s population growth rate from 2005-2010 is 1.43%, much higher than 
that of China, which is 0.51% in the same period.
156
 Currently, India’s population 
is very young.
157
 According to the theory of demographic dividend, this will add 
advantages to India’s future economic growth. Yet the rapidly expanding 
population is also one of the most potent social changes in India. The demands of 
the expanding population for education, housing, jobs, natural resources etc. will 
place an increasingly heavy burden on India’s limited capacity. Furthermore, due to 
its relatively rapid population growth, the net increase in per-capita income has 
been modest, despite India’s good economic performance since the 1990s. Slow 
growth of per-capita income has failed to transform the basic economic structure of 
Indian society, and a large portion of the population continues to live below the 
poverty line. 
Energy scarcity is one of the challenges faced by India. Despite enormously 
expanded production of electricity, India’s generating capacity is still hindered by 
inefficiency and strained by rapidly increasing demands. The inadequate power 
supply remains a serious bottleneck to India’s development. The Indian electrical 
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infrastructure is generally considered unreliable. The nation suffers from frequent 
power outages. In July 2012 India suffered the largest power outage in history, 
occurring as two separate events on 30 and 31 July 2012. The outage affected over 
700 million people in the country. Twenty of India’s 28 states were hit by power 
cuts, along with the capital, New Delhi.
158
 For its development, India’s energy 
resources are limited in terms of the demands upon them. With less reserve of oil 
and gas, India has no other option except to import. This in turn has a heavy cost on 
economic development efforts. Furthermore, water supply also remains a major 
problem in India. 
India’s industrial progress is hindered by its infrastructure. In the past, 
development of infrastructure was completely in the hands of the public sector. The 
government has opened up infrastructure to the private sector allowing foreign 
investment. Today, most public infrastructure is constructed and maintained by 
private contractors, in exchange for tax and other concessions from the government. 
However, the progress is not enough and this will prevent India from sustaining 
higher growth rates. 
On the growth front, reforms have indeed delivered beyond expectations. India 
has become one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Yet, the growth has 
had a fairly limited impact on poverty reduction and employment generation. 
While both interpersonal and interregional inequality has been aggravated, agrarian 
distress is increasingly becoming an important cause of social concern (Nachane 
2011: 21). India is currently in a dilemma of a so-called “revolution of rising 
frustrations,” as the gap between aspiration and achievement has widened 
(Hardgrave & Kochanek 2008: 13). Like China, the challenge for India is to 
transform one of the oldest, most complex, continuous civilizations and one of the 
most populous countries in the world into a modern nation state. When India 
gained its independence, its political elites were clear that one of the major goals of 
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India is to catch up with the industrialized world and to improve the living 
conditions of the people. The leadership of India has succeeded to a considerable 
degree yet far below expectations. There are two contrasting images of India with 
its economic growth. On one hand is the aspiration and expectation of its elites and, 
on the other hand, the state has failed to reduce major disparities in the society. As 
Nayyar (2008: 399) commented: “The perceptions, as also the realities, depend on 
who you are, what you do and where you live,” and “There is an India that is 
global and there is a Bharat that is local.” Managers of industry, editors of 
newspapers, ministers of governments, or software engineers in Bangalore see one 
India, which shapes thinking about India 2025 in the world. However, there are 
also poor tribals in Orissa or Madhya Pradesh, landless laborers in Bihar, Dalits in 
Uttar Pradesh, which construct a different image of India (Ibid.). In the process of 
transformation and within India’s competitive political framework, new groups 
have become political participants, asking for more equal distributions. Meanwhile, 
the diversities of India based on language, religion, caste, etc. are compounded by 
the chasm between the rich and poor, between the English-speaking elite and the 
vernacular mass, and between the city and the village. All these have brought high 
conflict potentials to the society, complicating the development process. 
6.1.3 India as Emerging Power 
There is a widespread belief among India’s elites of its destiny to play a major role 
in the world stage. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru firmly believed 
that India’s size, geostrategic location and historical traditions entitled her to a 
leading role in Asian and world affairs (Nehru 1956: 57):  
India, constituted as she is, cannot play a secondary part in the world. She will 
either count for a great deal or not count at all. No middle position attracted 
me. Nor did I think any intermediate position feasible.  
Realization of elite visions largely depends on material resources being at their 
demand. India is endowed with many of the attributes of a great power, yet India 
failed to achieve the great power status. It had long been considered as a state with 
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large population and slow economic growth, and as a regional power of South Asia. 
Its emergence as a power of global 
significance has been largely driven by 
its remarkable economic growth over 
the past two decades. In 1991, the 
Indian government introduced 
neo-liberal economic reforms in India 
initiating the opening up of the 
economy for international trade and 
investment, deregulation, initiation of 
privatization, tax reforms, and 
inflation-controlling measures. The 
economic events of 1991 triggered a 
new phase for India’s economic rise 
and consequently international notice. 
According to the 2003 Goldman 
Sachs’s report about BRICs states, 
India has the potential to show the 
fastest growth over the next 30 and 50 
years.
159
 In both academic and political 
circle, it has become standard practice to label India as an emerging power. This 
change in expectations about India received resonance in India’s media and public 
discussions, and the communication of the idea of an ‘emerging India’ from the 
world outside leading to internalization of the rhetoric as part of India’s current 
identity. As Stephen Cohen (2001: 17) described: “Most Indians, especially those 
in the Delhi-centered strategic and political community, strongly believe that their 
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country is once again destined to become a great state, one that matches the 
historical and civilizational accomplishments of the Indian people. This view is 
encountered at nearly all points along the Indian political spectrum.” Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh also put it:  
Today, India is at a historical point in its development trajectory. … The world 
is today looking at India with great interest as the saga of our development and 
rise to prominence on the international state unfolds. Rare are such moments in 
history when a nation suddenly captures the imagination of the world.
160
  
Survey data of the Pew Research Center also shows that Indians have become 
confident about India’s power. According to its survey in 2010, almost four-in-ten 
Indians (38%) thought India is already one of the world’s leading powers and 
roughly half (49%) said it will be one eventually.
161
 
The change of world’s perception of India has also been driven by major 
transformation in Indian strategic behaviour, for example, in its nuclear policy. 
Indian leaders treated India’s nuclear-weapons program as a way to enhance 
prestige and autonomy in the international stage. The impact of the 1998 nuclear 
tests on India’s desire for great power status was immense. Since then, India has 
entered into the global political, economic and strategic mainstream and has 
transformed much of its foreign diplomacy. 
India’s decision to go nuclear is the interplay between security concerns on one 
hand, and the rationale and dynamics behind India’s struggle for international 
recognition on the other (Frey 2006: 5). Several events such as the Indo-Chinese 
war of 1962, the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 and, above all, the first Chinese 
nuclear test of 1964, seriously deteriorated India’s strategic environment. Although 
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India, with enough nuclear material and the necessary technology had the option of 
“going nuclear,” India’s strategic elite remained rather dismissive towards the 
bomb. No clear policy evolved during this period. In 1968, the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was concluded. This treaty established the unequal 
international nuclear order which divided the world into nuclear “haves” and 
“have-nots.” India’s strategic elites began to struggle for an equity-based 
international nuclear order in the 1970s and tested a “peaceful nuclear device” in 
1974. Yet India’s nuclear programme was still in a state of indecision. India’s 
behaviour towards nuclear programme in the 1960s and 1970s was mainly 
constrained by the norms developed by Nehru which emphasize moral superiority 
and negation of military power to acquire recognition in international system. Only 
in the 1980s, this orientation of India’s strategic elites began to change and the 
external pressures also mounted to a point for such change, leading to the nuclear 
tests in 1998. Behind India’s change in its nuclear policy, it is India’s quest for 
military power and the elite understanding that India, due to its size and 
achievements, has a natural right to have nuclear weapons. This nationalistic 
element had been inherent to India’s nuclear debate at the beginning though largely 
hidden behind the morally defined normative values attributed to the nuclear issue 
prior to 1998 (Frey 2006: 205). 
India’s rapid economic growth in recent years is also being translated into 
expanded military capabilities. India’s military expenditure has increased 
significantly from US$16.4 billion (Rs199 billion) in 1991 to US$44.2 billion 
(Rs2,330 billion) in 2011, ranked 7th in the world in 2011.
162
 The increase in 
India’s defence expenditure is mainly due to military force modernization of the 
army and air force and the strong focus on the development of a blue-water navy. 
India’s relatively high and rising level of military spending is controversial to 
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India’s reality of its underdevelopment in many areas. Notwithstanding, high levels 
of military expenditure are not necessarily contrary to Indian public opinion. The 
Survey data of the Pew Research Center in 2010 showed that most Indians have a 
positive view of the Indian military and believe it is having a good influence on the 
nation.
163
 India also sees its military forces, especially its navy, as a key 
component of its power projection in the region (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2012: 
205). 
There is a significant gap between India’s self-perception and the evaluation 
by others in the international system (Mitra 2003; Brewster 2012; Nayar and Paul 
2003) In others’ eyes, India is often regarded as a country which has great potential, 
possessing part of great power capabilities such as nuclear weapons, a large 
population and military but one that has not yet achieved great power status. 
However, many in New Delhi believe that India is unfairly denied recognition of 
its global importance, or in other words, they perceive an entitlement to 
international status based on India’s potential rather than its actual capabilities 
(Brewster 2012: 3). This gap between India’s ambition and its capabilities is an 
important feature to a proper understanding of India’s behavior, as commented by 
Mitra (2003: 404):  
This hiatus between the perception of India and its self-perception also causes 
it to shuttle uneasily between grandstanding on the one hand, and inexplicable 
acquiescence with situations that are contrary to its interests or declared 
principles on the other, lowering, in the process, its credibility even further. 
Though there is a lot of enthusiasm for the idea of India as a major power among 
the middle class, the political leadership has been much more cautious.
164
 In fact, 
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economic strength is the foundation of power projections. If its growth continues, 
India will become one of the largest economies in the world and consequently no 
one can deny its status. As C. Raja Mohan pointed out, it is not a question of 
whether India wants to be or India should be a great power. Instead, if the logic of 
its current economic growth continues, its relations with the world will also be 
fundamentally altered. It follows, that India’s weight in the global system will 
inevitably increase making it become a major power.
165
  
The notion of an emerging power implies movement upward in a hierarchical 
or class system. To make such a move, a state must acquire the capabilities to 
change its rank (Cohen 2001: 31). In an assessment of India as an emerging power, 
Mistry (2004: 81-82) summarized that the pace of India’s rise will depend on two 
main factors. One is India’s economic and military capabilities, which are likely to 
steadily expand, barring an economic crisis. The other is its relations with other 
states. He suggested India to normalize ties with Pakistan, China, and other key 
Asian countries, and develop a strategic partnership with the United States. By 
doing so, India can offset its strategic disadvantage versus its potential rivals. Thus, 
it will be better able to shape regional and world affairs, and thereby emerge as a 
great power in the world system in the coming decade. 
6.1.4 India as Regional Power 
India is located in the centre of South Asia. It borders other states in South Asia, 
while none of these neighbors border another, and its dominance is further 
underlined by the size of its population, resources and military capacities compared 
to its neighbors. 
 For much of the past sixty years, India’s relations with its South Asian 
neighbors have been largely unilateralist and hegemonic. India inherited the notion 
of security from the British Raj as the paramount power in South Asia. This was 
evident in the early years after the independence, especially in the relations with 
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the Himalayan kingdoms. Through the 1949 Indo-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship 
Bhutan became a protectorate of India. Similarly, the 1950 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship between India and Nepal made India responsible for Nepal’s defence 
and foreign policy. In addition to these treaties, India successfully annexed Sikkim 
in 1975. 
In the Nehru period, India’s South Asia policy was characterised by a 
differentiated approach that was shaped by India’s bilateral interests and conflicts 
and not necessarily by a regional perspective (Wagner 2005: 3). After Nehru’s 
death, India faced multiple crises of enormous severity. In the sphere of foreign 
policy, the United States called forth its military aid to Pakistan as a means to 
secure the regional containment of India. The conflict with China in 1962 
strengthened the alliance relationship between China and Pakistan. Facing such 
situation, India was forced to depend on the Soviet Union for arms. Under Indira 
Gandhi’s rule a more coherent concept of regional policy was applied, which is 
widely described as the “Indira Doctrine,” and is characterized by using hard power 
to consolidate India’s position in South Asia. Her approach was also continued by 
her son, Rajiv Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi insisted that other South Asian countries 
should resolve problems bilaterally with India and that external powers, such as the 
US and China, should have no role in the region. These ideas laid the ground for 
India’s military interventions in East Pakistan in 1971 (which created Bangladesh), 
the 1987 to 1990 intervention in Sri Lanka, and the one in the Maldives in 1988. 
However, India’s unilateralism and hegemony was not successful (Wagner 2005; 
Burgess 2009). India was perceived as a regional bully among its small neighbors 
and its antagonistic relations with Pakistan led to a further worsening of situation in 
South Asia. The development of the region is burdened by inter-state disputes as 
well as intra-state conflicts. By the beginning of 1990, the Indian peace-making 
mission in Sri Lanka failed and Indian troops withdrew. Except for Nepal and 
Bhutan, India was not in a position to shape or control a country in South Asia by 
political or military means. 
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The loosening of the Cold War constraints and the economic performance with 
a stable growth rate in the 1990s gave India’s foreign policy new impetus, both at 
regional and global level. In 1991, Narasimha Rao assumed the Prime Minister’s 
Office. In the realm of foreign policy, he developed India’s “Look East” policy, 
which marked a strategic shift in India’s perspective of the world. Through “Look 
East” policy, India has not only expanded trade and investment in Southeast Asia 
and strengthened strategic relations with countries in the region, but also carved out 
a relatively larger regional role for itself. An unspoken element in India’s “Look 
East” policy is India’s strategic goal to limit China’s influence in Southeast Asia. 
To varying degrees, various nations in Southeast Asia also see India as a potential 
balancing actor or counter-weight to growing Chinese power in the region 
(Ganguly 2008, in Shambaugh & Yahuda: 160). Comparing to China, ASEAN did 
not have suspicions that India had ulterior ambitions of its own in this region. This 
line of thinking led to the continuous upgrading of the relationship between 
ASEAN and India (Gupta, in Sinha & Mohta 2007: 361). In 1996, India became a 
“dialogue partner” in the ASEAN Regional Forum and was accepted as a summit 
level partner (on par with China, Japan and South Korea) in 2002. 
On the South Asian stage, Indian unilateralism and hegemony receded in the 
1990s. The malign hegemon of the 1980s was trying to become a benign hegemon 
(Wagner 2005). This turn was reflected in the “Gujral Doctrine,” authored by Inder 
Kumar Gujral who became Indian Foreign Minister in 1996 and later Prime 
Minister from April 1997 to March 1998. The “Gujral Doctrine” is a set of 
principles to guide the conduct of foreign relations with India’s immediate 
neighbors. This policy was based on two basic assumptions: Firstly, India being the 
most powerful country in the region, should not insist on strict and immediate 
reciprocity from its smaller neighbors for its goodwill gestures. Secondly, 
Indo-Pakistan relations being a very complex one should be regarded as a separate 
category, and first priority should be given to improving less problematic relations 
with neighbors like Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka (Mishra 2000). This policy 
signified that India’s interests had extended beyond South Asia, and its relatively 
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more generous approach to neighbors within the region, while dealing with 
Pakistan separately. 
At the same time, regional cooperation in South Asia gained new momentum. 
The SAARC came into existence in 1985. However, the progress of SAARC was 
modest until the early 1990s. In the 1990s, India’s economic reform created the 
opportunity to engage in trade with its neighbors and India came to use SAARC as 
an instrument for confidence-building in South Asia. A free trade framework was 
negotiated among member states. In January 2004, the South Asia Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA) was signed during 12th SAARC Summit held in Islamabad, 
Pakistan. India’s activities in SAARC signified that India now prefers soft power 
strategies rather than hard power strategies for its hegemony in South Asia. The use 
of military power is viewed by New Delhi as necessary only as a measure of last 
resort (Bajpai 2008).  
6.2 India’s National Interest 
6.2.1 Economic Development 
As a developing country with the second largest population in the world, India 
faces lots of domestic challenges, which include reduction in poverty, inequality, 
and unemployment, better provision of education, health, housing, and food to its 
citizens, the broadening of economic and social opportunities, internal security and 
the forging of a cohesive nation-state. Currently, the most vital national interest for 
India would be continued economic progress and well-being of the country to meet 
the demand of development. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: 
Our government believes that processes of wealth creation are essential for us 
to meet our commitment to eradicating poverty, and to realize the latter, we are 
dedicated to supporting the former.
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We need faster growth because, at our level of incomes, there can be no doubt 
that we must expand the production base of the economy if we want to provide 
broad-based improvement in the material conditions of living of our population, 
and if we are to meet effectively the rising aspirations of our youth.
167
  
However Mr. Manmohan Singh also realized:  
But growth alone is not enough if it does not produce a flow of benefits that is 
sufficiently wide-spread. We, therefore, need a growth process that is much 
more inclusive, a growth process that raises incomes of the poor to bring about 
a much faster reduction in poverty, a growth process which generates 
expansion in good quality employment, and which also ensures access to 
essential services such as health and education for all sections of the 
community.
168
 
Economic development cannot alone solve all these problems but it is at least a key, 
to make a bigger pie for distribution. Thus, economic well-being has become an 
ends and means in itself. By focusing on growth to address the challenge of 
development, Manmohan Singh also talked about the relationship between India’s 
foreign policy and its domestic goal: 
As we strive to realize our due place in the comity of Nations, any policy must 
stand the test of one simple question: how will it affect our quest for 
development and our need to provide a secure environment for government to 
deliver to our people. For this, it goes without saying that the realization of our 
goal lies in widening, deepening and expanding our interaction with all our 
economic partners, with all our neighbours, with all Major Powers. As a 
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confident nation, we will interact with the world as a confident equal partner, 
seeking mutuality of benefit for all.
169
  
Singh’s speech clearly conveyed the message that current India’s foreign policy 
should serve the development goal of the nation. 
6.2.2 Security 
Defined by the Westphalian state system which makes up the world today, a state’s 
security interests should first of all meet the needs of survival, of which ideas of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity is at the centre. As a member within this system, 
India’s understanding of security is also conformed to this basic framework. In 
security terms, India’s national interests can be divided into external and internal 
security domains. Issues discussed in international relations and foreign policy are 
mainly related to interests in external security domains, yet they cannot be 
separated from the internal security domain. In terms of external security, India’s 
national interests mainly include: protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
the protection of citizens against external aggression and terrorism; military 
deterrence; ensuring peace and stability in its immediate neighborhood; maritime 
security (Dahiya 2012: 75). It is in the context of these interests that threats and 
challenges to India’s security are examined and will be reflected at the level of 
foreign policy. Furthermore, India’s understanding of its security interest has a 
strong regional focus. For India, as a successor state to the Raj, the whole of South 
Asia constitutes a strategic entity and is its natural and rightful sphere of influence. 
Hence, India regards any external intervention and great power presence in the 
region both as a threat to regional security and as a challenge to its own preeminent 
position. 
India’s security conception is also influenced by the concept of “balance of 
power.” Whether the idea of “balance of power” will be a time tested truth we do 
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not know yet, but it is a part of the reality that any politicians in the world would 
face. Ideas have power and can turn into reality. The most obvious consequence of 
this idea is the military build-up. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh clearly 
indicated:  
But the reality is that we live in a world of unequal power relations. We live in 
an uncertain international security environment. We are therefore obliged to 
create adequate defence preparedness to manage any potential challenge to 
our security and vital national interests.
170
  
In the Indian case, focus is being given to defence modernisation, with an inclusive 
nuclear doctrine based on minimum deterrence and a “No First Use” policy. 
For India, security also closely connects to independence and autonomy, which 
was the major goal of India’s nationalists struggle before 1947. This security 
concern was manifested in India’s adherence to strategic autonomy in its foreign 
policy to avoid dependence on western powers and to increase policy options in the 
Cold War, while in the domestic sphere it reflected in the emphasis on 
“self-reliance.” During the Cold War India’s strategic autonomy took the form of 
non-alignment, which was based on a view that India as a weak country was unable 
to resist outside forces and thus was reliant on the principle of autonomy to 
preserve itself. The success of the Non-aligned Movement at one time did make 
India achieve its aspiration of leadership and status among the Third World 
countries. Non-aligned Movement was diluted with the end of the Cold War, but 
that does not mean that strategic autonomy has lost its importance in India. 
Strategic autonomy is still inextricably linked in Indian strategic thinking, 
regardless of the government in power in New Delhi. India “will not abandon its 
tradition of prickly independence,” and this drive for autonomy “is deeply rooted in 
India’s political culture and is unlikely to dissipate easily. Any major state seeking 
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to work with India will have to take account of this deep-seated proclivity in 
India’s decision-making apparatus” (Ganguly 2008: 164). Thus, nonalignment as 
the embodiment of India’s quest for autonomy remains officially the foundation of 
India’s foreign policy in a modified form, that “the contents have been reshuffled, 
repacked, enriched and, occasionally jettisoned by India’s current leaders” (Mitra 
2009: 32). It should be considered as India’s rational instrument to protect its 
security interests and enhance its strategic position in the world politics. 
6.2.3 Status 
India’s quest for great-power status remains in the new global environment and it is 
fuelled by the global acceptance of India’s rise. India is an extraordinarily status 
conscious power and India’s evolution into a modern nation state has been marked 
by an inordinate quest for international recognition of its status (Mehta 2009: 217). 
However, the achievement of great power status has been inadequate and 
incomplete due to its lack of capabilities. India’s positive economic performance 
since the mid-1990s and its nuclear status in 1998 shifted international perceptions 
of its potential and gave India confidence. In this context, India began to talk about 
participation and take responsibilities in the global stage. Indeed, with its rising 
power status, India will be increasingly called upon to undertake more 
responsibilities. Here, again economic interest is on the foreground. Moreover, the 
previous bipolar structure of the international system which emphasizes ideology 
tended to provide opportunities for states like India and China to play bigger roles 
than their material capabilities can actually allow them to play (Norbu 1998: 313). 
In the current unipolar world system, which is dominated by an economic order 
created by the USA and other western powers, their opportunities for playing 
bigger roles and achieving higher status tend to be more dependent on their actual 
power. Hence, in order to secure its current status and possibly achieve higher 
ranking in the future, India needs to enhance its comprehensive national power too. 
Without a strong domestic base, the role of leadership in world affairs will be 
constricted. Hence, there is a near unanimity that, in the medium term, it is India’s 
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economic well-being and ability to meet domestic challenges that will drive its 
quest for strategic autonomy.
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6.3 Conclusion 
With regards to India’s objective national identity and interest, my arguments here 
are similar with the arguments presented on chapter 5. Like China, India is a 
modern state which embodies a major civilization. The civilization state identity 
captures the sense of India’s greatness and the themes that construct the founding 
idea of India. The historical and cultural reality of India is of a “melting pot” 
society, yet its emphasis on diversity brings about more diversities in society 
challenging India as a unity, which leads to a “salad bowl” situation. India also 
perceives itself as a victim of invasions from outsiders. In terms of this, its 
narratives of history are constructed and strategic autonomy is given its place in its 
strategic and security considerations. Though the Non-aligned Movement was 
diluted with the end of the Cold War, this does not mean that strategic autonomy 
has lost its importance in India. As a modern nation state, its nation-building and 
national integration process has not finished yet, hence, sovereignty and territorial 
integrity are equally important to India vis-à-vis national security. 
As a developing country, India’s priority is primary domestic. Economic 
well-being gained momentum in political elite’s perception of India’s interests in 
the current domestic and international settings. Trade and bilateral economic 
cooperation have become the cornerstones of India’s relations with the world. In an 
article about India’s foreign policy priorities, Indian Minister of External Affairs, 
S.M. Krishna (2009: 349) wrote: 
India’s economic engagement with the world has deepened and our global 
trade has grown. In fact, with many countries, bilateral economic and 
commercial relations have become the driving force of a more intensive 
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engagement. Our Missions abroad, in addition to liaising with local 
counterpart ministries on traditional issues, are now expected to actively 
promote our commercial interests. 
India is an extraordinarily status conscious power due to its past greatness in 
civilization, yet the achievement of great power status has been inadequate and 
incomplete in the post-independence time. India’s emerging status in the 21st 
century has triggered a new self-definition of its own image leading to an 
increasingly confidence on its new political role in international affairs. India is 
now willing to take more responsibility on the international stage, actively 
participating in international organizations and treaties, and no longer relying 
solely on an argument of autonomy to protect India from outside influence.  
As a regional power, India has consolidated its influence in South Asia and 
would like to continue its dominance in the region in the 21
st
 century, though 
India’s growing influence has gone beyond the region with its growing power. 
Nevertheless, India now prefers soft power strategies rather than hard ones for its 
hegemony in South Asia.  
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 have examined India’s and China’s national identities 
and national interests, which are important for understanding India’s and China’s 
foreign policies and their behaviors in the international politics. In the following 
two Chapters, I will explore how their identities and interests affect their foreign 
policies towards each other, which determine the trends and dynamics of the 
India-China relations. 
7 China’s India Policy 
In this chapter, China’s India policy will be explored from the foreign policy 
decision-making in China, from China’s foreign policy strategy in general and 
China’s perception of India. These three aspects belong to situational definition of 
a state’s behaviour, in which national identity and national interest will find their 
expression. All these three aspects will have impact on China’s strategy towards 
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India. To begin with, I will first give a brief overview of foreign decision-making 
in China, because it provides the background information for the other two aspects. 
7.1 Foreign Policy Decision-making in China 
China’s international relations today are no longer only being decided by a very 
centralised and cloistered political elite in Beijing. The number of actors that take 
part in the formation of the country’s foreign policy has grown within the Chinese 
government as well as increasingly outside it. Non-governmental actors, including 
enterprises, financial institutions, local governments, research institutes, NGOs, 
media and even frequent users of the Internet have been transformed from 
irrelevant actors to stronger players in Chinese foreign policy. In short, the CCP 
still commands foreign policy, but the circle of foreign policy actors has become 
more diversified. 
China is a party-state. The Party is the paramount political actor within the 
country and there is negligible separation between the apparatus of government and 
the structure of the CCP. Inner-party rules for decision-making are based on the 
Leninist principle of democratic centralism, which is also the decision-making rule 
of the state organs in China. The governing structure of China is very hierarchical. 
According to democratic centralism, there is the freedom of members of the 
political party to propose, discuss, debate and criticize in the process of decision 
making, but once the decision of the party is made by a majority vote, all members 
are expected to uphold that decision. This means that an individual is subordinate 
to the organization and the lower levels are subordinate to the higher levels of the 
Party and of the state organs. 
The Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) acts as the de facto highest and most 
powerful decision-making body in contemporary China, exercises centralized 
control over the whole political system. The members of PSC are the top leaders of 
China. Over the past thirty years, China has gradually completed the transition 
from strongman politics to collective leadership. The collective leadership has been 
implemented since the third generation of leadership led by Jiang Zemin. The 
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supreme leader (who usually holds the positions of the President, the Secretary of 
CCP, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission at the same time) does not 
have absolute power, but functions usually as a convener and chairs meetings. 
Decisions are reached through consensus-building. Collective leadership is 
considered a way to prevent autocracy, but may result in reducing the efficiency of 
decision-making. Moreover, collective leadership inherently involves more 
factional competition and coalition-building within the Party in the absence of 
strongman politics. 
In the PSC, Leading Small Groups (LSGs) are important decision-making 
consulting bodies and make supra-ministerial coordination to build consensus on 
issues that cut across the government, party, and military systems when the existing 
bureaucratic structure is unable to do so. They are headed by PSC members, 
composed of leading members of the relevant government, party, and military 
ministerial ranking agencies.
172
 The most critical foreign policy decisions are 
made in the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), also known as the 
National Security Leading Small Group (NSLSG).
173
 Although the supreme leader 
is consistently portrayed as “first among equals” of the PSC members, he does have 
more authority than the rest as the convener by summarizing and unifying the views of 
members. Since foreign affairs have long been considered of the most sensitive 
areas, usually the supreme leader heads the FALSG/NSLSG, as well as the Taiwan 
Affairs LSG. The FALSG provides a forum for the members of the central 
leadership in charge of foreign affairs to meet face to face with foreign policy 
specialists, including the leading officials of relevant government, and military 
establishments, academic specialists, and even influential journalists. Attached to 
the FALSG is the Central Foreign Affairs Office (CFAO) as the executive body of 
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the FALSG/NSLSG for staff work and to exercise overall sectoral coordination (Lu 
2001; Sun 2013). During the period which this writing focuses, President Hu Jintao 
is the head of the Foreign Affairs LSG and he was assisted by the Dai Bingguo,
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who charged the CFAO since 2005. Dai is a professional diplomat, his role was 
equivalent to the national security advisor to the President. Dai and CFAO 
occupied a central position in advising Hu on routine foreign affairs issues and 
eased the burden of Hu. The decision-making process was described by a senior 
Chinese official like this: most of the procedural issues were managed within the 
ministries. For those that reached the CFAO, Dai and the CFAO had a large 
authority to make decisions. “Only those that Dai could not decide with certainty 
will be brought to Hu, and only those that Hu could not decide alone will be 
pushed to PSC” (Sun 2013: 7). This means that on strategic issues such as setting 
of broad agendas, or issues with emergency such as crisis management, the 
supreme leader has to rely on the collective leadership of the Politburo Standing 
Committee to build consensus by discussions and occasional voting around the 
final decision. Hence, with regards to major strategic issues, it is difficult to 
evaluate the degree of influence that a specific person, agency or factor has on any 
given PSC decision, without knowing the arena in which decisions are made and 
who sits at the table.  
Consensus-building is now a crucial part of day-to-day governance in China. 
The pluralization of the Chinese society put enormous pressure on the Party. Hence, 
consensus-building is imperative for the Party to keep unity and political stability. 
In the PSC, no leader today wishes to carry sole responsibility for a major, critical 
policy decision in case the decision fails and backfires, jeopardizing his own career 
and, in a worst case scenario, the legitimacy of the whole system (Sun 2013: 6). 
For decisions on strategic issues, expanded meetings will be convened in PSC 
including representatives of related government ministries, the military, Party 
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departments and some retired senior officials to hold broad discussion in order to 
achieve a widely accepted decision. This decision making model is best 
summarized as “collective leadership, democratic centralism, individual 
consultations, and decision by meetings” (集体领导，民主集中，个别酝酿，会议
决定 ). 175  However, consensus-building requires an enormous amount of 
discussion and bargaining to reach a compromise. Hence, it is very time consuming, 
and the compromise reached by this way may not be the best choice with regard to 
a policy issue. Moreover, a failure to reach consensus often means agreeing to 
postpone a decision to enable further study of the matter or sometimes it ends in 
deadlock with no positions taken at all. In addition to problems created by 
consensus-driven decision-making, China’s foreign policy decision-making process 
also suffers from narrow agency interests and a deficiency in policy coordination 
among various agencies and ministries with “the left hand does not know what the 
right is doing” (Lampton 2001: 2). There are some structural problems that 
contribute to this lack of coordination. For example, when it comes to civil-military 
coordination, the system fails to provide general oversight over PLA actions with 
national security consequences (Sun 2013). In the processes of information analysis, 
objectivity is often compromised to the existing guidelines. Personal relationship 
has traditionally been and is still endemic in Chinese society, playing an active role 
in the decision-making processes. 
China’s foreign policy actors have become more diversified. Within the 
Chinese Government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is today merely one actor in 
the realm of foreign policy and not necessarily the most important one. It faces 
competition for influence over foreign policy formulation from the Ministry of 
Commerce and several other government bodies that have expanded their 
international outreach in their respective fields, such as the People’s Bank of China, 
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the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance and 
the Ministry of State Security. These official actors could have conflicting stakes in 
the process of foreign policy making. Furthermore, the foreign policy actors 
outside the official establishment today are also striving to influence the foreign 
policy making. These include local governments, research institutes, state-owned 
enterprises, financial institutions. 
The influence of public opinion on foreign policy in China is also increasing, 
because Chinese society has become more pluralistic than it was 10 or 20 years ago. 
Chinese citizens can express their views through various media, especially on 
Internet. In Chinese political philosophy, the political legitimacy of a ruler and 
government was derived from the mandate of heaven. Unjust rulers will lose the 
mandate therefore the right to rule the people, and people have the right to 
overthrow them. Today’s leaders do take care of the public opinion, because they 
need the public support for their political purpose. Furthermore, public opinion is 
also a barometer for the government to see the reaction of the public on various 
issues so that the government can decide how to act in the next steps. Chinese 
leaders have the understanding of which issues are sensitive and could lead to 
social instability or could benefit political competitors; and nationalism is 
important with regard to foreign policy issues (Lampton 2001). In general, Chinese 
leadership has more space to maneuver in the sphere of public opinion, because the 
media is still controlled by the state, though nowadays the space in which the 
leadership can operate has already been narrowed because of the spread of 
information technology and the social media. In China, the word “strategic 
community” is still not very popular, comparing to the Indian context. However, 
there are researchers of think thanks, academics in leading universities, and senior 
journalists who to some extent play a role as opinion leaders though they are not 
independent. Sometimes, they can express views that are somewhat different from 
the official line, but generally they will stay within the boundaries that the 
government sets when they make their voices heard in the public. This relationship 
between the public, the government and the strategic elite in China (see Figure 7-1) 
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Thus, in China’s public opinion sphere, the government still has a dominant role. It 
intentionally tries to steer the public opinion and has been generally successful. 
 
 
Figure 7-1 Relationship between government, strategic elite and public in China 
 
7.2 China’s Foreign Policy Strategy 
There are two distinct phases of China’s foreign policy. The first phase was 
dominated by Mao Zedong and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. Mao attached great 
importance to class struggle and revolution, ideology and security were the main 
consideration of China’s foreign policy making. The second phase started when 
Deng Xiaoping came to power after the death of Mao. Deng abandoned the 
ideological rhetoric of Mao and reformulated China’s foreign policy strategy. His 
ideas on foreign affairs are an important part of his theory of building socialism 
with Chinese characteristics and a creative development of the foreign policy 
formulated by Mao and Zhou. 
Deng’s foreign policy objectives are clearly domestically-oriented: to serve 
China’s central mission of “economic construction.” He discussed the issue of 
peace and development, arguing that these are the two main themes of the 
contemporary world, and that the challenges China faced were “matters of 
North-South divide,” that is, the development question:  
Government 
Public guiding 
Strategic 
Elite 
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From the economic point of view, the two really great issues confronting the 
world today, issues of global strategic significance, are: first, peace, and 
second, economic development. The first involves East-West relations, while 
the second involves North-South relations. In short, countries in the East, West, 
North and South are all involved, but the North-South relations are the key 
question. … In short, if the countries in the South are not duly developed, the 
countries in the North will find only very limited outlets for their capital and 
products; indeed, if the South remains poor, the North will find no outlets at 
all.
176
  
Deng also readopted an independent foreign policy, which was set in the early days 
of the PRC but was actually not followed in terms of the reality of the rivalry 
between the Soviet Union and the US. It is clear that Deng had an excellent 
mastery of the domestic development and of the changing international 
environment. Even if after Deng, policy making in Beijing has been characterized 
by careful compromise and consensus-building, his ideas on diplomacy have been 
followed by his successors. The guidelines he laid, of which peace, development 
and independence are the core, have become the consensus on foreign policy 
entrenched among party leaders. His successors Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao added their 
own interpretations and new content onto Deng’s guidelines based on new 
challenges of their time, but did not deviate from Deng’s ideas. 
In Jiang’s Zemin’s era, China continued the good-neighbor policy of Deng, 
and established various types of partnerships with other major powers and began to 
play an active role in regional cooperation. In the late 1990s, the “New Security 
Concept” was raised to address the China’s security environment in the context of 
the emergence of non-traditional security threats, of “China threat theory.” It 
stressed the mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality of states, and respect for different 
cultures and different development paths. In addition to comprehensive security, it 
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also stressed cooperative security, common security and the development of 
comprehensive national power (CNP). Moreover, the idea of international 
responsibility was also brought to China’s foreign policy, since the international 
voices that China should take more responsibility to deal with regional and global 
affairs were also increasing with China’s growing power. Thus, since the 
mid-1990s China has attached great importance to cultivating an international 
image of a responsible cooperative power. Phrases such as “responsible great 
power” have emerged frequently in official talks. 
Throughout the period on which this study is based, Hu Jintao owned the 
office of the Chinese president as the head of the fourth generation leadership. The 
situation which Hu Jintao faced was that, China had become a rising power. China 
had to address the challenges coming from this new identity and status in the 
international community. Creating a favorable surrounding for its domestic 
development was still important as well as consolidation of the domestic 
achievement. It was in this context that Hu developed new foreign policy thinking 
under the concepts of “peaceful development” and “harmonious world.” The 
concept “harmonious world” is an extension in China’s foreign policy of Hu 
Jintao’s domestic-oriented “building a harmonious society” policy in response to 
the rising unhappiness at increasing economic inequalities and ecological disasters 
in China.
177
 
In late 2003 and early 2004, the phrase “peaceful rise” appeared in public 
speeches of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao. The phrase was coined 
by Zheng Bijian, the former Vice Principal of the Central Party School, in his 
speech at the Boao Forum for Asia (2003).
178
 His speech had a great response at 
home and abroad. The topic of “China’s peaceful rise” attracted broad attention 
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both internationally and domestically. It refers to the idea that in the past, a rise of a 
new power often resulted in drastic changes to global political structures, and even 
war, but China will not rise as other great powers through force. Instead, China’s 
rise will help to maintain a peaceful international environment. However, the term 
“peaceful rise” caused controversy among Chinese leaders, in part because there 
were opinions that the use of the word “rise” could fuel the notion of “threat.” 
Therefore, in the second half of 2004, “peaceful rise” faded out gradually in the 
news, and political propaganda, and was replaced by the more low-profile term 
“peaceful development.” By 2012 China had published two White Papers, one in 
2005, and one in 2011, to systematically explain the theory and practice of 
“peaceful development” and Chinese government’s position in this regard.179 
In a nutshell, the theory of “peaceful development” states that China’s path of 
peaceful development is a choice determined by China’s national conditions and 
carries forward China’s historical and cultural tradition; it may be defined as 
“China should develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to 
world peace through its own development,” which more concretely include that 
China “should achieve development with its own efforts and by carrying out reform 
and innovation,” “should open itself to the outside and learn from other countries,” 
“should seek mutual benefit and common development with other countries in 
keeping with the trend of economic globalization,” and “should work together with 
other countries to build a harmonious world of durable peace and common 
prosperity.”180 Chapter three “China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing Peaceful 
Development” of the 2011 White Paper could be regarded as a summary of China’s 
foreign policies since Deng Xiaoping, putting all the thinking on international 
relations and foreign policies of Deng, Jiang, and Hu under the banner of peaceful 
development. There are five pillars for China to pursue peaceful development 
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according to the document, which include promoting the building of a harmonious 
world; pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace; promoting new thinking 
on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination; 
actively living up to international responsibility; and promoting regional 
cooperation and good-neighborly relations.
181
 These are the guiding policies that 
construct the doctrine of peaceful development, giving us the framework to 
understand China’s foreign policy behaviours of the time this thesis focuses on and 
thereafter. 
Here it needs to be noted that in the second half of Hu’s tenure, from 2007 to 
2012, many new challenges emerged in China’s diplomacy which led to active 
debates on Deng’s “tao guang yang hui, you suo zuo wei (韬光养晦, 有所作为)” 
strategy. Questions were raised about how to protect China’s oversea interests when 
more and more Chinese travelling, studying and doing business abroad, how to 
protect their personal security and property; how to counter the US’s new strategic 
move towards Asia-Pacific and the strengthening US-Japan alliance; how to solve 
China’s territorial disputes with neighboring countries, especially the maritime 
disputes in South China Sea and Diaoyu island with Japan. In this context, China’s 
diplomacy was criticized by many within the government establishment and the 
public as too “soft” to address such challenges. Some foreign policy experts, such 
as Yan Xuetong, Luo Yuan, advocate that China should give up the strategy of 
keeping a low profile and non-alliance in order to better respond to the United 
States and Japan strategic containment, safeguard national interests and enhance 
China’s great power status.182 Other experts, such as Liu Jianfei of the Central 
Party School holds the view that the key responsibility for China’s foreign 
diplomacy is the maintenance of a peaceful and stable international environment 
for domestic development and reforms. Therefore, China’s foreign policy should 
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serve development not security.
183
 In the 2011 edition of China’s Foreign Affairs, a 
white paper published by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the diplomatic concept “you 
suo zuo wei” (modest operations) which had been used after the end of the Cold 
War was first time replaced by “ji ji zuo wei” (active operations).184 It indicates 
that Deng’s guiding principle of “keeping a low profile” has partially changed in 
response to the new situation that China has emerged to the center of the 
international stage. It also indicates the transformation of a diplomacy mainly 
serving domestic development to a great power diplomacy, which is more complex 
and requires a combination of political, economic, security, cultural and other 
resources. How to build this great power diplomacy system has thus become the 
main theme in China’s foreign policy and will have implications in the coming 
decades. Yet this slightly course correction does not necessarily means that China’s 
behavior will become aggressive, it should be understood within the given 
framework of peaceful development and in the continuity of China’s foreign policy.  
7.3 China’s Perception of India 
In his primary research on Chinese perception of India, Randol gave a very precise 
description of the current state of play: “a largely neutral (but sometimes 
confounding) perception of its neighbor indicates India is not a priority (at best) 
and in some cases insignificant (at worst) for China. A perceptible change in these 
attitudes, however, is on the horizon” (Randol 2008: 212). 
The perception of India by the Chinese government can have a constraining 
effect on its foreign policy choices towards India. In China, India is not perceived 
as an enemy or rival, instead, India is largely seen by the mainstream in China as a 
friend or a partner. 
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India meets all the basic criteria applied to determine the importance of a 
country to China’s foreign policy. As Zhou Gang, former Chinese ambassador of 
India, commented: 
We often talk about that the major powers are the key; the periphery is the 
primary; the developing countries are the basis; multilateral cooperation is the 
important stage. India is a big power, a neighbor, a developing country, is also 
influential in the Asia-Pacific region and the Indian Ocean region. The country 
has a very important position in China’s diplomacy.185  
However, India remains low in China’s list of foreign policy priorities compared to 
China’s place in India’s list of priorities. China’s security concerns are directed 
mainly toward the US, East and Southeast Asia. South Asia has lower priority, and 
China does not regard India as a serious rival. Chinese public and academia follow 
developments in Taiwan, Japan and the US with much greater interest than 
development in India. In recent years, due to their growing economic ties and 
recognition of India as emerging power, the importance of India has been steadily 
rising in Chinese perception. This change was confirmed by State Councilor of 
China and the Chinese Special Representative in the border talks Mr. Dai Bingguo: 
“Our relationship has gained increasing importance in China’s foreign 
relations.”186 
Similar to India’s case, there are also different perceptual positions on India in 
China which can be roughly distinguished as pro cooperation, pro competition and 
in the middle. On the one hand is the position which emphasizes cooperation and 
the common identities and interests of China and India. For example, their 
understanding of international order, of human rights, of cooperation on 
                                                 
185
 “Chinese peripheral diplomacy ten moments (five): ‘We have achieved a major milestone’ [中
国周边外交十瞬间（五） :“我们完成了一件大事” ],” November 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2007-11/14/content_9224907.htm. 
186
 “State Councillor Dai Bingguo gives an interview to Press Trust of India,” China Daily, 
December 13, 2012, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-12/13/content_16015436.htm.  
140 
 
anti-smuggling and anti-terrorism, of economic development and the requirements 
of maintaining domestic stability. On the other hand, there is the position that 
views India as a hostile country occupying vast territory of China, being 
preoccupied with the memories of the war in 1962 and trying to achieve its 
territorial claims by developing military strength and increasing military 
deployment in border areas. This position emphasizes the conflicting geopolitical 
interests with India and that China should be on guard against India.
187
 
Mainstream Chinese perception of India moves between these two positions and 
currently the former one is the dominant one, which is represented by the 
government and most of the academia (Bhattacharyya 2007: 698-699).
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Obviously, the constraints of China’s political system make its government 
officials express their opinions in line with the government position in their public 
speeches. Though there is more than one perception on India, the government is 
usually coherent and shows a unified position towards the outside. Finally, while 
China gradually copes with the systems in USA and other western countries with 
increasing sophistication, it has been difficult for China to understand the 
complexities of India’s society and its plural democracy of which free expression 
of views do not always represent the position of the government. There has been a 
lack of South Asian and Indian expertise in China and a lack of interactions, which 
can be attributed to this lack of understanding. 
7.3.1 Main Identity Elements in China’s Perception of India 
In current Chinese perception of India, there are some basic identity elements of 
India on which China’s interests are identified and decisions towards India are 
made. There are two frames of reference, globally and regionally (Randol 2008: 
222; Han 2002; Zhao 2008). China’s perception of India is first based on the reality 
that India is an important neighbor of China. Although South Asia is not China’s 
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most decisive security area, negative impact on stability in China’s southwest 
brought about by conflicts and unrests in this region cannot be underestimated and 
India is obviously the decisive factor of the situation in South Asia. Due to the 
history of Sino-Indian relations and the India’s geographical location, India’s 
actions and policies could cause disturbances in China’s southwest periphery and 
frontier areas. Therefore, India is of considerable importance for China to maintain 
peace and stability in this region (Zhao 2008). 
Second, India as the regional power of South Asia, has ambitions of being a 
world power. At the same time it is emerging as a military power. India is 
accelerating its pace of military modernization and its military spending has 
substantially increased to maintain its deterrence capability, especially targeting 
Pakistan and China. Although Chinese scholars and scientists have been concerned 
about the development of nuclear weapons in India, they generally agree that 
India’s comprehensive power is still limited and it has not become a threat to 
China’s overall security even after India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and the launch of 
the Agni missiles. As a South Asian power, India sees South Asia as its sphere of 
influence and guarantor of national security and denies any big power presence in 
the region. In order to balance India’s influence, small countries between India and 
China would like to seek closer relations with China. China has no intention to 
separate South Asia by winning over one party to isolate the other, but China 
cannot refuse small countries in South Asia to seek to establish a good relationship 
with it as they are also China’s neighbors and China has its own stakes in these 
countries. China knows that with its growing influence in South Asia, India feels 
contained by China and has been sceptical of any China’s moves in the region. 
Moreover, the mistrust caused by the 1962 conflict is still shaping India’s 
perception of China. Hence, it is challenging for China to manage China-India 
relations. 
At the global level, India is understood as an emerging power as well as a 
representative and a leader of developing countries. The rule-makers and discourse 
leaders of the current international system are the Western powers. India and China 
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and other developing countries do not have much say in the system. On many 
issues such as the international order, climate change, human rights and the 
concepts of sovereignty they can reach a broad consensus, cooperating in 
multilateral regimes, and making their voices heard. As the largest developing 
countries in the world, they have many similar domestic challenges and they can 
share their experiences with each other in issues of socio-economic development. 
In this sense, India could be an important cooperative partner of China. At the same 
time India as an emerging power also brings pressure to China on strategic level, 
especially on China’s relations with other great powers. In China’s perception, real 
security threat comes from the US.
189
 Since 1998 India’s nuclear tests there has 
been intensified political engagement between the US and India. China is very 
concerned about US-India relations, and whether India will side with the United 
States to contain China. In the Asia-Pacific region, where China is playing a central 
role, it is the US’s intention to win over India in order to balance China in this 
region. With the support of the US, a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue was initiated 
in 2007 by then-Prime Minister of Japan Shinzo Abe between the US, Japan, India 
and Australia. However, the military alliance between the four countries got 
nowhere, because China issued formal diplomatic protests to its members. 
Although China expressed its worry and concerns about a possible US-India 
alliance, at the political level China realized that it would not be easy for Indians to 
be drawn into an alliance with the United States against China because of its 
political culture.
190
 According to China’s State Councilor, Dai Bingguo: 
India is a country of strategic independence. It will not be wooed or ordered 
about by anyone else. Being a forerunner of the Non-Aligned Movement and a 
large emerging country with growing international influence, India will stick to 
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its traditional independent foreign policy and contribute to the peace and 
development of the region and beyond.
191
  
Zhou Gang, former Chinese ambassador in India also commented, “India has its 
own strategy, its own pursuit, and its self-esteem, it will not be easy for India to 
pull chestnuts from fire for the United States.” He also showed understanding 
regarding growing India-US ties, “India wants to develop its economy, to achieve 
its defense modernization. It is unlikely to realize this, if it does not develop 
relations with the US to get the technology.”192 
7.3.2 Media and Public Opinion 
Public opinion has increasing importance in China and media plays an important 
role in the development of public opinion. Chinese media has become increasingly 
commercialized, with growing competition and diversified content. State media 
outlets are no longer heavily subsidized by the government, they also need to 
attract advertisement through programs that people find attractive. Despite 
government monitoring, state media are no longer merely mouthpieces of the 
government and not all of them represent government positions. Especially in 
topics about international issues, media have more room to maneuver. It is under 
this background that India has become one of the attractive topics in international 
news reports. 
Among the state media at the central level, only the Party newspaper, People’s 
Daily, Reference News,
193
 published by Xinhua News Agency, China Radio 
International (CRI) and China Central Television (CCTV), reflect China’s official 
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policy and position on India (Tang 2004). This kind of media is authoritative. They 
generally hold a positive attitude towards India which is in line with the 
government’s position that India is a partner and a friend. These media have editors 
and reporters who are familiar with the overall strategy and policy of Chinese 
diplomacy and are able to grasp the proper scale to report India in a way to 
promote bilateral relations.  
However, with regard to Chinese public perception of India, the 
market-oriented urban media and online media have increasing impact. The Indian 
image on these sections of Chinese media varies from moderate to negative (Tang 
2004). There are two aspects to explain this: On the one hand, it should be 
recognized due to marketing considerations that some of these media specifically 
seek to promote national pride by showing that China is superior to India, by 
focusing on issues which could foster nationalist sentiments, or by choosing 
various negative social news of India to meet the readers/viewers’ tastes. On the 
other hand, negative image making about India in Chinese market-oriented media 
and online media is to a certain extent a “tit-for-tat” of Chinese media in reaction of 
increasing distorted or misinformed reports on China in Indian media.
194
 There is 
an acute perception deficit in the Indian media, with China being regularly 
portrayed as a security threat, which is largely due to the influence of the writings 
by a small group of experts from domestic think-tanks.
195
 According to Tang Lu’s 
observation, the overall tone of India’s media reported about China from 2003 to 
2006 was more positive, although it sometimes revealed some of the concerns and 
worries of China. However, starting from the end of 2006, the media’s negative 
reports in China gradually increased and reached a climax between August and 
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September 2009 when India’s English-language media hyped border transgressions 
issue collectively (Tang 2010). The negative stories about China attracted certainly 
the attention of Chinese journalists and to some extent provoked criticism towards 
the Indian government and Indian media in the Chinese media,
196
 which 
contributed to an increasingly negative perception of India in the Chinese public.
197
  
Some survey data confirmed this tendency in Chinese public perception of 
India. The World Public Opinion Survey data from 2006 to 2012, conducted by the 
Chicago Council on Global Affairs for the BBC World Service shows that Chinese 
view of India’s influence in the world is increasingly negative (See Figure 7-2). 
Survey data of the Pew Global Attitudes project from 2005 to 2012 also shows that 
India’s favorability in China is declining (See Figure 7-3).198 On the India-China 
relationship, the Pew Report on China of October 2012 shows that 39% of Chinese 
view India-China relationship as being based on cooperation, and 24% see it as 
being marked by hostility. In 2010, 53% of Chinese viewed India-China 
relationship as marked by cooperation, and 9% by hostility. On Chinese attitudes 
towards India’s economy, the Report shows that 44% of Chinese view India’s 
growing economy as a good thing while 25% see it as a bad thing for China in 
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2012; Chinese view India’s growing economy as a good thing for China 60%, bad 
thing for China 13% in 2010.
199
 
There is another Chinese survey which was conducted in 2007 in Chinese 
colleges and universities about how Chinese students perceive India. College 
students belong to China’s future elites, they have better access to information and 
knowledge, hence, their perception of India will to a large extent represent and lead 
the public opinion. On question of the perception of India-China relationship, about 
69.1% students said it is a state of neither friend nor foe, but this did not mean that 
India-China relationship is not important, because 74.3% students believed that 
India-China relationship is “important” and “very important.” Besides, another 56% 
of college students held “very welcome” and “welcome” attitude towards Indian 
companies entering Chinese market. These data shows the current state of the 
India-China relations is far from the ideal state in the perception of students (Li and 
Liu 2008: 41).
200
 It is perceived as “not bad and not good,” which is in the middle. 
This is a critical state. It could easily turn bad or turn good, depending on which 
kind of forces is stronger under given conditions. 
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Figure 7-2 Chinese view of India’s influence in the world (Source: BBC World Service polls, 
2006-2012) 
 
 
Figure 7-3 India’s favorability in China (Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/, 2005-2012) 
 
On the whole, there is an increasing discrepancy between the official 
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years, the old problems in Sino-Indian relations have not been resolved and new 
issues are emerging. The discrepancy in fact reflects the current dilemma and 
structural constraints in India-China relations.
201
 While the official relations have 
been in a stable developmental stage, there is a lack of trust and understanding at 
the people-to-people level. On the one hand is the government position that India is 
a good friend and partner and India’s rise as part of the rise of developing society 
in the current world order is welcome. On the other hand, negative remarks of 
China in Indian media are often found in Chinese media, giving Chinese public a 
somewhat different image that India is not a very friendly country towards China. 
Whether an emerging India will be beneficial or harmful to China is a question 
whose answer has not yet reached a clear consensus within the Chinese public 
(Zhao 2011). 
7.4 China’s Strategy towards India 
China’s foreign policy strategy towards India should be understood in terms of 
China’s own identity and interest, in terms of China’s perception of India and 
China’s foreign policy strategy. In the contemporary era, China’s national identity 
prescribes that economic development is the priority of China. Hence, China’s 
diplomacy should serve the goal of economic construction, and is committed to 
developing friendship and cooperation with other countries to create a favorable 
international environment for its development, as CCP’s Central Committee 
pointed out in 2006:  
China will pursue an independent foreign policy of peace, unswervingly follow 
the path of peaceful development, … and safeguard Chinas sovereignty, 
security and development interest, … Foreign Affairs work must persist in 
taking economic construction as the center, closely combined with the 
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domestic overall situation, and carry work forward by co-ordinating domestic 
and international situations.
202
 
This guideline was named by Hu Jintao the “peaceful development theory,” which 
integrates the thinking on diplomacy of Chinese leadership since Deng Xiaoping, 
and defines China’s neighborhood policy in this period. As indicated in the 16th and 
17
th
 Party Congress Reports:   
We will continue to cement our friendly ties with our neighbors and persist in 
building a good-neighborly relationship and partnership with them. We will 
step up regional cooperation and bring our exchanges and cooperation with 
our surrounding countries to a new height.
203
 
 
For our neighboring countries, we will continue to follow the foreign policy of 
friendship and partnership, strengthen good-neighborly relations and 
practical cooperation with them, and energetically engage in regional 
cooperation in order to jointly create a peaceful, stable regional environment 
featuring equality, mutual trust and win-win cooperation.
204
 
India is China’s important neighbor, thus, China’s strategy towards India is 
situated in this neighborhood policy and is based on the perception that India is not 
a threat to China. From the Chinese point of view, its policy towards India does 
have defensive and competitive elements, but the mainstream is still marked by 
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cooperation. First, both from the short and long term perspective, India will not 
overtake the United States and even Russia to become China’s main security threat. 
India for China is like India for the US, is a country that China want to win over to 
balance US’s influence in Asia and for a more fair international order. Second, 
China wants to avoid conflicts with its immediate neighbors for its domestic 
development, and China’s economic development can also benefit from a peaceful 
and prosperous neighborhood. It is not the case as many western and Indian 
commentators have observed that China does not like to see India as prosperous 
and strong because of competitive relations. This kind of interpretation is based on 
a realist mindset and focuses only on power factors in the international relations 
while ignoring the historical, cultural and geo-political complex of China. As 
declared in many occasions, China’s intention in foreign policy is to have “win-win” 
relations with other countries in terms of achieving welfare, development and 
prosperity. A prosperous and stable India will be good for China’s periphery and 
for China’s economic well-being too. Third, India and China have considerable 
common interests in the reform of the international political and economic order. 
Therefore, to win over India – i.e. to have a long term, cooperative and stable 
relationship with India, is at the core of China’s India policy, and this will continue 
in the future for a long period of time so long as domestic socio-economic 
development remain the dominant goal in the country. This attitude of China is 
reflected in China’s State Councilor Dai Bingguo’s statement to The Hindu:  
While working hard to develop itself, China is fully committed to developing 
long-term friendship and cooperation with India. It is our genuine hope that 
India will enjoy prosperity and its people, happiness. There does not exist such 
a thing as China’s attempt to “attack India” or “suppress India’s 
development”. … We need to guide and promote the growth of China-India 
relations with the concept of peaceful development. We need to view each 
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other’s development in a positive light and regard each other as major partners 
and friends, not rivals.
205
  
One of China’s guiding principles when it comes to its neighborhood policy is 
the notion of “practical cooperation.” It reflects the pragmatism that is prevailed in 
China’s foreign policy making. The will of China of seeking a better Sino-Indian 
relationship is clear, but in the process there are still many structural problems. For 
instance, practical cooperation entails starting with something easy, such as 
expanding cooperation in economy, trade and finance, strengthening 
people-to-people exchanges to improve mutual understanding, and further, it 
should not let difficult issues such as border issue stand in the way of taking the 
relationship forward. Given India’s continuing vigilance against China, and some 
uncertainties in Sino-Indian relations, such as border dispute, Tibet problem and 
Sino-India-Pakistan triangle, managing China-India relations remains challenging 
for China. How to prevent the positive momentum from being reversed, how to 
make more substantive improvement in their strategic partnership, and how to 
avoid negative competitions are central questions that concern the Chinese 
government. 
China’s cooperative and approach towards India is set in the general 
framework of its foreign policy. However, when it comes to concrete issue areas, 
the application of the approach depends on the nature of the individual issue, 
and whether there is will of cooperation from both sides since cooperation is 
unattainable with only one side of the two parties willing to cooperate. In the 
strategic and security issues, the dominant mindset is the realist one, of which 
security-dilemma, balance of power and competing sphere of influence are a part. 
This realist mindset is also determined by India and China’s identity as nation 
states, that security, territory, und unity could not be easily sacrificed. The 
cooperative policy framework can to some extent lessen the tensions and conflicts 
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or moderate positions in these issues, but it is difficult to alter the overall situation 
of these issues, if the dominant mindset is still the competitive one. To explain this, 
I take the example of China’s South Asia policy.  
In South Asia, China’s policy is not aimed against India. The difference 
between China’s and India’s approach to South Asia is that one is more from an 
economic perspective and the other from a strategic and security perspective. Since 
the 1990s, China has modified its policy towards Pakistan, and has been no more 
only one-sided. Here, it cannot be excluded that China’s relations with Pakistan do 
have some considerations of balancing India, but it is only one aspect. As an 
immediate neighbor of Pakistan and other South Asian countries, China has its own 
stakes in having good relations with them. China developed relations with Nepal 
actively. This is in fact more out of economic considerations, for a breakthrough of 
opening up in southwest China. The same can be seen in China’s relations with Sri 
Lanka. China’s investment in the construction of Hambantota port is not for a kind 
of “string of pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean, but for economic interests. China 
knows that India has the best strategic position in the Indian Ocean and does not 
have the ambition to compete with India in the Indian Ocean. However, since India 
looks at China’s influence in South Asia mainly from strategic and security 
perspective, it will not be easy to see India and China fully cooperating in regional 
issues of South Asia, even if China were to take such an initiative or have a 
cooperative manner. 
In general, the situation of India-China relations is still far away from China’s 
strategic objectives with India. It is difficult to achieve a breakthrough in the short 
run. Guided by practical cooperation, the reality is in fact a strategy of gradual 
cooperation. China has realized gradual cooperation with India is more realistic 
(Zhao 2008). First, the historic problems between them cannot be resolved in the 
short term, and the higher ranking of China in international system could further 
India’s suspicion towards China and complicate the situation. Second, two 
countries are emerging simultaneously, which has led to a competitive situation to 
some extent, making overall cooperation unlikely in the short run. Hence, a gradual 
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cooperation is conducive to adjust their differences and to maintain the necessary 
room to manoeuvre, while the possibility for military conflict with India has been 
taken into account, and a deterrence capability is maintained. 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at China’s strategy towards India from the perspective of 
foreign policy making and foreign policy strategies that guide its diplomacy, and 
China’s perception of India. 
After Deng Xiaoping, a collective leadership was established in China with 
decision-making being done in a consensus-driven way by democratic centralism. 
Though China’s system has become more pluralistic and foreign policy actors have 
diversified, the Party is still at the center of foreign policy making, laying the 
guidelines for China’s foreign policy. The most critical strategic policy decisions 
are made in the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG), also known as the 
National Security Leading Small Group (NSLSG) in Politbureau Standing 
Committee (PSC), of which the President is the head. Most of the procedural issues 
are managed within the ministerial level. In decision-making process, relationship 
between government and public opinion has been always a topic for discussion. In 
Chinese system, the government and the party are in a strong position. Leaders will 
consider public opinion in foreign policy making. Meanwhile, they also seek to 
control public opinion and have been generally successful. 
In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping abandoned the ideological rhetoric of Mao. Peace, 
development and independence became the core concepts in China’s foreign policy. 
His successors Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao added their own interpretations and new 
content on Deng’s foreign policy thinking based on the new situation of their time, 
but did not deviate from Deng’s ideas. In Hu Jintao’s tenure, the period that my 
thesis focuses, China’s leadership raised the concepts “peaceful development” and 
“harmonious world” in diplomacy and integrated China’s foreign policy thinking 
since Deng Xiaoping into “peaceful development theory,” that China should 
develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to world peace 
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through its own development. Though at the end of Hu’s tenure, there was a 
slightly course correction which indicates a more active strategy in safeguarding 
China’s core interests as reaction to China’s new international challenges, this 
should be understood within the given framework of peaceful development and in 
the continuity of China’s foreign policy. 
China’s official perception of India is neutral, and China does not perceive 
India as a threat. There are two frameworks to China’s perception of India: a) a 
regional one and a global one. In the region, China’s perception of India is first 
based on the reality that India is an important neighbor of China, especially for 
maintaining peace and stability in its periphery. Second, India is a regional power 
of South Asia. Although China’s security concerns are directed mainly toward the 
US, East and Southeast Asia, South Asia has lower priority, China needs to be 
concerned about the security implications on India’s military build-up in the region. 
At the global level, India and China can reach a broad consensus in many issues 
and be cooperative, yet at the same time India as an emerging power also brings 
pressure to China on geo-strategic level, especially on China’s relations with the 
US and other great powers.  
In China there are also different perceptual positions on India, which can be 
roughly distinguished as pro cooperation, pro competition and in the middle, 
though the division of different positions is less obvious in China due to its 
political system. Currently, a pro cooperation stance is the dominant one, which is 
represented by the Government and most of Chinese academia. Different from the 
official position that India is a friend and partner, and that India’s rise is part of the 
rise of developing society in the current world order, public opinion in China 
shows a more complex image about India, in which media plays an important role. 
Chinese media has been increasingly commercialized and does not always 
represent the government’s view. For commercial reasons and to a certain extent as 
a “tit-for-tat” strategy in reaction of distorted or misinformed reports on China in 
Indian media, there has been a negative image making of India in Chinese media, 
leading to a puzzled perception of India in Chinese public that India is not very 
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friendly towards China. Whether an emerging India will be beneficial or harmful to 
China, remains an open question in the Chinese public. The discrepancy in fact 
reflects the current dilemma and structural constraints in India-China relations, and 
the lack of trust and understanding at the people-to-people level. 
To summarize, China’s India policy should be understood in terms of China’s 
own identity and interest, in terms of its foreign policy decision-making, its foreign 
policy strategy and China’s perception of India. China’s peaceful development 
strategy is determined by its national identity and interest, that China should pursue 
an independent foreign policy, follow the path of peaceful development and take 
economic construction as the center. This gives the framework of its neighborhood 
policy, of which establishing friendly neighborhood for domestic development and 
practical cooperation is the core. Setting in this context, China’s policy towards 
India does have defensive and competitive elements, but the mainstream is still 
driven by cooperation. However, in concrete issue areas, the application of the 
cooperative approach depends on the nature of the individual issue, and whether 
there is the will of cooperation from both sides. In the strategic and security issues, 
determined by the nation state and regional power identity, which prescribes the 
importance of sovereignty, the dominant mindset is still shaped by realist 
understandings such as balance of power, sphere of influence, and self-help. The 
cooperative policy framework can to some extent lessen the tension and conflicts 
or moderate positions in these issues, but it is difficult to alter the overall situation 
of these issues. In general, the situation of India-China relations is still far away 
from China’s strategic objective even if efforts are already underway for the 
development of practical cooperation,  
8 India’s China Policy 
After examining China’s policy towards India, this chapter will focus on how is 
India’s policy towards China. As I have done in the last chapter, I will first 
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examine the aspect of foreign policy decision-making in order to set the stage for a 
proper analysis of a state’s foreign policy strategy in general. Next, I will examine 
India’s foreign policy strategy. Following this, I will look at India’s perception of 
China, and at the end draw my conclusion about India’s China policy. 
8.1 Foreign Policy Decision-making in India 
Due to the nature of India’s political system, India’s foreign policy formation is 
affected less by the changing global environment and more by the level of interest 
of the Prime Minister, along with bureaucrats in the Ministry of External Affairs 
(MEA), the media, public opinion, and the ideologies of various political parties 
(Bandyopadhyaya 2003: 82). 
Decision making in India’s foreign policy is often characterized as 
personalized, ad hoc and reactive (Bandyopadhyaya 2003; Pant 2006; Hardgrave & 
Kochanek 2008, Mehta 2009). India has a small, elitist, and highly bureaucratic 
foreign service, and most routine decisions are made by these officers within the 
hierarchy of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). Ministries concerned with 
India’s international relations include External Affairs, Defense, Commerce, and 
Finance. There has generally been a concentration of decision making authority in 
the Prime Minister, and to a small extent in the Foreign Minister. With a small 
coterie of personal advisors, major decisions on policy are made by the two, and 
the process is often informal. In recent years, the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) 
has built up a staff of its own to formulate and conduct, in partnership with the 
MEA but with more power than the MEA (Malone 2011:7). India’s foreign policy 
decision-making process was also criticized for lacking an institutional mechanism 
for dealing with problems of national security. In November 1998 National 
Security Council (NSC) was established by the NDP government to address this 
problem. The National Security Council was headed by the Prime Minister 
included the Ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home, Finance of the 
Government of India, and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. The 
three-tiered structure of the NSC comprises the Strategic Policy Group, the 
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National Security Advisory Board and a Secretariat represented by the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC). In addition, there is the National Security Advisor 
(NSA). The NSA, appointed by the Prime Minister, has become the most powerful 
authority on national security since 1998 and has sidelined the institution of the 
NSC. At times, important decisions were taken in an ad hoc manner without 
utilising the Cabinet Committee on Security and the Strategic Policy Group which 
was composed by key secretaries, service chiefs, and heads of intelligence agencies 
for inter-ministerial coordination for the NSC (Pant 2006: 766).  
A recent phenomenon affecting foreign policy decision-making in India has 
been the increasingly assertive role of regional political parties (Singh 2012: 141). 
In the past 15 years, coalition politics has become the norm in India and the 
regional parties are necessary for the survival of the coalition governments. Thus, 
they are able to influence foreign policy in accordance to their worldview. 
The making of Indian foreign policy is also hampered by poor coordination 
among the various institutions concerned with India’s international relations. 
Frequently, ministries make important decision on sensitive issues affecting the 
conduct of Indian foreign policy without consulting MEA. The problem is most 
critical in the lack of strategic policy coordination between MEA and the Ministry 
of Defense (MOD), with the MEA having the authority in Diplomacy and the latter 
in military issues. (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2008: 477). Furthermore, India’s 
foreign policy making has been criticized for lacking strategic vision (Tanham 
1992; Subrahmanyam 2005; Pant 2006, 2008).
206
  
India’s foreign policy actors have also become more diversified. In the past the 
MEA and PMO had strong influence, but now the MOD has also gained influence, 
as well as other Ministries such as Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and 
Industry. For obvious reasons, policy makers in democracies tend to be much more 
sensitive to the dynamics of public opinion. There has been a broad consensus in 
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public opinion in favor of India’s foreign policy in most major instances, however, 
at times public opinion has also compelled the government to change its policy 
postures such as the cases of India-China border conflicts in the late 1950s and 
India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s.207 On the India’s nuclear 
issue, public opinion has also been playing a very influential role. We can say that 
though the media and public opinion do not play a decisive role, they impose 
pressures and constraints on the foreign policy making. Within India’s current 
democratic setup, the interaction between the elected leaders and the public is 
mediated by a limited number of strategic thinkers and opinion leaders who are 
identified as India’s strategic community. They are people who populate 
think-tanks, academic institutions, newspaper columns, journals, and televisions 
programs, as well as the seminars and informal discussions to be found mainly in 
New Delhi. These people operate mostly outside the formal parameters of the 
Government, but a number of them have had and still have various connections 
with government personnel and politicians. Hence, a considerable congruence 
between government policy and nongovernmental perceptions can be created as the 
governmental and extra-governmental portions of the strategic community share 
ideas in their own fashion (Hoffman 2004: 34-35). These strategic elites are able to 
determine the government’s policy in two ways: first, by directly advising India’s 
policy makers; and second, by guiding public opinion and generating public 
pressures on the government. The relationship between the government, public 
opinion and strategic elite in India see Figure 8-1 (Frey 2006: 30). Moreover, this 
link in India between public opinion and foreign policy is strengthened by the rapid 
development of telecom, internet, mass media and the new institution of public 
opinion polls and surveys. 
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Figure 8-1 Relationship between government, strategic elite and public in India (Source: 
Frey 2006) 
 
8.2 India’s Foreign Policy Strategy 
India’s foreign policy strategy is embedded in its strategic thinking. Contemporary 
debates about India’s strategic thinking can be traced back to the discussion of the 
term “strategic culture.” During the Cold War, scholars attempted to develop a 
theory of political culture. In 1977, American scholar Jack Snyder in his RAND 
report on Soviet limited nuclear war doctrine brought the political culture argument 
into modern security studies by coining the term “strategic culture.” Snyder’s 
contributions had resonance for other security policy analysts. Many subsequent 
works on strategic culture emerged since then. On India’s strategic culture, one of 
the most influential works is George K. Tanham’s India’s Strategic Thought, also 
published by RAND. Tanham concluded in this book that India lacks long-term, 
coherent strategic thinking. His book opened the debate of whether India has a 
strategic culture, and the argument that India does not have a strategic culture and 
that Indians have historically not thought consistently and rigorously about strategy 
became a commonplace among some experts on Indian security. Though many 
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scholars and politicians disagree with this opinion (Bajpai 2010, Jones 2006, 
Menon 2012),
208
 Tanham’s pioneering work prompted India’s political circle and 
academia to seriously consider India’s strategic culture and strategic options related 
to the nation’s future.  
 To answer the question whether India has a strategic culture, it is meaningful 
to first look at what is strategic culture. Strategic culture is reflected in the 
belief-systems that guide the making of foreign and security policy. The strategic 
culture approach presumes that individual interests are constructed in the context of 
temporality and logically consistent patterns of perceptions about a country’s role 
in international politics and in the use of military force towards achieving political 
ends. These patterns are rooted in historically formative experiences of a state. 
They are influenced by philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive factors as the 
state and its elites develop through time (Neumann and Heikka 2005: 6). In this 
sense, for a civilization and state like India, it is impossible that it does not have a 
strategic culture. As Jones summarized, India’s strategic culture is mosaic-like, due 
to its substantial continuity with the symbolism of pre-modern Indian state systems 
and threads of Hindu or Vedic civilization dating back several millennia. This 
continuity of values was battered and overlaid but never severed or completely 
submerged (Jones 2006). Today, many of the ideological roots of India’s strategic 
positions can be found through an examination of its pre-independent history. The 
most profound two modes are the traditions of Kautilya and of Ashoka. The former   
represented realist values and the latter idealist ones (Kumar 2008; Song 2008). 
Moreover, during the rise of nationalism under British rule, India’s strategic culture 
assimilated much of what we think of as 20th Century “modernity” (Jones 2006). 
Hence, India’s behavior after 1947 is informed by a composite culture which 
cannot be separated from its own history and the history of the world. 
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India’s strategic culture today operates through a parliamentary democracy and 
within a diverse society. This system allows for a wide range of opinions to be 
voiced, thus, India’s diversity is also reflected in its strategic thoughts and its 
strategic community which could be described as “an elite divided against itself 
and within itself,” of which divisions “do not fall along neat regional, cultural, 
economic, or professional lines” (Cohen 2001: 64). Currently, the most popular 
description of India’s contemporary strategic culture is made by Kanti Bajpai 
(2010).
209
 While acknowledging that India does not have a tradition of strategic 
thinking is not altogether incorrect, he holds the opinion that India does have a 
fairly coherent set of principles since its independence, and its strategic culture was 
dominated by the worldview of its first Prime Minister Nehru, and has been in 
rapid evolution since the end of the Cold War (Bajpai 2010: 521). He summarized 
three main streams of the strategic thinking in India, namely Nehruvianism, 
neo-liberalism, and hyperrealism.
210
 However, it should be noted that these 
categories are ideal types – i.e. constructs formulated for analytical purposes, 
carrying in each of them a number of Indian perceptions. Each stream contains 
individual ideas offered by many people, and people can also shift from one 
position to another position overtime, or can bridge between positions. While these 
streams disagree in key respects, they also share a core set of assumptions and 
arguments. First of all, all three paradigms accept the centrality of the sovereign 
state in International Relations and agree that there is no higher authority in the 
international system. In such a system, states can only help themselves and strive to 
protect their territory and autonomy. Secondly, all three paradigms see interests, 
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power and violence as the staples of international relations that states cannot ignore. 
Thirdly, they accept that power comprises both military and economic capabilities 
at a minimum and both types of capabilities are vital for security. Beyond this 
common base, they differ on the best strategy and means to be adopted (Bajpai 
2010a, 2010b). 
 For Nehruvians, the state of “anarchy” can be mitigated by international laws 
and institutions, negotiations and cooperation between states, and to make 
preparations for war and a balance of power central to security and foreign policy 
is both ruinous and futile. For neoliberals, economic well-being is vital for national 
security. Economic strength can substitute for military power or, can be more 
effective. Where Nehruvians see communications and contact as the key to the 
transformation of international relations, neo-liberals believe that trade and 
economic interactions can achieve this. The hyperrealists are pessimistic about 
international relations, they see the endless cycle of repetition of inter-state threat, 
counter-threat, rivalry and conflict, where the risk of war is only managed by the 
threat and use of violence (Ibid.). All three paradigms are not new and continue to 
have their supporters across the various segments and institutions of Indian life. All 
three are to be found in the press, academia, and India’s governmental institutions 
(Ibid.). 
 Currently, economic development and prosperity has gained importance in the 
India’s self-understanding. While Nehruvianism still in many aspects defines 
India’s foreign policy strategy, which, in this sense, shows the continuity of India’s 
foreign policy, it seems that neo-liberal thinking has also gained increasing 
influence and there is a tendency towards pragmatism.  
India’s current foreign policy is facing many challenges. Firstly, there is no 
political consensus in the country on national security issues.
211
 There was a broad 
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consensus behind the policy of non-alignment during the Cold War.
212
 However, 
since the end of the Cold War, there has been no clear strategy in foreign and 
security policy which is comparable to non-alignment and India has been searching 
one. As Harish Kapur commented: “India really was never rudderless, but then it 
was also never direction-oriented after the Nehru era” (Kapur 2009: 414). The 
major changes after the Cold War on national security such as 1998 nuclear tests 
and better relations with the US in the 2000s, are reactive and pragmatic responses 
to pressing conditions. Secondly, the government has not been able to address the 
crucial issue of coordination required to formulate and address the issues of 
national security.
213
 The NSC has been a useful invention but it lacks powers of 
enforcement. The departmental interests are very strong and it becomes difficult to 
synchronise them. Moreover, there is no common understanding among various 
segments of the government of what national security constitutes.
214
 
Recently there is a cumulative effort within Indian strategic community to 
push the Indian Government towards making its own strategic concept or vision 
clear in a national strategic document. For example, in 2010 there was one book 
“The Long View from Delhi: To Define the Indian Grand Strategy for Foreign 
Policy” by Rajeev Kumar, and Raja Menon.215 This book is followed by a strategic 
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document in 2012, called Nonalignment 2.0, written by a group of analysts and 
policy makers, and an edited volume “Grand Strategy of India: 2020 and Beyond” 
by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. However, the effort is unlikely to 
succeed given the divisions in India’s polity and its weak government at present, 
since the government would then have to contend with a storm of critique. Hence, 
India’s strategic “ad hocism” is likely to continue, as the government continues to 
draw on such publications for inspiration in its deliberations in the absence of an 
over-arching strategic doctrine.
216
 This does not mean that there is no movement in 
the security field, and that India’s foreign policy does not have fixed points or 
interests, but it does reflect “a case of cautious prudence” (Mehta 2009). To this 
extent, India’s foreign policy will remain reactive, will be reckoned with India’s 
own economic well-being and capabilities, and will be cautious in keeping its 
strategic autonomy. 
8.3 India’s Perception of China 
India’s perception of China will not only affect its own policy towards China, but 
also have constitutive effect on China’s perception of India, which will in turn 
influence China’s policy towards India. 
8.3.1 China as a Significant Other 
China is for India a significant Other. The humiliation out of the 1962 war has been 
integrated in India’s nation-building process since the 1962. India has not forgotten 
its own defeat in the 1962 war, which shapes an enduring Indian perception that 
China is not to be trusted. The unsettled border is not only a geographic reality but 
also the psychological hurdle in India’s relations with China, leading to the danger 
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of seeing bilateral relations most through the lenses of the border issue and 
security. 
In India’s perception of China, there are also two frames of reference: a global 
one and a regional one. In South Asia, India has great concern over China’s 
influence and is wary of China’s links with neighbors such as Pakistan. Such 
preoccupation deepens its threat perception about China and its feeling of 
insecurity in South Asia, since for India threat comes from two sides 
simultaneously. In global politics, both countries have much in common, as both 
are rising powers and developing countries leading to similar positions in 
multilateral forums. In addition, they have similar historical experience as the 
victims of foreign invasion and subjugation, and face certain common problems 
such as environmental pollution, economic development, population and 
employment. 
Self-perception is the lense through which Others is defined. India perceives 
itself on par with China and thus China is a reference point for India in many 
respects including in foreign policy, domestic policy, security and economy. As it 
identifies itself as an emerging power, it also perceives China as a rising giant and   
competitor in India’s quest for international status. The complex perceptions of 
India for China are also reflected in the discourse of catching up with China, which 
many argue might take a long time, but it would be more sustainable in a 
democracy.
217
 With the increasing gap in military and strategic strength between 
India and China, the view that China is a major threat to India’s security has been 
gaining ground.
218
 However, there is also a duality on how Indians perceive China. 
According to the Indian Poll 2013, while 83% of respondents see their neighbor as 
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a security threat, it is also notable that 63% want India-China ties to improve, and 
only 9% think that the relationship is already too close. The poll also shows that 
while Indians are strongly attached to their democratic rights, there is also a degree 
of respect for aspects of China’s growth and development. In geopolitics, while 70% 
of poll respondents think China’s aim is to dominate Asia and 65% agree that India 
should work with other countries to limit China’s power, 64% also agree that India 
and China should cooperate to play a leading role in the world together.
219
 This 
result shows some positive signals in the relations that there are enough potential 
for cooperation between the two Asian giants. 
8.3.2 Three Positions 
With regards to India’s contemporary perceptions of China, there is a consensus 
across the Indian political spectrum for improving bilateral ties with its neighbor 
and for resolving Sino-Indian differences through dialogue – an aspiration that 
finds reflection in governmental policy.
220
 However, the official perspective hides 
a broader debate in India about how to deal with China through an attitude that 
drifts between two ends: on the one end, China is a respectable ancient civilization; 
on the other end, China is an aggressive and expansionist threat. 
 In general, there are three basic perceptual positions on China. Some scholars 
categorized them as pragmatists, hyper-realists and appeasers while others call 
these groups as mainstream, China-is-hostile and China-is-not-hostile factions 
(Hoffman 2004: 39–49; Malik 2003: 6–8).221 Although there are other labels to 
describe these different positions, the basic orientations are the same. These three 
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perceptual positions on China can be roughly associated with three strategic 
streams in India (Hoffmann 2004: 50), Nehruvianism, neo-liberalism, and 
hyperrealism, which I have already discussed in Chapter 5.  
China is not hostile 
India’s pro-China lobby consists of Communists, left-leaning academics, 
journalists, pacifists, anti-nuclear, anti-U.S. elements and idealists (Malik 2003). 
Increasing numbers of young Indian students in China and small-time-small-town 
business travellers have also lately emerged as a new pro-China lobby in India 
(Singh 2008: 86). To them, China is not an aggressive power that threatens or 
bullies its neighbors. Rather, China is a developing country seeking to improve the 
lives of its people, through a pragmatic project, that desires good relations with 
India in the long run. They have also a broad geopolitical interests in common, 
namely to ensure that Asia does not become either an arena of conflict between 
Asian countries themselves, or an object of Western influence once again. 
According to Hoffman (Hoffman 2004: 46), this position has also areas of overlap 
with the neo-liberal position, and contains a definite sense of realpolitik, such as 
that India too faces something of a strategic dilemma. However, they hold that 
engagement with China will modify Chinese policies more than encirclement, 
supporting minimalist and non-provocative defense and favoring a bilateral 
relationship based on common security concerns. In terms of this, India has to 
pursue a steady, patient course of diplomacy with China. 
Mainstream 
This position emphasizes economic engagement with China. Economics should be 
the key factor in India’s relations with China because intensifying trade and 
commerce would eventually raise the stakes for the country in its relationship with 
India. India will benefit from its economic relationship with China, and in addition 
will gain diplomatic leverage. This position does not deny that India and China are 
competitors but believe their aspirations are manageable. The Asia-Pacific region is 
big enough to accommodate both India and China’s aspirations. The position also 
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emphasizes the need to “emulate China” and has many takers in official circles, 
especially within the business lobby (Malik 2003: 5).  
According to this position, currently China inclines to have responsible and 
sober policies regarding India, but this may be likely to continue only for a limited 
time. China may be unwilling to acquiesce to the rise of India. From this 
perspective the country has been viewed as a potential threat or challenge to Indian 
interests in the long run, though currently China does not constitute a clear-cut, 
direct military threat to India. Overlapping with the “China is not hostile” position, 
this view also holds the notion that India and China share similar interests on many 
issues. Hence, there is the possibility for India and China to avert major future 
problems through diplomacy and other forms of appropriate action. 
China is hostile 
This position connects more closely to the hyperrealists’ strategic view, and sees 
China as a “clear and present danger” to India, far more so than Pakistan.222 
International relations, for hyperrealists, are basically a matter of conflict 
management among power-pursuing states. Many of those who hold this position 
are in the military establishment and strategic community. Hyperrealists believe 
that China will always undercut India militarily or economically. India and China 
are likely to come into conflict as their capabilities, ambitions and influences grow. 
The Chinese, in their view, only respect power. China is practicing strategic 
encirclement of India and is seeking top power position in Asia. Furthermore, this 
position tends to perceive Chinese pragmatism in foreign and security policy and 
economic modernization as merely tactical, and will be dispensed with when 
Beijing feels strong enough to use unilateral means. Hence, India must prepare 
itself militarily to deal with China, especially in air, naval, nuclear and space 
capabilities. Hyperrealists favor an Indian naval presence in the South China Sea, 
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some would go so far as to insist that India reopen the Tibet question and help 
counter China’s rule.  
Supporters of this view, also decry the mainstream position of “trade over 
security” as irrational. Moreover, the notion of joint Sino-Indian management of 
Asian security is treated as an illusion. For hyperrealists, an anti-China alliance 
with the United States is welcome in the near term. But in the long run, New Delhi 
must knit together a system of alliances, particularly in Asia, that will contain 
China with India playing the role of the linchpin to the system (Malik 2003). 
Perception on China may also be categorized amongst those representing 
official, academic, think-tanks, or business community; and perceptions of regional 
actors such as in India’s northeast could also be different from the center. However, 
we have to acknowledge that even in the same grouping, the view could be varied. 
For example, though generally the business community belongs to a pro-China 
lobby, some of its members focuses more on the negative impacts of China’s 
economic growth on India, while others have a more nuanced attitude. There are 
also sharp differences of opinion on China within the policy establishment. The 
MEA moves between the official political line and its own instincts, which are to 
mistrust China. The MOD favors a hawkish policy vis-à-vis China (Malik 2003). 
The comment of B. Raman (2009), who was the director of the Institute for 
Topical Studies, Chennai, indicates the connection between the perceptive 
positions on China in India and their impact on the relations:  
While the political leadership, the serving bureaucracy and the business class 
want to be forward-looking, large sections of the civil society and strategic 
analysts continue to be chained to the past and tend to discourage any forward 
movement. As a result, the relations are moving at variable speeds – a little 
faster in the case of the political leadership, the serving bureaucracy and the 
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business class and much slower in the case of the civil society and the 
non-governmental strategic analysts’ community.223 
8.3.3 Media and Public Opinion 
In India public opinion is playing an increasing role in foreign policy 
decision-making due to changes in India’s domestic polity, though foreign policy 
was dominated and continues to be dominated by the political elite (Kapur 2009). 
Since the late 1990s, there has been a dramatic increase of the private electronic 
media, which has had a significant impact on the national security and foreign 
policy discourse in the country (Baru 2009; Mohan 2009). In C. Raja Mohan’s 
words, the media “has become a potential brake on new initiatives as well as a 
facilitator of new moves by the government. This in turn has put a new premium on 
the political classes and the security establishment reaching out to the media and 
leveraging its influence” (Mohan 2009: 9).  
As we know, the perception of China in India is tendentially marked by 
mistrust. In recent years, this was further strengthened by the increasing distorted 
or misinformed reports on China by the Indian media.
224
 China was often 
portrayed as a security threat, the more positive issues like trade/commerce, 
economics, tourism, and science and technology are downplayed vis-à-vis security 
subjects and border disputes.
225
 Especially, there has been a surge in reports of 
Chinese border incursions in recent years, which has become the largest source of 
Indian public distrust of China. According to Global Times’ survey, “border” is the 
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most common word used in Indian media reports on China.
226
 The data of the 
World Public Opinion Surveys and the Pew Global Attitudes project confirmed this 
tendency. The World Public Opinion Surveys’ data shows that from 2006 to 2012 
Indian view of China’s influence in the world was increasingly negative (See 
Figure 8-2). The Pew Global Attitudes project found that from 2005 to 2012 
China’s favorability in India was declining (See Figure 8-3). Though these 
cross-national surveys suffer from their limitation, such as a small sample size and 
mainly urban samples, the result can to a certain extent reflect the reality in the 
recent years. A new opinion poll of Lowy Institute conducted between 30 August 
and 15 October 2012, which claims to be one of the most comprehensive surveys 
on the attitudes of Indian citizens towards their future in the world, reached the 
same result.
227
 
Nevertheless, what is behind this phenomenon? First of all, India’s media 
market has become highly competitive. News coverage of countries is increasingly 
influenced by revenue considerations (Baru 2009; Tang 2010). Thus for media, it is 
important to have stories that can attract viewers’ attention. In this context, 
authenticity and objectivity end up being sacrificed. Second, though the Indian 
Government approach is to “win” over the media to its point of view, the 
Government’s influence in shaping media thinking is declining (Baru 2009: 
278-279).
228
 Third, media can be manipulated by groups to advance their own 
interests. The fragmentation of political power in the center strengthened the 
media’s influence in shaping public attitude. Different sections of bureaucracy also 
leak information to media on a selective basis to shape public opinion for their own 
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advancement or for winning policy battles within the government (Mohan 2009).
229
 
In the case of diplomacy with China, some sections of bureaucracy and society 
may be unsatisfied with the government’s position, and push the government to 
react by using public opinion and media.
230
 Fourth, India does not have many 
foreign correspondents. Though China has emerged as India’s largest trade partner 
and is India’s biggest neighbor, only four media organizations had correspondents 
stationed in China by 2010.
231
 Hence most Indian media outlets had to depend on 
reports by Western media, and often viewed China from a Western perspective 
(Baru 2009: 282).
232
 With this said, it would be hyperbolic to state the media is  
the root of negative perceptions of China in India. Rather, the sense of mistrust has 
more to do with structural constraints in the relations, of which border dispute still 
holds significance. Public perception of China is shaped largely by political and 
strategic elites through the media. Their views thus become the views of the public, 
shared by a large cross-section of society. The representation of China in Indian 
media in fact reflects a large sense of anxiety on the part of Indian society about a 
rising China, and the challenges that this might entail. 
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Figure 8-2 Indians’ view of China’s influence in the World (Source: BBC World Service polls, 
2005-2012) 
 
 
Figure 8-3 China’s favorability in India (Source: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/, 2005-2012) 
 
8.4 India’s Foreign Policy Strategy towards China 
In general, China has remained high in India’s foreign policy priority list. Since 
Vajpayee’s China visit in 2003, India’s China policy has adopted a comprehensive 
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approach which is based on the mainstream position calling for constructive 
engagement with China. To establish a friendly and cooperative relationship with 
the country has become a consensus that cuts across ideologies and party lines and 
has remained fairly consistent over time (Bhattacharyya 2007: 695; Acharya 2013). 
In Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s words, “Our policy towards China is 
characterized by continuity and consensus.”233 It was Vajpayee, who first actively 
started the new initiative towards China, upgraded economic ties and attempted to 
solve difference with the country through dialogue. This line was continued by the 
Singh government because “…there is unanimity in this House regarding the 
importance of our relations with China. As I said in my Statement, our Government 
attaches great importance to the development of our relations with China. There is 
great scope for expansion of our economic interaction with this great neighbour of 
ours.” 234 He also acknowledged that, “There are risks, but I think, these risks will 
not deter us from moving forward, though we shall do so mindful of all the 
elements that go to influence this complex situation which we have to deal with.”235 
 The Indian government has gained parliament support of its cooperative policy 
with China. While engaging the country, India also follows the balance of power 
logic towards China. Since there are still issues in their relationship that can lead to 
military confrontation, India has not yet dismissed worries surrounding a worst 
case scenario. Hence, for India, security considerations have more weight in the 
relationship, because China is perceived as a serious security threat. The Indian 
Government has adopted a “balanced engagement” strategy in terms of the 
mainstream position of debates on China, in which both pro-China and 
China-hawks can find their positions.
236
 However, with regard to policies on 
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concrete issues, there is still the question of whether emphasis should be made 
more on balancing or on engagement, which challenges the Indian Government in 
terms of its China policy.
237
 As a result, India’s strategy towards China appears to 
be issue-centric, and the choice of strategy it uses depends on the merits of the 
issue.
238
 
 Moreover, foreign policy is much more an area of elite politics, where political 
elites feel they have fewer constraints in policy making. While the Indian 
government continues to expand ties with China, civil society still lags far behind. 
Hence, the scope of a constructive policy towards China is still constrained and 
undermined by persistent mistrust. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at India’s China policy from the perspective of foreign policy 
making, foreign policy strategy that guides its diplomacy, as well as India’s 
perception of China. These three aspects belong to the part of situation definition in 
a state’s foreign policy making, in which national identity and national interest 
make their presence felt. 
With regard to India’s foreign policy making, it is often characterized as 
personalized, ad hoc and reactive and hampered by poor coordination among the 
various institutions in the policy establishment. Decision-making authority 
concentrates in the Prime Minister, alongside with a small coterie of personal 
advisors and with the help of MEA. National Security Advisor who is appointed by 
Prime Minister has been playing an influential role in the making of foreign and 
security policies since 1998. Foreign policy actors have also diversified. Ministries 
such as Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, as well as 
regional parties have also increasing influence on foreign policy in recent years. In 
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the meaning time, in its democratic setting, India has a very active strategic 
community which mediates the elected leaders and the public, expresses their 
opinions and gives pressure on the Government on foreign policy issues. Hence, a 
considerable congruence between government policy and nongovernmental 
perceptions can be created. 
India’s foreign policy making provides the general political setting of India’s 
foreign policy formulation. Meanwhile, India’s foreign policy strategy cannot be 
separated from its strategic culture. Currently, the most popular description of 
India’s contemporary strategic culture is made by Kinti Bajpai. He summarized 
three mainstreams of strategic thinking in India, named Nehruvianism, 
neo-liberalism, and hyperrealism. Nehruvians believe that the state of “anarchy” 
can be mitigated through communications and cooperation between states; 
neoliberals emphasize the role of trade and economic interaction in the interstates’ 
relations; and the hyperrealists see the interstates’ relations through the lens of 
threat, conflict and rivalry. Since the 1990s, liberalism has gradually gained 
importance and there has been a tendency towards pragmatism, though 
Nehruvianism still keeps its relative weight in India’s foreign policy expressions. 
India’s current foreign policy is also facing many challenges. It is criticized by 
many observers that Indian Government is reluctance to articulate a grand strategy. 
There is a cumulative effort within Indian strategic community to push the 
government towards this way through various writings. However, the effort is 
unlikely to succeed given the divisions in India’s polity and its weak government at 
present. Hence, India’s strategic adhocism will continue, but this does not mean 
that India’s foreign policy does not have fixed points or interests. Instead, it reflects 
“a case of cautious prudence” by trying to keep its strategic autonomy and being 
pragmatic in terms of enhancing its capabilities. 
Comparing to China, India’s perceptual positions on China are more visible 
due to its democratic system. There are three perceptual positions on China, 
China-is-hostile, mainstream and China-is-not-hostile. These positions can be 
roughly associated with the three strategic streams. In general, China is for India a 
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significant Other, not only in terms of the size and population, but for being an 
ancient civilization and a rapidly rising developing country. India perceives itself 
on par with China, making its neighbor a reference point for India in many respects. 
Different from what can be witnessed in China, the 1962 border war has been 
deeply integrated in the national building process in India. The border issue with 
China was not only discussed widely in the public, but also had a massive impact 
on India’s security environment. It has shaped an enduring Indian perception that 
China is not to be trusted, and acted as a psychological hurdle for India in dealing 
with China. Although India-China ties have been strengthened in recent years, fear 
and suspicions of China have not been lessened, but intensified by the increasing 
distorted or misinformed reports on China on Indian media, especially on the 
border issue. However, the representation of China by the Indian media in fact 
reflects the anxiety of the Indian society about a rising China, and the problems and 
challenges in their relations. In short, the overall perception of China in India 
should not be considered as a very pessimistic one. There are also positive signs 
which imply the possibility of cooperation. Though China is perceived as a security 
threat only after Pakistan in India, there is also a degree of respect for aspects of 
China’s growth and development, just as many Indians perceive that there is 
enough potential for cooperation between the two Asian giants.  
Since Vajpayee’s China visit in 2003, India’s China policy has adopted a 
comprehensive approach which is based on the mainstream position calling for 
constructive engagement with China. This is also a consensus that cuts across 
ideologies and party lines and has gained the support of the parliament. In the 
government mid-line approach of “balanced engagement,” both pro-China and 
China-hawks can find their positions. However, there is still the question of 
whether emphasis should be made more on balancing or on engagement in concrete 
issue areas, which gives India’s strategy towards China an issue-centric appearance. 
Furthermore, the scope of a constructive policy towards China is still constrained 
and undermined by persistent mistrust. 
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9 Conclusion 
The objective of this thesis has been to explain the current development of bilateral 
relations by using the two core concepts of national identity and national interest. I 
have reviewed the historical development of India-China relations and focused on 
the period from 2003 to 2012. In this period, India-China relations have shown a 
mixed nature and gained a multifaceted character, with competition and 
cooperation acting in parallel ways. Sometimes one side is stronger, and sometimes 
they are equal in power and influence. At the governmental level, cooperation has 
become the dominant theme in their rhetoric towards each other. However, if we 
explore concrete issues, different issue areas show distinctive dynamics. For 
instance, in economic relations, cultural and educational issues, cooperation has 
been the major trend. Similarly, in multilateral negotiations, both countries have 
adopted the norm of multilateral cooperation. Still, cooperation has been easier in 
the international regimes rather than regional regimes because of a competitive 
mindset that is keen on keeping their traditional sphere of influence in the region; 
in energy issue, the initial driver was competition, but with time, one can witness a 
sense of interdependence that has led to eventual cooperation. As discussed in 
some detail, there have been some hard-core issues such as border issues, the 
“Tibet issue” and India-Pakistan-China triangle that I have argued to constrain 
India-China relations. These have marked sources of tension, conflicts and 
competition among the two Asian giants, constantly intervening the positive trend. 
The security dilemma has been persistent, though cooperation and mitigation of 
conflicts in these issues has been observable. 
After presenting the general picture of the current dynamics of India-China 
relations, I examined China’s and India’s objective national identities and interests. 
China’s and India’s national identity is based on a civilization state in a form of 
nation state, a developing country, a regional power and a rising power. Their 
identity as a developing country prescribes the importance of socio-economic 
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development; their identity as a rising power/emerging power means that the 
importance of improving its standing in the international community; their identity 
as a nation state and a regional power implies that in its way of dealing with 
security issue, both firmly uphold Westphalian principles, emphasizing territorial 
integrity, sovereignty, independence and autonomy, and care about its influence in 
the region which it seeks to dominate. 
Among all these national identities and interests, the national identity as 
emerging power and the national interest of economic development have gained 
prominence in recent foreign policy-making efforts and lay the ground for their 
cooperative approach towards each other at the governmental level. Their identities 
as modern states and regional powers prescribe the importance of the national 
security interest, which closely connects with realist understandings such as 
self-help and balance of power in the current international system. These realist 
understandings are still dominant in security related issues in their bilateral 
relations, and have spill-over effects on other non-security issues. This explains 
competition part of their relations. 
Set in this context, China’s and India’s policies towards each other do have 
defensive and competitive elements, but the mainstream is based on cooperation. 
Guided by practical cooperation, China has a strategy of gradual cooperation 
towards India, which is conducive to adjusting their differences and to maintaining 
a necessary room to manoeuvre, while also maintaining a deterrence capability. On 
the Indian side, India pursues a strategy of “balanced engagement,” yet there is still 
the question of whether emphasis should be made more on balancing or on 
engagement in concrete issue areas. Furthermore, the scope of a constructive policy 
towards China is still constrained and undermined by persistent mistrust. Moreover, 
though the overall framework is cooperative, the application of the cooperative 
approach depends on the nature of the individual issue, and whether there is the 
will of cooperation on both sides. In strategic and security issues, the dominant 
mindset is still driven by a realist interpretation of international relateions. The 
cooperative policy framework can to some extent lessen the tension and conflicts 
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or moderate positions in these issues, but it is difficult to alter the overall situation 
of these issues. 
In addition to China’s and India’s objective national identities and interests and 
their foreign policy strategies, the thesis has also explored their perceptions 
towards one another. Their perceptions imply a process of interaction between their 
government levels and societal levels, vertical as well as horizontal, in which the 
perception of the other will not only reflect their national identities and interests, 
but also affect one’s own policy towards the other. This, in turn, has constitutive 
effects on the other’s perception of it and the other’s policy towards it. Both in 
India and in China, there are different perceptual positions towards the other, which 
can be generally oriented towards engagement, the middle way, and calibrated 
competition. In China, the former one is dominant, represented by the Government 
and widely-held views shared in Chinese academia. In India, the middle way is 
more influential and is also reflected in the Government’s policy towards China. 
China’s official perception of India is neutral, and India is not a threat to China, 
though China follows India’s emergence with watchful eyes. What worries China 
is not India’s emergence in the realm of power, but India’s role between the US 
and China. In India’s perception of China, China has been a reference point for 
India in many respects not least because of its size and population, and the fact of 
being an ancient civilization which is now rapidly developing. Different from that 
in China, the 1962 border war has been deeply integrated in the national building 
process in India since then. The border issue shaped an enduring Indian perception 
that China is not to be trusted, and became a psychological hurdle for India in 
dealing with China. In policy making, “decision-makers tend to fit incoming 
information into their existing theories and images” (Jervis 1968: 455). Therefore, 
in India’s assessment, China has been a threat, whether China is rising or not. With 
China’s rising power, what worries India most is India’s relative power position 
vis-a-vis China. Though India-China ties have been strengthened in recent years, 
fear and suspicions of China have not been lessened, but strengthened by the 
increasing distorted or misinformed reports on China from the Indian media, 
181 
 
especially on the border issue. This, in turn, led to the negative image-making of 
India on the Chinese media and a puzzled perception of India in Chinese public 
that India is not very friendly towards China. Their public perceptions in fact 
reflect the current dilemma and structural constraints in India-China relations, and 
the lack of trust and understanding on the people-to-people level. 
9.1 Prospects and Challenges 
In an era of globalization, the prospects for India-China cooperation should be very 
wide and positive. Both are the most populous developing countries in the globe, 
giving them common ground for cooperation in many issues. For both India and 
China, the contemporary priority is the domestic development, to continue the 
domestic reforms and to address the needs of their population so that they can keep 
the pace of the current development and enhance their comprehensive power in the 
international system. By fostering deeper, long-term ties will help both nations to 
focus on domestic issues, and to explore each other’s market for further economic 
growth. Both are neighbors and old civilizations that have intensive cultural and 
trade ties going back to the past. This is also a positive point that is often 
mentioned by both sides that relations will benefit from more exploration of the 
historical and cultural ties so that both can learn from the past for developing 
indigenous understandings about each other. Furthermore, India and China’s 
cooperation is also important for peace and development in Asian and the world. 
As India’s National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon commented:  
When you look at the range of India-China engagement… the fact at how 
peaceful that border is… the fact that we have made progress even on the 
boundary settlement discussions… the kind of congruence we have on several 
international issues and the way we work together on it, then you get a more 
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balanced picture of the relationship, of its potential, for us and, for them, for 
the region, for the world, that it can actually do good together.
239
 
However, the scope of India-China engagement is still constrained by some 
major issues, such as the border dispute, the China-Pakistan-India relations, the 
Tibet problem and the US’s role in Asia. At the ideational level, the lack of trust 
and confidence between the two countries, the realist understandings of self-help 
and balance of power, of inevitability of conflict between two rising powers Asia, 
continue to influence perceptions in India and in China. All these structural 
constraints cannot be easily removed. Hence, India-China relations will move at 
varied speeds, with some sections faster than the others, but towards greater 
convergence than divergence. 
9.2 Policy Recommendations 
Based on the current reality of India-China relations, some aspects should be 
further promoted. First of all, both governments should take the lead to improve 
mutual understanding between the two nations. To be sure, improved mutual 
understanding will not definitely create harmony or reduce differences of interests, 
but in the context of their interdependence, it can at least help reduce the danger of 
acting on imagined rather than real conflicts of interests and of unnecessarily 
aggravating the security dilemma. Needless to say, the Chinese and Indian 
governments should be concerned about the convergence and divergence of their 
perceptions towards each other and the impact of the perception gap on the 
relations. Since India feels more threatened by China than China by India, the 
Chinese government needs to learn how to convey its often neutral and at times, 
positive feelings to the Indians, and win the confidence from India. Here is also 
important to mention the communication deficit due to an information deficit 
between the two countries. Given the lack of interaction in the contemporary 
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history of their relations, very little understanding or knowledge exists on either 
sides about the other. This lack of information hinders the effective communication 
both at the political level and the civil society level. This kind of gap should be 
bridged through the common efforts from both governments by enhancing 
people-to-people level interaction. There is still much space to be explored in this 
area, and one has reason to feel cautiously optimistic when considering the growing 
number of Indians visiting China for work, education and tourism. Moreover, both 
sides should strengthen their area studies programs about each other, developing 
the indigenous understanding about each other’s culture and society. 
 Second, both sides should look beyond the “hard” issues such as border and 
security, and start gradual cooperation along “soft” issues via pragmatism. The 
difficulties in border issue should not block the development in other issues. A 
possible way is to start with functional and small-steps cooperation in some areas, 
in which there are more common interests or complementarities, so that 
cooperation is easier to be started with and achieved. Through cooperation in a 
“soft” issue, mutual trust and win-win mindset could be gradually fostered, and the 
incremental positive experiences will also to some extent prevent the spill-over 
effect of realist notions from spreading into other issues except security-related 
issues.  
 Third, both sides should consolidate the existing institutions and explore the 
possibilities of new mechanisms. Over the past years, intensive exchanges between 
top leaders have been institutionalized. At the ministerial level, the two foreign 
ministries have instituted dialogue mechanisms on issues relating to 
counter-terrorism, policy planning and security, besides strategic dialogue and 
regular consultations. In the economic domain, there are the India-China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue (SED) and the India-China Joint Economic Group (JEG) to 
foster trade and investment. On the border issue, there are Special Representatives’ 
talks and consultation and coordination mechanisms on the border to mitigate the 
conflicts and to maintain a peaceful border. Shortly before the completion of this 
thesis, the two countries signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in 
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October 2013 that will further strengthen maintenance of stability on the border. 
With the expansion of communication and dialogue in new areas, new mechanisms 
will continue to emerge, adding to current institutions in the bilateral relations. Yet 
many mechanisms still stay on paper and have not been properly implemented. 
Hence, a better coordination within and between the governments is needed for 
implementation and problem solution. Moreover, institutional-building is also 
taking place at the multilateral level. In fact, bilateral relations cannot be separated 
from the multilateral context. India and China are both members of multilateral 
frameworks and they need to accommodate to each other, making concessions in 
some issues to benefit from others in these frameworks. Constrained by the 
multilateral frameworks, they will appeal rather to peaceful means than to the use 
of force to solve their differences. Thus, institution-building should also be 
strengthened at the multilateral level.  
In closing, we should ask what India and China can learn from each other, but 
not who can get ahead of the other. However, while recognizing the existence of 
competition we should also see competition in positive terms – i.e. turn rivalry into 
healthy competition, and compete against the “Self” rather than against others. 
India’s Prime Minister Vajpayee captured this spirit in 2003: 
But we need to clearly understand the difference between healthy competition 
and divisive rivalry. … We should focus on the simple truth that there is no 
objective reason for discord between us, and neither of us is a threat to the 
other. These simple, but profound, principles should form the bedrock of the 
future India-China partnership.
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However, the development of India-China relations since then has showed that they 
are still far from a healthy mode of competition, being described by Acharya (2013) 
as entering a “strategic stasis.” However, we have also witnessed that positive 
trends have been emerging and ties between the two countries have been 
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strengthening. As Wendt (1992) famously said: “anarchy is what states make of it,” 
and self-help is not the only logic in the international system, being thus open to 
the possibility of multiple logics. Agents, that are states, are seen as being capable 
of making a difference in the international structure. Hence, important are the 
shared ideas or cultures, which are generated by the interactions among state actors, 
that define their relationship. As to the future of India-China relations, their 
political leadership should take the initiative to foster a shared culture between 
them that is based on reciprocity and win-win scenarios by creating common 
interests. This is the fundamental path through which India and China can get out 
of their current strategic inertia and stasis in the direction of mutually-beneficial 
strategic acceleration.
186 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
Acharya, Alka (2011), “Course Correction: An Analysis of the Origins and 
Implications of the Sino–Indian Agreements of 2003 and 2005,” China 
Report 47(2): 159-171. 
Acharya, Alka (2013), “The Strategic Stasis in the India-China Relationship,” 
Economic and Political Weekly 48(26-27): 25-29. 
Asher, C. B. and Cynthia Talbot (2008), India Before Europe, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ashley, Richard K. (1984), “The Poverty of Neo-realism,” International 
Organization 38(2): 225-286.  
Bajpai, Kanti (1998), “India: Modified Structuralism,” in Alagappa, Muthiah (ed.), 
Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford: 
Standford University Press. 
Bandyopadhyaya, Jayantanuja (2003), The Making of India’s Foreign Policy, New 
Delhi: Allied Publishers. 
Barnett, Michael (2005), “Social Constructivism,” in Baylis, John, and Steve Smith 
(eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Baru, Sanjaya (2009), “The Influence of Business and Media on Indian Foreign 
Policy,” India Review 8(3): 266-285. 
Baxter, Craig et al. (2002), Government and Politics in South Asia, Boulder, San 
Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press. 
Beard, Charles A. (1934), The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in 
American Foreign Policy, New York: Macmillan. 
Beard, Charles A. (1935), The Open Door At Home: A Trial Philosophy of 
National Interest, New York: Macmillan. 
Benton, Ted (1981), “Objective Interests and the Sociology of Power,” Sociology 
187 
 
15: 161-184. 
Bhattacharyay, Biswa and Prabir De (2005), “Promotion of Trade and Investment 
between People's Republic of China and India,” CESifo Working Paper No. 
1508, available at 
http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoW
P.html.  
Bhattacharyya, Sanjay (2007), “India and China: New Directions,” in Sinha, Atish 
and Madhup Mohta (eds.), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and 
Opportunities, New Delhi: Academic Foundation. 
Brewster, David (2012), “India as an Asia-Pacific Power,” London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Burgess, Stephen F (2009), “India and South Asia,” in Pant, Harsh V. (ed.), India’s 
Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, London and New York: Routledge.  
Cai, Fang, et al. (2009), “Employment and Inequality Outcomes in China,” 
Institute of Population and Labour Economics, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, available at http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/42546043.pdf. 
Carr, E.H. (1945), Nationalism and After, London: MacMillan. 
Chafetz, Glenn et al. (eds.) (1999), The Origins of National Interests, London: 
Frank Cass.  
Chakraborty, Debashis and Dipankar Sengupta (2006), IBSAC (INDIA, BRAZIL, 
SOUTH AFRICA, CHINA): A Potential Developing Country Coalition in 
WTO Negotiations, CSH Occasion Paper, No. 18, French Research Institutes 
in India. 
Chaturvedi, Gyaneswar (1991), India-China Relations: 1947 to Present Day, Agra: 
MGP.  
Checkel, Jeffery T. (1998), “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations 
Theory,” World Politics 50(2): 324-348. 
Clinton, W. David (1994), The Two Faces of National Interest, Baton Rouge and 
London: Louisiana State University Press. 
Cohen, Stephen P. (2001), Emerging Power India, Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
188 
 
Institution Press.  
Commuri, Gitika (2010), Indian Identity Narratives and the Politics of Security, 
London: Sage Publications. 
Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison (2002), The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, 
Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 
Connolly, William (1983), “The Import of Contests over ‘Interest’,” in Connolly, 
The Terms of Political Discourse, pp. 46-83, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Dabhade, Manish and Harsh V. Pant (2004), “Coping with Challenges to 
Sovereignty: Sino-Indian Rivalry and Nepal’s Foreign Policy,” 
Contemporary South Asia 13(2): 157-169. 
Dahiya, Rumel (2012), “Reforming the Military Institutions and National Security 
Strategy,” in Venkatshamy, Krishnappa and Princy George (eds.), Grand 
Strategy for India: 2020 and beyond, New Delhi: Pentagon Security 
International. 
Danilovic, Vesna (2008), “National Interest,”  in Griffiths, Martin (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics, London: 
Routledge. 
Dass, Sujata K. (2004), Atal Bihari Vajpayee: Prime Minister of India, Kalpaz 
Publications, Delhi.  
Deepak, B. R. (2005), India & China (1904-2004): A Century of Peace and 
Conflict, New Delhi: Manak. 
Deng, Yong (2000), “Escaping the Periphery: China’s National Identity in World 
Politics,” in Hu, Weixing et al. (eds.), China’s International Relations in the 
21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts, Lanham: University Press of 
America. 
Deng, Yong (2005), “Better Than Power: ‘International Status’ in Chinese Foreign 
Policy”, in Deng, Yong and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), China Rising: Power and 
Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, Lanham and Boulder: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
189 
 
Deshingkar, G. D. (1979), “India-China: The Security Dimension,” China Report 
15(2): 69-75.  
Dittmer, Lowell and Samuel Kim (eds.) (1993), China’s Quest for National 
Identity, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Dreyer, June Teufel (2008), China’s Political System: Modernization and Tradition, 
New York: Pearson Longman. 
Erikson, Erik H. (1959), Identity and the Life Cycle, New York, Norton. 
Evans, Graham and Jeffery Newnham (1998), The Penguin Dictionary of 
International Relations, London: Penguin. 
Frankel, Joseph (1970), National Interest, London: Pall Mall Press. 
Frey, Kasten (2006), India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security, London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Friedberg, Aron L. (2005), “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict 
Inevitable?” International Security, 30(2): 7-45. 
Gandhi, Arun (1983), The Morarji Papers: Fall of the Janata Government, New 
Delhi: Vision Books. 
Ganguly, Sumit (1994), “The Prime Minister and Foreign and Defence Policies,” in 
Manor, James, Nehru to the Nineties: The Changing Office of Prime Minister 
in India, London: Hurst & Company. 
Ganguly, Sumit (2004), “India and China: Border Issues, Domestic Integration, and 
International Security,” in Frankel, Francine R. and Harry Harding, The 
India-China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ganguly, Sumit (2008), “The Rise of India in Asia,” in Shambaugh, David and 
Michael Yahuda (eds.), International Relations of Asia, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2008. 
Garver, John W. (2001), Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth 
Century, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press.  
Garver, John (2004), “China’s Kashmir Policies,” India Review 3(1): 1-24. 
190 
 
George K. Tanham (1992), Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay, Santa 
Monica: RAND. 
George, Alexander and Rober Keohane (1980), “The Concept of National Interest: 
Uses and Limitations,” in George, Alexander, Presidential Decisionmaking 
in Foreign Policy, Boulder: Westview. 
Gilboy, George J. and Eric Heginbotham (2012), Chinese and Indian Strategic 
Behavior, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Gupta, Karunakar (1974), The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier, Calcutta: 
Minerva. 
Guruswamy, Mohan et al. (2003), “Can India Catch up with China?” Economic 
and Political Weely 38(45): 4749-4751. 
Han, Hua [韩华] (2002), “Friendly Neighbors or Security Threat – How do India 
and China See Each Other (友好邻邦还是安全威胁——中印如何看待对
方),” South Asian Studies [南亚研究] (2): 6-13. 
Hardgrave, Robert L. and Standey A. Kochanek (2008), “India: Government and 
Politics in a Developing Nation,” 7th edn, Boston: Thomson/Wadsworth. 
Hoffmann, Stanley (1978), Primacy or World Order: American Foreign Policy 
Since the Cold War, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Holslag, Jonathan (2010), China and India: Prospects for Peace, New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
Jacob, Jabin T. (2012), “India’s China Policy: Time to Overcome Political Drift,” 
Policy Paper, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang 
Technological University, available at 
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/policy_papers/Time%20to%20Overcome
%20Political%20Drift.pdf. 
Jain, B.M. (2004), “India-China relations: Issues and Emerging Trends,” The 
Round Table 374: 253-269. 
Jepperson, Ronald L. et al. (1996), “National Identity, and Culture in National 
Security,” in Katzenstein, Peter (ed.), The Culture of National Security, New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
191 
 
Jervis, Robert (1968), “Hypotheses on Misperception,” World Politics 20(3): 
454-479. 
Jetly, Nancy (1979), India-China Relations: 1947-1977, New Delhi: Radiant 
Publishers. 
Jha, Nalini Kant (2002), Domestic Imperatives in India’s Foreign Policy, Colorado 
Springs: International Academic Publishers. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain (1995), Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand 
Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Jones, Rodney W. (2006), India’s Strategic Culture, SAIC, available at 
https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dtra/india.pdf. 
Kanti, Bajpai (2010a), “India and the World,” in Jayal, Niraja Gopal and Pratap 
Bhanu Mehta (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
Kanti, Bajpai (2010b), “Indian Grand Strategic Thought: Six Approaches in Search 
of a Core?” paper presented at the conference on “India’s Grand Strategic 
Thought: Past, Present, Future,” organized by the Institute for Defence 
Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, and the Institute for Defence 
Studies, Oslo, held in Oslo, September 8-11, 2010.  
Kapur, Harish (1994), Indian Foreign Policy 1947–92: Shadows and Substance, 
New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Kapur, Harish (2009), Foreign Policies of India’s Prime Ministers, New Delhi: 
Lancer International. 
Kapur, Devesh (2009), “Public Opinion and Indian Foreign Policy,” India Review 
8(3): 286-305. 
Kaul, T.N. (1991), Indo-Soviet Relations: Prospects and Problems, New Delhi: 
Patriot Publishers. 
Khilnani, Sunil (1997), The Idea of India, London: Hamish Hmilton. 
Khilnani, Sunil (2010), “Politics and National Identity,” in Jayal, Niraja Gopal and 
Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Politics in India, New 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
192 
 
Khokhar, Amna Yusaf (2011), “Sino-Indian Relations: Implications for Pakistan,” 
paper presented at the seminar on “Pakistan-China Relations – 2011: Year of 
Friendship,” organised by the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, 
available at 
http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1299745166_57265659.pdf. 
Klotz, Audie and Cecelia Lynch (2007), Strategies for Research in Constructivists 
International Relations, Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe. 
Kower, Paul (1999), “The Three Faces of Identity,” in Chafetz, Glenn et al. (eds.) 
(1999), The Origins of National Interests, London: Frank Cass. 
Kratochwil, F. (1989), Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions of 
Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic 
Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Krauthammer, Charles (1990), “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs 70(1): 
23-33. 
Krishna, S.M. (2009), “India’s Foreign Policy Priorities,” India Quaterly 65 (4): 
345-49. 
Kumar, Radha (2008), “India as A Foreign Policy Actor - Normative Redux,” 
CEPS Working Document, No. 285, available at 
http://aei.pitt.edu/7585/1/Wd285.pdf. 
Kumaraswamy, P.R. (2007), “India’s Energy Cooperation with China: The 
Slippery side,” China Report 43(3): 349-352. 
Lamb, Alastair (1964), The China-India Border, London: Oxford University Press.  
Lampton, David M. (2001), “China’s Foreign and National Security Policy-Making 
Process: Is It Changing, and Does It Matter?” in Lampton (ed.), The Making 
of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000,  
Standford: Standford University Press. 
Lee, Jae-hyung (2002), “China’s Expanding Ambitions in the Western Pacific and 
the Indian Ocean,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24(3): 549-568. 
Lei, Guang (2004), “From National Identity to National Security: China’s 
Changing Responses toward India in 1962 and 1998,” The Pacific Review 
193 
 
17(3): 399-422.  
Leonard, Mark (2008), What Does China Think? New York: PublicAffairs. 
Li, Junyong [李俊勇] and Siwei Liu [刘思伟] (2008), “Understanding and 
Perception of the Sino-Indian Relations (中印关系理解与认知),” South 
Asian Studies [南亚研究] (1):36-41. 
Li, Li (2009), Security Perception and China-India Relations, New Delhi: KW 
Publishers. 
Liu, Xuecheng (1994), Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations, 
Lanham: University Press of America. 
Lu, Ning (2001), “The Central Leadership, Supraministry Coordinating Bodies, 
State Council Ministries, and Party Departments,” in Lampton, David M. 
(ed.), The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of 
Reform, 1978-2000, Standford: Standford University Press. 
Mair, Victor H. (1991) “What Is a Chinese “Dialect/Topolect”? Reflections on 
Some Key Sino-English Linguistic Terms,” Sino-Platonic Papers, 
Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, University of 
Pennsylvania, available at 
http://sino-platonic.org/complete/spp029_chinese_dialect.pdf.  
Malik, J. Mohan (1999), India-China Relations in the 21st Century: The 
Continuing Rivalry, New Delhi: Orient Longman. 
Malik, J. Mohan (2003), “Eyeing the Dragon: India’s China Debate,” Asia-Pacific 
Center for Security Studies, available at 
http://www.apcss.org/Publications/SAS/ChinaDebate/ChinaDebate_Malik.pd
f.  
Malone, David M. (2011), Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian 
Foreign Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Mansingh, Surjit and Steven I. Levine (1989), “China and India: Moving Beyond 
Confrontation,” Problems of Communism, 38(2-3): 30-49. 
Mansingh, Surjit (2005), India-China Relations in the Context of Vajpayee’s 2003 
Visit, The Sigur Center Asia Papers, No. 21, The Sigur Center for Asian 
194 
 
Studies, George Washington University, available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~sigur/assets/docs/scap/SCAP21-Mansingh.pdf. 
Markey, Daniel (2009), “Developing India’s Foreign Policy ‘Software’,” Asia 
Policy, No. 8, pp. 73-96.  
Maxwell, Neville (1970), India’s China War, London: Jonathan Cape.  
McCullagh, C. Bejam (1991), “How Objective Interests Explain Actions,” Social 
Science Information 30: 29-54. 
Mehta, Pratap Bhanu (2009), “Still Under Nehru’s Shadow? The Absence of 
Foreign Policy Frameworks in India,” India Review 8(3): 209-233. 
Mishra, Pramod Kumar (2000), “Responding to the Changing Global Milieu: From 
Nehru to Vajpayee,” in Jha, Nalini Kant (ed.), India’s Foreign Policy in a 
Changing World, New Delhi: South Asian Publishers. 
Mistry, Dinshaw (2004), “A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of India as an 
Emerging World Power,” India Review 3(1): 65-87. 
Mitra, Subrata K. (2003), “The Reluctant Hegemon: India’s Self-perception and the 
South Asian Strategic Environment,” Contemporary South Asia 12(3): 399 - 
417. 
Mitra, Subrata K. (2009), “Nuclear, Engaged, and Non-Aligned: Contradiction and 
Coherence in India’s Foreign Policy,” India Quarterly 65(1): 15-35. 
Mitra, Subrata K. (2011), “Democracy’s Resilience: Tradition, Modernity, and 
Hybridity in India,” Harvard International Review 32 (4): 46-53. 
Mohan, C. Raja (2003), Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New 
Foreign Policy, New Delhi: Penguin Books India. 
Mohan, C. Raja (2009), “The Making of Indian Foreign Policy: The Role of 
Scholarship and Public Opinion,” ISAS (Institute of South Asian Studies) 
Working Paper, No. 73, National University of Singapore. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1951), In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical 
Examination of American Foreign Policy, New York: Alfred A. Knopf.  
Morgenthau, Hans J. (1978), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and 
Peace, 5th rev. edn, New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
195 
 
Nachane, D.M. (2011), India Development Report 2011, Oxford and New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press. 
Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V. Paul (2003), India in the World Order: Searching for 
Major Power Status, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nayyar, Deepak (2008), Liberalization and Development, New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press.  
Nehru, Jawaharlal (1956), The Discovery of India, 6th edn, Calcutta, Signet Pr.  
Neumann, Iver B. and Henrikki Heikaa (2005), “Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, 
Practice, The Social Roots of Nordic Defence,” Cooperation and Conflict 40 
(1): 5-23. 
Norbu, Dawa (1998), “After Nationalism? Elite Beliefs, State Interests, and 
International Politics,” International Studies 35(3): 295-315.  
Noronha, Ligia and Yongxiang Sun (2008), “The India-China Energy Dialogues of 
2006 and 2007: A Report,” China Report 44(1): 47-52. 
Nye, Joseph S. (1990), “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy 90(80): 153-171. 
Nye, Joseph S. (2003), The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only 
Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Onuf, Nicholas (1989), World of Our Making, Columbia: University of South 
Carolina. 
Pant, Harsh V. (2006), “Indian Foreign Policy and China,” Strategic Analysis 30(4): 
760-780. 
Parekh, Bhikhu (2010), “Re-imagining India,” in Sen, Amartya et al., Re-imagining 
India and Other Essays, New Delhi: Orient BlackSwan. 
Perkovich, George (1999), India’s Nuclear Bomb, Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Ramesh, Jairam (2005), Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India, 
New Delhi: Indian Research Press.  
Randol, Shaun (2008), “How to Approach the Elephant: Chinese Perceptions of 
India in the Twenty-first Century,” Asian Affairs 34(4): 211-226. 
196 
 
Ranganathan, C. V., and Vinod C. Khanna (2000), India and China: The Way 
Ahead after ‘Mao’s India War’, New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications. 
Rosenau, J. N. (1968), National Interest, New York: Macmillian. 
Ruggie, J. G. (1983), “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward 
a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics 35 (2): 261-285. 
Rusko, Chritopher J. and Karthika Sasikumar (2007), “India and China: From 
Trade to Peace?” Asian Perspective 31(4): 99-123.  
Sachdeva, Gulshan (2006), “Attitude towards China’s Growing Influence in 
Central Asia,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4(3): 224-259. 
Saigal, J. R. (1979), The Unfought war of 1962, New Delhi: Allied Publishers.  
Saighal, Vonod (2004), “Reappraising the Idea of India,” in Debroy, Bibek and D. 
Shyam Babu, (eds.), The India Mosaic: Searching for and Identity, pp. 
153-172, New Delhi: Academic Foundation.  
Sardesai, Rajdeep (2006), “Manipulations and Bias in News,” in Sahay, Uday (ed.), 
Making News: Handbook of the Media in Contemporary India, Oxford 
University Press.  
Scott, David (2011), Handbook of India’s International Relations, London and 
New York: Routledge. 
Shambaugh, David (2005), Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh and Jing-dong Yuan (2001), “Resolving the 
Sino-Indian Border Dispute,” Asian Survey 41(2): 351-376.  
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh and Jing-dong Yuan (2003), China and India: 
Cooperation or Conflict? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Singh, Bhupendra Kumar (2010), “Energy Security and India-China Cooperation,” 
International Association for Energy Economics, available at 
http://www.iaee.org/en/publications/fullnewsletter.aspx?id=13.  
Singh, Nitya (2012), “How to Tame Your Dragon: An Evaluation of India's 
Foreign Policy Toward China,” India Review 11(3): 139-160. 
Smith, Steve (1986), “Theories of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview,” 
197 
 
Review of International Studies 12(1): 13-29. 
Song, Dexing [宋德星] (2008), “Realism Orientation and Moral Standards - On the 
Dual Characteristics of Strategic Culture in India (现实主义取向与道德尺度 
- 论印度战略文化的二元特征),” South Asian Studies [南亚研究] (1): 9-15. 
Stein, Burton (1998), A History of India, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Subrahmanyam, K. (2005), Shedding Shibboleths: India’s Evolving Strategic 
Outlook, Delhi: Wordsmiths. 
Sun, Yun (2013), “Chinese National Security Decision-Making: Processes and 
Challenges,” The Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy 
Studies, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2013/05/chinese-national-security-
decision-making-sun. 
Swamy, Subramanian (2001), India’s China Perspective, New Delhi: Konark 
Publishers. 
Tang, Lu [唐璐] (2004), “The Preferences of Chinese Media Reports on India and 
Their Impact on Chinese Public (中国媒体对印度报道的偏好及其对公众
的影响),” South Asian Studies [南亚研究] (1): 68-73. 
Tang, Lu [唐璐] (2010), “Perception of China of India’s Mainstream English 
Media Reports and Public Opinion (印度主流英文媒体报道与公众舆论对
华认知),” South Asian Studies [南亚研究] (1): 1-13. 
Thapar, Romila (1966), A History of India, vol. 1, London: Penguin Books. 
Trubowitz, Peter (1998), Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in 
American Foreign Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Turner, John C. (1985), “Social Categorization and the Self-Concept: A Social 
Cognitive Theory of Group Behavior,” in Lawler, Edward J. (ed.), Advances 
in Group Processes, vol. 2, Greenwich: JAI Press. 
Vermani, Arvind 2006, “India-China Economic Cooperation,” in Aziz, Jahangir et 
al. (eds.), India and China: Learning from Each other, Wahington, DC: 
International Monetary fund.  
198 
 
Wagner, Christian (2005), “From Hard Power to Soft Power? Ideas, Interaction, 
Institutions, and Images in India’s South Asia Policy,” Heidelberg Papers in 
South Asian and Comparative Politics, Working Paper No. 26. 
Wang, Hongying (2005), “National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy,” 
in Deng, Yong and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), China Rising: Power and 
Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy, Lanham & Boulder: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Weldes, Jutta (1996), “Constructing National Interest,” European Journal of 
International Relations 2(3): 275-318. 
Wendt, Alexander (1992), “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46(2): 391-425. 
Wendt, Alexander (1999), Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Whiting, Allen S. (1992), “Foreign Policy of China,” in Macridis, Roy C. (ed.), 
Foreign Policy in World Politics, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Wiggins, David (1985), “Claims of Need,” in T. Honderrich (ed.), Morality and 
Objectivity, London: RKP. 
Woodman, Dorothy (1969), Himalayan Fontiers: A Political Review of British, 
Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries, London, Barrie, and Rockliff: The 
Cresset Press. 
Wu, Xinbo (2009), “Chinese Perspectives on Building an East Asian Community 
in the Twenty-first Century,” in Green, Michael J. and Bates Gill (eds.), 
Asia’s New Multilateralism: Cooperation, Competition, and the Search for 
Community, New York: Columbia University Press. 
Ye, Zhengjia (1998), “Clearing the Atmosphere,” Frontline 15(21): 7-10.  
Zhang, Guihong (2006), “The Rise of China: India’s Perceptions and Responses,” 
South Asian Survey 13(1): 93-102. 
Zhang, Minqiu [张敏秋] (2004), Sino-Indian Relations: 1947-2003 (中印关系研
究: 1947-2003), Beijing: Peking University Press (北京大学出版社). 
199 
 
Zhao, Gancheng [赵干城] (2008), “Brief Analysis of China’s Strategy towards 
India (中国对印度战略浅析),” South Asian Studies [南亚研究] (1):3-8. 
Zhao, Gancheng [赵干城] (2011), “How does China Appraise the Rising of India 
(中国如何估量印度的崛起),” Southeast Asian and South Asian Studies [东
南亚和南亚研究] (3):21-24. 
Zhao, Weiwen [赵蔚文] (2000), Records of Turbulences in Sino-Indian Relations: 
1949–1999 (印中关系风云录: 1949-1999), Beijing: Current Affairs (时事出
版社).  
 
